Narrative:

I was working the west approach position of dca and had just assumed control of the position. Large transport X was on downwind to runway 18 on a northwest heading at 9000'. Large transport Y was inbound over the armel VOR and instructed to fly a heading of 070 degrees at 8000'. I was involved with handing off a military aircraft to daa and instructed large transport X to descend to 5000'. I finished with the aircraft to daa and observed large transport X and large transport converging. I told large transport X to turn right to a heading of 050 degrees and told large transport Y to descend. My transmission to large transport Y was blocked and I told large transport X to expedite his turn and told large transport Y to descend to 5000' and expedite through 6000'. Things were not progressing as I hoped and in desperation I told large transport X to stop descent and told large transport Y to turn immediately left to heading 350 degrees. At this point large transport Y said that he had seen the traffic and that they had already passed. At this point the conflict terminated. In follow up, large transport Y said that he had taken evasive action. Everything that I had tried to do did not work to resolve the situation. I believe that if my first transmission to large transport Y had been received, the situation would not have been as serious as it turned out; however, there is no way to be sure. Supplemental information from acn 152645: large transport X was being vectored on downwind to the lda approach to runway 18 at dca. Approach control cleared us to 5000', right turn to 050 degrees. They asked us to expedite the descent. As I detected a tone of urgency in his voice, I pulled the spoilers out and descended as rapidly as possible at the assigned speed of 210 KTS. Approaching 6000' we were told to stop our descent and issued traffic at 10 O'clock. As I was stowing the spoilers and pulling up, the second officer pointed to the traffic (large transport Y) and said, 'don't pull up--go down!!' I saw the traffic and pushed down. The large transport Y appeared to be pulling up. It went over us at less than 300' about 2 seconds after I first saw it. If we had not taken action, I believe that we would have hit. We were vectored across the lda course and back to the approach behind the large transport Y. We landed west/O further incident. The first officer and I were busy at the time and I believe that the actions of the second officer prevented a midair. Supplemental information from acn 153210: the second officer threw off his restraints and looked out the window. He immediately said, 'don't pull up, go down.' the large transport Y crew told approach control that we had come very close (possibly within 100'). The controller said, 'I know, but stick with me and I'll get it straightened out,' and to his credit, he did. The second officer probably prevented a midair with his quick action. Supplemental information from acn 152683: after passing armel VOR at 8000' heading 100 degrees. We were cleared to turn left to 070 degrees and descend to 5000', and to descend to 5000' and expedite through 6000'. We then heard ATC say to large transport X level off immediately. We then saw large transport X at our 2 O'clock low in right turn and appeared to be climbing approximately 200' below us. I immediately added power and pulled back to climb and turned hard right to go over the large transport X aircraft to 8300'. I feel that if we did not take evasive action we would have been struck by the large transport X aircraft. My copilot kept telling me to keep pulling up harder. My airspeed decreased to 210 KTS. There was a controller change shortly after this occurred. The controller seemed to be under an extremely heavy workload and having a difficult time keeping up with the overall situation. WX was very hazy and flight visibility 304 mi maximum. Supplemental information from acn 152381: by the controller's action and our pulling up, a midair was avoided. Sometimes it is hard to make an absolute statement. However, the chain of events that make midairs were all there. I'm just glad that the chain was broken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR AND 5 FLT CREW REPORTS DESCRIBE CLOSE NMAC BETWEEN 2 LGTS BEING VECTORED FOR APCH INTO DCA DUE TO CTLR DISTR WITH OTHER TRAFFIC, AND HIS INABILITY TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION BECAUSE OF FREQ CONGESTION AND BLOCKED TRANSMISSION.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE W APCH POS OF DCA AND HAD JUST ASSUMED CTL OF THE POS. LGT X WAS ON DOWNWIND TO RWY 18 ON A NW HDG AT 9000'. LGT Y WAS INBND OVER THE ARMEL VOR AND INSTRUCTED TO FLY A HDG OF 070 DEGS AT 8000'. I WAS INVOLVED WITH HANDING OFF A MIL ACFT TO DAA AND INSTRUCTED LGT X TO DSND TO 5000'. I FINISHED WITH THE ACFT TO DAA AND OBSERVED LGT X AND LGT CONVERGING. I TOLD LGT X TO TURN RIGHT TO A HDG OF 050 DEGS AND TOLD LGT Y TO DSND. MY XMISSION TO LGT Y WAS BLOCKED AND I TOLD LGT X TO EXPEDITE HIS TURN AND TOLD LGT Y TO DSND TO 5000' AND EXPEDITE THROUGH 6000'. THINGS WERE NOT PROGRESSING AS I HOPED AND IN DESPERATION I TOLD LGT X TO STOP DSNT AND TOLD LGT Y TO TURN IMMEDIATELY LEFT TO HDG 350 DEGS. AT THIS POINT LGT Y SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE TFC AND THAT THEY HAD ALREADY PASSED. AT THIS POINT THE CONFLICT TERMINATED. IN FOLLOW UP, LGT Y SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION. EVERYTHING THAT I HAD TRIED TO DO DID NOT WORK TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. I BELIEVE THAT IF MY FIRST XMISSION TO LGT Y HAD BEEN RECEIVED, THE SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AS SERIOUS AS IT TURNED OUT; HOWEVER, THERE IS NO WAY TO BE SURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 152645: LGT X WAS BEING VECTORED ON DOWNWIND TO THE LDA APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. APCH CTL CLRED US TO 5000', RIGHT TURN TO 050 DEGS. THEY ASKED US TO EXPEDITE THE DSNT. AS I DETECTED A TONE OF URGENCY IN HIS VOICE, I PULLED THE SPOILERS OUT AND DSNDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AT THE ASSIGNED SPD OF 210 KTS. APCHING 6000' WE WERE TOLD TO STOP OUR DSNT AND ISSUED TFC AT 10 O'CLOCK. AS I WAS STOWING THE SPOILERS AND PULLING UP, THE S/O POINTED TO THE TFC (LGT Y) AND SAID, 'DON'T PULL UP--GO DOWN!!' I SAW THE TFC AND PUSHED DOWN. THE LGT Y APPEARED TO BE PULLING UP. IT WENT OVER US AT LESS THAN 300' ABOUT 2 SECS AFTER I FIRST SAW IT. IF WE HAD NOT TAKEN ACTION, I BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD HAVE HIT. WE WERE VECTORED ACROSS THE LDA COURSE AND BACK TO THE APCH BEHIND THE LGT Y. WE LANDED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. THE F/O AND I WERE BUSY AT THE TIME AND I BELIEVE THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE S/O PREVENTED A MIDAIR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 153210: THE S/O THREW OFF HIS RESTRAINTS AND LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW. HE IMMEDIATELY SAID, 'DON'T PULL UP, GO DOWN.' THE LGT Y CREW TOLD APCH CTL THAT WE HAD COME VERY CLOSE (POSSIBLY WITHIN 100'). THE CTLR SAID, 'I KNOW, BUT STICK WITH ME AND I'LL GET IT STRAIGHTENED OUT,' AND TO HIS CREDIT, HE DID. THE S/O PROBABLY PREVENTED A MIDAIR WITH HIS QUICK ACTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 152683: AFTER PASSING ARMEL VOR AT 8000' HDG 100 DEGS. WE WERE CLRED TO TURN LEFT TO 070 DEGS AND DSND TO 5000', AND TO DSND TO 5000' AND EXPEDITE THROUGH 6000'. WE THEN HEARD ATC SAY TO LGT X LEVEL OFF IMMEDIATELY. WE THEN SAW LGT X AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK LOW IN RIGHT TURN AND APPEARED TO BE CLBING APPROX 200' BELOW US. I IMMEDIATELY ADDED PWR AND PULLED BACK TO CLB AND TURNED HARD RIGHT TO GO OVER THE LGT X ACFT TO 8300'. I FEEL THAT IF WE DID NOT TAKE EVASIVE ACTION WE WOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE LGT X ACFT. MY COPLT KEPT TELLING ME TO KEEP PULLING UP HARDER. MY AIRSPD DECREASED TO 210 KTS. THERE WAS A CTLR CHANGE SHORTLY AFTER THIS OCCURRED. THE CTLR SEEMED TO BE UNDER AN EXTREMELY HEAVY WORKLOAD AND HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME KEEPING UP WITH THE OVERALL SITUATION. WX WAS VERY HAZY AND FLT VISIBILITY 304 MI MAX. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 152381: BY THE CTLR'S ACTION AND OUR PULLING UP, A MIDAIR WAS AVOIDED. SOMETIMES IT IS HARD TO MAKE AN ABSOLUTE STATEMENT. HOWEVER, THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT MAKE MIDAIRS WERE ALL THERE. I'M JUST GLAD THAT THE CHAIN WAS BROKEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.