Narrative:

We were dispatched with 25.0 plan gate; no destination alternate and remaining fuel 6991 using a cost index (ci) of 29. Destination forecast for vicinity showers; scattered 3;000 feet; and broken 7;000 feet. The flight plan included the LEEHY5 arrival to go past the airport on the west side to land southbound. We discussed that a wind change to northerly runways in the forecast would tend to increase our remaining fuel since we were arriving from the southeast.we departed with 25.0 fuel due to a maintenance request report found during pilot preflight of exterior of aircraft. Takeoff with 24.7 fuel that matched flight plan. After takeoff; the first officer (first officer) and I discussed a ci increase per policy to improve arrival time. We agreed that the increased ci would cost significant fuel but only improve the arrival time by 5 minutes. We agreed that ci 29 was prudent in that 38 minutes late versus 43 minutes late was imperceptible; the flight receiving the aircraft could still achieve [a no delay]; and the increased fuel burn would result in an imprudent lower remaining fuel. During flight; we flew the flight plan as published and monitored fuel and winds against the flight plan. There were no significant deviations. Periodic pireps were sent via ACARS miscellaneous reports. Periodic ATIS checks continued to show southerly winds with gusts consistent with the forecasts.prior to descent; we discussed the wind being strong and gusty but right down the runway for 16. We discussed the windshear advisories and how mini-GS and autothrust would be appropriate. We discussed that we would listen for reports from aircraft in front of us and adjust accordingly. Our fuel was tracking as expected; but we agreed that if windshear started to cause missed approaches; we would not have time to loiter. We didn't verbalize a specific plan at this point...most likely due to the workload with the arrival and the turbulence. We were busy on arrival with light to moderate chop and turbulence below FL195. We both remarked that south of slc was better weather than the north based on observation. Having just reviewed the airport database the night before concerning authorized airports; I was aware that we had no authorized airports in the vicinity of slc for diversion; however; there were runways available south of slc. I didn't verbalize this to the first officer during the arrival and vectors for the approach.we were vectored from the arrival and told to intercept the 16R localizer at 8;000 ft. An aircraft ahead of us reported losses and gains of airspeed on final but none outside limits. Shortly thereafter; we were told to track the 16R localizer inbound but to maintain 8;000 feet because they were changing the airport around. We then received vectors off of the localizer and incremental climbs to 12;000 feet. At this point; we told ATC 'min fuel advisory.' ACARS to dispatch was sent. They acknowledged and told us that they'd; '...get us right in.' we were on a south-southeast heading descending to 10;000 southwest of the airport and I reported the airport in sight at our 8 o'clock to the approach controller with the hope of expedited vectors. Mentally; I was beginning to be concerned as to the decreasing probability of an assured landing at slc due to the combination of previous aircraft reports; gusty wind conditions; and shifting wind directions. Committing to a visual approach to slc with lower than desired fuel followed by a go-around and more vectors to the north in poorer weather conditions would result in an undesired critical fuel state. We then received a right turn to continue to the south with a simultaneous report of an aircraft going around at slc. At this point; I identified to ATC [priority] and requested a diversion to the south. ACARS to dispatch was sent. I knew both the fuel state and the need to land at an unauthorized field would require [assistance]. Though we had 4;800 lbs. Fuel on board (fob); my personal limit to cross a thresholdat my final destination/alternate/diversion field is 4;300 fob providing I have a high landing probability and can accomplish a VFR go-around to a tight pattern at that airport. The fuel is appropriately higher with corresponding lesser conditions. I knew there were two airports in visual conditions with good runways to the south. We happened to have a pilot jump seater in the flight deck that lived in slc. As I asked ATC about the airports to the south; the jump seater was familiar with pvu and had jeppesen coverage. We chose pvu; sent ACARS to dispatch; and got cleared directly to a visual approach. ATC and weather confirmed VMC and good winds at pvu. We landed safely in pvu and taxied to the local FBO. We were nocomm on ACARS on the ground in pvu. We conducted all necessary communications for dispatch; maintenance control; fueling; etc. Over personal mobile phone. Without my phone; we would have had a lot of difficulty.weather didn't develop as forecast. Our position in the sequence of aircraft in relation to the weather/wind changes and the turning around of the airport was probably the absolute worst possible. Earlier would have allowed us to land south or go-around with a direct to provo with higher fob. Later may have allowed us to vector directly into a northerly landing and avoid the long vector to the north for the southerly approach and then back to the south for the northerly approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier's flight crew; and a Dispatcher; reported a diversion to an unauthorized field due to fuel constraints and windshear at their planned destination.

Narrative: We were dispatched with 25.0 PLAN GATE; no destination alternate and remaining fuel 6991 using a Cost Index (CI) of 29. Destination forecast for vicinity showers; scattered 3;000 feet; and broken 7;000 feet. The flight plan included the LEEHY5 arrival to go past the airport on the west side to land southbound. We discussed that a wind change to northerly runways in the forecast would tend to increase our remaining fuel since we were arriving from the southeast.We departed with 25.0 fuel due to a maintenance request report found during pilot preflight of exterior of aircraft. Takeoff with 24.7 fuel that matched flight plan. After takeoff; the First Officer (FO) and I discussed a CI increase per policy to improve arrival time. We agreed that the increased CI would cost significant fuel but only improve the arrival time by 5 minutes. We agreed that CI 29 was prudent in that 38 minutes late versus 43 minutes late was imperceptible; the flight receiving the aircraft could still achieve [a no delay]; and the increased fuel burn would result in an imprudent lower remaining fuel. During flight; we flew the flight plan as published and monitored fuel and winds against the flight plan. There were no significant deviations. Periodic PIREPs were sent via ACARS MISC REPORTS. Periodic ATIS checks continued to show southerly winds with gusts consistent with the forecasts.Prior to descent; we discussed the wind being strong and gusty but right down the runway for 16. We discussed the windshear advisories and how mini-GS and Autothrust would be appropriate. We discussed that we would listen for reports from aircraft in front of us and adjust accordingly. Our fuel was tracking as expected; but we agreed that if windshear started to cause missed approaches; we would not have time to loiter. We didn't verbalize a specific plan at this point...most likely due to the workload with the arrival and the turbulence. We were busy on arrival with light to moderate chop and turbulence below FL195. We both remarked that south of SLC was better weather than the north based on observation. Having just reviewed the airport database the night before concerning authorized airports; I was aware that we had no authorized airports in the vicinity of SLC for diversion; however; there were runways available south of SLC. I didn't verbalize this to the FO during the arrival and vectors for the approach.We were vectored from the arrival and told to intercept the 16R localizer at 8;000 ft. An aircraft ahead of us reported losses and gains of airspeed on final but none outside limits. Shortly thereafter; we were told to track the 16R localizer inbound but to maintain 8;000 feet because they were changing the airport around. We then received vectors off of the localizer and incremental climbs to 12;000 feet. At this point; we told ATC 'min fuel advisory.' ACARS to dispatch was sent. They acknowledged and told us that they'd; '...get us right in.' We were on a south-southeast heading descending to 10;000 southwest of the airport and I reported the airport in sight at our 8 o'clock to the approach controller with the hope of expedited vectors. Mentally; I was beginning to be concerned as to the decreasing probability of an assured landing at SLC due to the combination of previous aircraft reports; gusty wind conditions; and shifting wind directions. Committing to a visual approach to SLC with lower than desired fuel followed by a go-around and more vectors to the north in poorer weather conditions would result in an undesired critical fuel state. We then received a right turn to continue to the south with a simultaneous report of an aircraft going around at SLC. At this point; I identified to ATC [priority] and requested a diversion to the south. ACARS to Dispatch was sent. I knew both the fuel state and the need to land at an unauthorized field would require [assistance]. Though we had 4;800 lbs. fuel on board (FOB); my personal limit to cross a thresholdat my final destination/alternate/diversion field is 4;300 FOB providing I have a high landing probability and can accomplish a VFR go-around to a tight pattern at that airport. The fuel is appropriately higher with corresponding lesser conditions. I knew there were two airports in visual conditions with good runways to the south. We happened to have a pilot jump seater in the flight deck that lived in SLC. As I asked ATC about the airports to the south; the jump seater was familiar with PVU and had Jeppesen coverage. We chose PVU; sent ACARS to Dispatch; and got cleared directly to a visual approach. ATC and weather confirmed VMC and good winds at PVU. We landed safely in PVU and taxied to the local FBO. We were NOCOMM on ACARS on the ground in PVU. We conducted all necessary communications for Dispatch; Maintenance Control; fueling; etc. over personal mobile phone. Without my phone; we would have had a lot of difficulty.Weather didn't develop as forecast. Our position in the sequence of aircraft in relation to the weather/wind changes and the turning around of the airport was probably the absolute worst possible. Earlier would have allowed us to land south or go-around with a direct to Provo with higher FOB. Later may have allowed us to vector directly into a northerly landing and avoid the long vector to the north for the southerly approach and then back to the south for the northerly approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.