Narrative:

While in cruise over the amazon the captain (pm) attempted to use the FMC to modify the flight path to the left to pass between two closely spaced thunderstorms without informing the PF. When I challenged this (we were 40 miles from the storms and I had planned on requesting a 30 right deviation shortly) he insisted and only grudgingly accepted a compromise of passing to the left of the storms and I even then had to insist on further deviation to increase the distance from the storms. He was intending to pass under the overhang. I allowed this as safety was not compromised and I felt that challenging him further would lead to a breakdown of cockpit communication.when the fuel low center EICAS warning came on I attempted to switch off the center pumps; verifying with him my intention to do so. He insisted that the correct procedure was to wait until the fuel pump lights came on as this would trigger the scavenge pumps to empty the remainder. I pointed out that the correct procedure was to shut the pumps off immediately and that the scavenge pumps operation was based on the fuel levels in the main tanks; not the pump lights. He refused to read the manual page I was showing him and the pumps were switched off late.prior to T/D I asked him to take the aircraft so I could set up the expected approach but he refused; claiming it was the pm duty to set up the approach. He ignored both my and the iros contention that this was not standard procedure and to avoid a breakdown of cockpit communication we allowed him to set up the approach. Which he did incorrectly; apparently not knowing that while the landing data request fills in the correct landing weight; the FMC approach page requires the correct weight to be inputted. We monitored his actions and corrected as necessary.on landing I attempted to turn on engine anti ice (6 deg C and light rain. Windshield wipers were on) and he attempted to stop me; claiming the threshold temperature was 3c. I simply ignored him; informed him of my intentions and turned on the engine anti ice to avoid engine damage.we were cleared into the ramp and had to wait behind a 757 on tow. He became impatient and taxied around it; leaving the guide in lines despite my warning that we might have a taxiway excursion; possibly taxiing over a painted island. I wasn't fast enough to get my feet on the brakes to stop him.during the flights there were many instances both when he was PF and pm where he would modify the flight path in the FMC and execute this without referring to the other pilot for verification. I had challenged him on this but had got no response so was very vigilant so as to avoid errors. I had noticed that challenging him on procedures simply led to him ignoring further communications; even when he was shown the correct procedures in the flight manual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 First Officer reported the Captain deviated from SOP on multiple occasions while on an international flight.

Narrative: While in cruise over the Amazon the Captain (PM) attempted to use the FMC to modify the flight path to the left to pass between two closely spaced thunderstorms without informing the PF. When I challenged this (we were 40 miles from the storms and I had planned on requesting a 30 right deviation shortly) he insisted and only grudgingly accepted a compromise of passing to the left of the storms and I even then had to insist on further deviation to increase the distance from the storms. He was intending to pass under the overhang. I allowed this as safety was not compromised and I felt that challenging him further would lead to a breakdown of cockpit communication.When the Fuel Low Center EICAS warning came on I attempted to switch off the center pumps; verifying with him my intention to do so. He insisted that the correct procedure was to wait until the fuel pump lights came on as this would trigger the scavenge pumps to empty the remainder. I pointed out that the correct procedure was to shut the pumps off immediately and that the scavenge pumps operation was based on the fuel levels in the main tanks; not the pump lights. He refused to read the manual page I was showing him and the pumps were switched off late.Prior to T/D I asked him to take the aircraft so I could set up the expected approach but he refused; claiming it was the PM duty to set up the approach. He ignored both my and the IROs contention that this was not standard procedure and to avoid a breakdown of cockpit communication we allowed him to set up the approach. Which he did incorrectly; apparently not knowing that while the Landing Data Request fills in the correct landing weight; the FMC Approach page requires the correct weight to be inputted. We monitored his actions and corrected as necessary.On landing I attempted to turn on Engine Anti Ice (6 deg C and light rain. Windshield wipers were on) and he attempted to stop me; claiming the threshold temperature was 3c. I simply ignored him; informed him of my intentions and turned on the Engine Anti Ice to avoid engine damage.We were cleared into the ramp and had to wait behind a 757 on tow. He became impatient and taxied around it; leaving the guide in lines despite my warning that we might have a taxiway excursion; possibly taxiing over a painted island. I wasn't fast enough to get my feet on the brakes to stop him.During the flights there were many instances both when he was PF and PM where he would modify the flight path in the FMC and execute this without referring to the other pilot for verification. I had challenged him on this but had got no response so was very vigilant so as to avoid errors. I had noticed that challenging him on procedures simply led to him ignoring further communications; even when he was shown the correct procedures in the Flight Manual.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.