Narrative:

After preflighting and preparing for departure; all the maintenance; fueling; and paperwork was completed. All the trash had been removed and we were ready for departure. I advised that we were ready and to organize grounds handlers and shut the door for departure.he walked across the ramp to the operations building and advised the ground handlers and was headed back from my view in the cockpit. I exited the cockpit to see if anything else might have popped up down on the main deck. Everything seemed ready and I advised a flight attendant (flight attendant) at L1 walking across the ramp that we would be ready to go and I did a head count to verify everyone was on board. Also asked her to have the [company] call me in the cockpit if he needed to tell me anything that changed from our last plan.I went back upstairs and completed a briefing for a runway 03 departure and got a maintenance briefing on what they had worked on and reviewed the sign-offs. Noted the air stairs were being moved and they stopped about fifteen feet away and I assumed they were getting chalks; extinguishers; and etc since they had stopped for some length of time at the fifteen foot mark away from the L1 door. After about six to ten minutes; the air stairs operator drove off to the operations building (about two hundred yards away) and I could see the operator get out and go into the building. We sat there for about another ten minutes curious if that was the extent of our marshaling out of the ramp area. We were the only aircraft out there and from our view of everything was clear in daylight from our view in the cockpit. Many places don't really marshal us out when powering out of parking but pull the chocks and extinguishers and kind of do a wave off at the side of the aircraft or well out of the way in front of the aircraft from my past experience on charters on bases using civilian contractors for ground handling come to mind as examples of this.after waiting for ten minutes it seemed that no one was going to standby outside to wave us off other than the air stair operator that left. We called to see if they could find our ground crew but to no avail. After some time we asked if ground control could see if we [were] clear for an engine start. [Controller] had to get binoculars and said it appeared to be clear to her and that we could start at our discretion. Not quite ready to do that I asked our mechanic to come to the flight deck to confer with him on dealing with the local ground handlers. He came up and advised they were pretty weak in his experience at bif. I believe he used the word 'lazy.' he also said they don't have headsets. Thinking we had been abandoned prematurely; we viewed the area again for obstacles in which we seemed clear from our view in the cockpit. We were the only aircraft on that very large ramp and felt that we were safe to start up and taxi after the ground controller advised we appeared to be clear.we ran the checklists; started engines and before taxi checklist. Called for taxi and advanced the throttles to taxi. I did feel a slight bump and tiller twitch left. Turned out to be a small set of chalks probably used on the nose wheel left side. I have taxied over chalks in my past where they couldn't get them dislodged from under a wheel and didn't have a tug. This felt like that and I taxied straight out so as keep them clear of the gear then turned left. After getting some space forward and turned I could see I was correct on the chalks (one set of small yellow ones used on one nose wheel) but nothing else.I taxied via 'alpha' to 'charlie' and hold short of runway 03 awaiting departure release which made us wait five minutes. We completed the 'before takeoff' checklist while waiting and were finally cleared for takeoff. Taxied forward to runway 03 and advanced the throttles to 70% N1 and then selected the auto throttles. At approximately 30-40kts we got a warning 'configuration stabilizer' master warning and I rejected the takeoff by closing the throttles applying the brakes. Rejected takeoff braking did not engage due to the low speed parameter. I did not stop all the way seeing the nature of the warning but slowed to about five kts as we asked tower where we could turn off the runway to evaluate the situation. They came back that they needed us to go to 'lima'; 'november'; or the end due to weight load constraints on the taxiways. At about that; time tower notified us that we seemed to have smoke coming out of engine #3. We had no indications of fire and requested more details if he could give them to us. He could not offer any more information and said he would send out a FOD inspector out as we continued to taxi to get off the runway. We had our mechanic sitting in the jumpseat from the earlier conference over the ground handler and brought him into the information loop. He noted no fire warnings and requested to keep #3 running so he could examine engine parameters which looked normal just like the other engines I agreed with him. We let it run a little while longer to observe and found nothing; but thought it would be better to error on the side of caution and I said to shut down engine #3 to the first officer (first officer).we eventually exited the runway onto 'november' then joined 'mike' to hold short of runway 21 expecting to taxi back to the blocks after the FOD inspector finished his job. We sat there idling for some time contemplating what was causing the the configuration stabilizer warning. We had both individually checked the weight and balance (west/B) against the FMC and rechecked it again while waiting on the FOD check. Per the weight and balance sheet we were at 23.1% tow mac and 3.1 units on the stab trim per the FMC and still indicated that on the FMC and stabilizer indicator in the green band. After some time; an initial report came back that there were pieces of metal about where we initiated the rejected takeoff. A little later another report came back that it appears to be pieces of a fire extinguisher.at this point we decided we might want to inspect the aircraft where we were at in case of damage or causing further damage. We got clearance to shutdown and did so. We started the APU and sent the mechanic down the access door. He came back with a report that a fire extinguisher was lodged in the right side inboard body gear wheel truck. We requested that we might need a tug to push us back some to dislodge it; which was not available. The FOD inspector came along by then and saw that it was discharged and pulled it out and put it in his truck. That explained the white smoke reported by the tower. The rejected takeoff put a lot of extra pressure on it and made the pressure vessel pop. The mechanic inspected the gear; tires and determined we could safely return to the ramp. Also noted that upper stab trim band light illuminated when the extinguisher was removed from the truck; but that could just be coincidence due to fuel burn by that time.once the mechanic returned to the cockpit; we got clearance to start up again and requested a firetruck escort back to the ramp in case any new problems happened. We were parked about three more spaces down from where we were earlier and were marshaled in. I wrote up the rejected takeoff due to the configuration stabilizer master warning going off; the discovery of an extinguisher in the right inboard body gear; and requested an inspection of a suspected possible second extinguisher due to the description we got from the FOD inspector making me think we might have two extinguishers involved in this event. It was after the inspection was done that it was determined that it was only one extinguisher. Brake temps were never an issue due to the low speed rejected takeoff and mostly empty airplane. Got no higher than 2's on the brake indicators.it took about thirty to forty five minutes to get our handlers out to the aircraft with air stairs and an extinguisher placed well out in front were we could see it from the cockpit. I believe ground control was able to get ahold of someone to recallthe ground handlers. We were told they had left the airport for home after we blocked out. Took about another hour and a half to get a k-loader to off load the tires in the spares kit and then an hour to replace the tires.post event. We found out that the air stair operator only works the air stairs and another person was supposed to pull chocks and the fire extinguishers. The person who was supposed to pull chocks and the extinguisher was taking the international trash to be dumped instead of staying at the aircraft to launch the flight. This split job delegation seems different than most of the other civilian handlers doing this for us at other bases. I regularly see the guy driving the air stairs; pulling chocks and extinguishers. One or two guys at the same time. Not one driving off with the air stairs and going home; leaving the aircraft sitting there with no ground handler around at all and obstacles in the way of the aircraft and out of view of the flight crew. At the very minimum; he should have told us that the other ground handler would be along in a little while and that we still have chocks and an extinguisher in place. None of which was told to the flight crew. A positive hand off between the two different ground handlers themselves should have been applied and even better if the flight crew was involved also.the mechanics inspected the flaps; tires; gear and replaced two tires and repaired a canon plug to the #9 brakes. We coordinated with dispatch to use the same flight release and flight plan. Update the flight releases validity period; refiled flight plan; fueled and had a new sable west/B made. We had the [company] create a new weight and balance so that the flight attendant's would be sitting at their stations shifting the mac a little just in case the extinguisher stuck in the wheel truck didn't cause the configuration stabilizer master warning. I believe the new west/B in that set up was 24.2% mac and 2.9 units of stab trim in the upper green band.we prepped for departure; briefed and this time we had an air stair operator and a person to pull chocks and the extinguisher that was placed this time in front of the aircraft where the crew could see it. Had to use hand signals with the ground handler. Started up and flashed him with the lights to taxi. He waived and then drove off without marshaling us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain of a large turbojet reported issues with ground personnel procedures that resulted in a rejected takeoff and aircraft damage.

Narrative: After preflighting and preparing for departure; all the maintenance; fueling; and paperwork was completed. All the trash had been removed and we were ready for departure. I advised that we were ready and to organize grounds handlers and shut the door for departure.He walked across the ramp to the operations building and advised the ground handlers and was headed back from my view in the cockpit. I exited the cockpit to see if anything else might have popped up down on the main deck. Everything seemed ready and I advised a Flight Attendant (FA) at L1 walking across the ramp that we would be ready to go and I did a head count to verify everyone was on board. Also asked her to have the [company] call me in the cockpit if he needed to tell me anything that changed from our last plan.I went back upstairs and completed a briefing for a runway 03 departure and got a Maintenance briefing on what they had worked on and reviewed the sign-offs. Noted the air stairs were being moved and they stopped about fifteen feet away and I assumed they were getting chalks; extinguishers; and etc since they had stopped for some length of time at the fifteen foot mark away from the L1 door. After about six to ten minutes; the air stairs operator drove off to the operations building (about two hundred yards away) and I could see the operator get out and go into the building. We sat there for about another ten minutes curious if that was the extent of our marshaling out of the ramp area. We were the only aircraft out there and from our view of everything was clear in daylight from our view in the cockpit. Many places don't really marshal us out when powering out of parking but pull the chocks and extinguishers and kind of do a wave off at the side of the aircraft or well out of the way in front of the Aircraft from my past experience on charters on bases using civilian contractors for ground handling come to mind as examples of this.After waiting for ten minutes it seemed that no one was going to standby outside to wave us off other than the air stair operator that left. We called to see if they could find our ground crew but to no avail. After some time we asked if ground control could see if we [were] clear for an engine start. [Controller] had to get binoculars and said it appeared to be clear to her and that we could start at our discretion. Not quite ready to do that I asked our mechanic to come to the flight deck to confer with him on dealing with the local ground handlers. He came up and advised they were pretty weak in his experience at BIF. I believe he used the word 'lazy.' He also said they don't have headsets. Thinking we had been abandoned prematurely; we viewed the area again for obstacles in which we seemed clear from our view in the cockpit. We were the only Aircraft on that very large ramp and felt that we were safe to start up and taxi after the ground controller advised we appeared to be clear.We ran the checklists; started engines and before taxi checklist. Called for taxi and advanced the throttles to taxi. I did feel a slight bump and tiller twitch left. Turned out to be a small set of chalks probably used on the nose wheel left side. I have taxied over chalks in my past where they couldn't get them dislodged from under a wheel and didn't have a tug. This felt like that and I taxied straight out so as keep them clear of the gear then turned left. After getting some space forward and turned I could see I was correct on the chalks (one set of small yellow ones used on one nose wheel) but nothing else.I taxied via 'Alpha' to 'Charlie' and hold short of runway 03 awaiting departure release which made us wait five minutes. We completed the 'Before Takeoff' checklist while waiting and were finally cleared for takeoff. Taxied forward to runway 03 and advanced the throttles to 70% N1 and then selected the auto throttles. At approximately 30-40kts we got a WARNING 'CONFIG STAB' master warning and I rejected the takeoff by closing the throttles applying the brakes. RTO braking did not engage due to the low speed parameter. I did not stop all the way seeing the nature of the warning but slowed to about five kts as we asked tower where we could turn off the runway to evaluate the situation. They came back that they needed us to go to 'Lima'; 'November'; or the end due to weight load constraints on the taxiways. At about that; time tower notified us that we seemed to have smoke coming out of engine #3. We had no indications of fire and requested more details if he could give them to us. He could not offer any more information and said he would send out a FOD inspector out as we continued to taxi to get off the runway. We had our mechanic sitting in the jumpseat from the earlier conference over the ground handler and brought him into the information loop. He noted no fire warnings and requested to keep #3 running so he could examine engine parameters which looked normal just like the other engines I agreed with him. We let it run a little while longer to observe and found nothing; but thought it would be better to error on the side of caution and I said to shut down engine #3 to the First Officer (FO).We eventually exited the runway onto 'November' then joined 'Mike' to hold short of runway 21 expecting to taxi back to the blocks after the FOD Inspector finished his job. We sat there idling for some time contemplating what was causing the the CONFIG STAB warning. We had both individually checked the Weight and Balance (W/B) against the FMC and rechecked it again while waiting on the FOD check. Per the Weight and Balance sheet we were at 23.1% TOW MAC and 3.1 units on the Stab Trim per the FMC and still indicated that on The FMC and STAB indicator in the green band. After some time; an initial report came back that there were pieces of metal about where we initiated the RTO. A little later another report came back that it appears to be pieces of a fire extinguisher.At this point we decided we might want to inspect the Aircraft where we were at in case of damage or causing further damage. We got clearance to shutdown and did so. We started the APU and sent the mechanic down the access door. He came back with a report that a fire extinguisher was lodged in the right side inboard body gear wheel truck. We requested that we might need a tug to push us back some to dislodge it; which was not available. The FOD Inspector came along by then and saw that it was discharged and pulled it out and put it in his truck. That explained the white smoke reported by the tower. The RTO put a lot of extra pressure on it and made the pressure vessel pop. The mechanic inspected the gear; tires and determined we could safely return to the ramp. Also noted that upper stab trim band light illuminated when the extinguisher was removed from the truck; but that could just be coincidence due to fuel burn by that time.Once the mechanic returned to the cockpit; we got clearance to start up again and requested a firetruck escort back to the ramp in case any new problems happened. We were parked about three more spaces down from where we were earlier and were marshaled in. I wrote up the RTO due to the CONFIG STAB Master Warning going off; the discovery of an extinguisher in the right inboard body gear; and requested an inspection of a suspected possible second extinguisher due to the description we got from the FOD inspector making me think we might have two extinguishers involved in this event. It was after the inspection was done that it was determined that it was only one extinguisher. Brake temps were never an issue due to the low speed RTO and mostly empty airplane. Got no higher than 2's on the brake indicators.It took about thirty to forty five minutes to get our handlers out to the aircraft with air stairs and an extinguisher placed well out in front were we could see it from the cockpit. I believe ground control was able to get ahold of someone to recallthe ground handlers. We were told they had left the airport for home after we blocked out. Took about another hour and a half to get a K-loader to off load the tires in the spares kit and then an hour to replace the tires.Post event. We found out that the air stair operator only works the air stairs and another person was supposed to pull chocks and the fire extinguishers. The person who was supposed to pull chocks and the extinguisher was taking the international trash to be dumped instead of staying at the aircraft to launch the flight. This split job delegation seems different than most of the other civilian handlers doing this for us at other bases. I regularly see the guy driving the air stairs; pulling chocks and extinguishers. One or two guys at the same time. Not one driving off with the air stairs and going home; leaving the aircraft sitting there with no ground handler around at all and obstacles in the way of the aircraft and out of view of the flight crew. At the very minimum; he should have told us that the other ground handler would be along in a little while and that we still have chocks and an extinguisher in place. None of which was told to the flight crew. A positive hand off between the two different ground handlers themselves should have been applied and even better if the flight crew was involved also.The mechanics inspected the flaps; tires; gear and replaced two tires and repaired a canon plug to the #9 brakes. We coordinated with dispatch to use the same flight release and flight plan. Update the flight releases validity period; refiled flight plan; fueled and had a new Sable W/B made. We had the [company] create a new weight and balance so that the FA's would be sitting at their stations shifting the MAC a little just in case the extinguisher stuck in the wheel truck didn't cause the CONFIG STAB Master Warning. I believe the new W/B in that set up was 24.2% MAC and 2.9 units of stab trim in the upper green band.We prepped for departure; briefed and this time we had an air stair operator and a person to pull chocks and the extinguisher that was placed this time in front of the Aircraft where the crew could see it. Had to use hand signals with the ground handler. Started up and flashed him with the lights to taxi. He waived and then drove off without marshaling us.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.