Narrative:

I conducted an afternoon flight to visit my friend in ZZZ. In the aircraft sitting in the copilot's seat with me was another friend. Flight following was used throughout the flight. 20 miles out; I monitored ZZZ CTAF and AWOS with a descent to 3500. 12 miles out I was released by approach. I descended to 1400 ft; established approach profile 16 inches manifold pressure; 110 kts. At 6 miles I intercepted the rwy xy extended centerline; radioed intent to land on [CTAF]; had the field in sight; performed initial pre-landing check; switched to fullest tank; deferred gear until approach angle intercept; RPM to 2500; and applied approach flaps. At approach; I lowered landing gear at PAPI glidepath intercept. At that time I noticed high tension power lines crossing the approach path that were unusually high and crossed the path to the runway. I continued maintaining safe clearance above the power lines on approach. On short final I applied full flaps and noticed the flaps were already in the full flaps position. Over the threshold I reduced throttle to idle and flared for normal landing. On touch down immediately I realized that I had a gear up landing. The aircraft had a smooth run out on centerline. I knew then that while my attention was diverted to the high power lines; I did not verify the gear lights had illuminated; I misidentified the flap switch as the landing gear switch explaining why it was in the full down position. I called FSS and requested assistance. Police; fire; and airport manager responded and verified no one was injured and released us to clear the aircraft from the runway. The NTSB called me and after providing info and a statement wrote '...call if you have any further questions; NTSB has no further interest in this event.' later that day the FAA office called and requested information as well which is the previous content.on reflection things that I can do are: I use a generic checklist that requires steps to be deferred. A landing flow checklist can be developed and used to the actual three phases to an approach. Unexpected obstacles added distraction to an otherwise sterile cockpit. A flyby of new airstrips would disclose the unexpected prior to approach. You can start using my passenger to read and confirm checklist items. This would not assist in solo tripsoutside my control: there are no mention of the high tension wires in the af/D or airport diagram?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE36 pilot reported making a wheels up landing after delaying landing gear extension in order to remain above high-tension wires. Pilot inadvertently extended the flaps when attempting to lower the landing gear.

Narrative: I conducted an afternoon flight to visit my friend in ZZZ. In the aircraft sitting in the copilot's seat with me was another friend. Flight following was used throughout the flight. 20 miles out; I monitored ZZZ CTAF and AWOS with a descent to 3500. 12 miles out I was released by Approach. I descended to 1400 ft; established approach profile 16 inches Manifold Pressure; 110 kts. At 6 miles I intercepted the Rwy XY extended centerline; radioed intent to land on [CTAF]; had the field in sight; performed initial pre-landing check; switched to fullest tank; deferred gear until approach angle intercept; RPM to 2500; and applied approach flaps. At approach; I lowered landing gear at PAPI glidepath intercept. At that time I noticed high tension power lines crossing the approach path that were unusually high and crossed the path to the runway. I continued maintaining safe clearance above the power lines on approach. On short final I applied full flaps and noticed the flaps were already in the full flaps position. Over the threshold I reduced throttle to idle and flared for normal landing. On touch down immediately I realized that I had a gear up landing. The aircraft had a smooth run out on centerline. I knew then that while my attention was diverted to the high power lines; I did not verify the gear lights had illuminated; I misidentified the flap switch as the landing gear switch explaining why it was in the full down position. I called FSS and requested assistance. Police; fire; and airport manager responded and verified no one was injured and released us to clear the aircraft from the runway. The NTSB called me and after providing info and a statement wrote '...Call if you have any further questions; NTSB has no further interest in this event.' Later that day the FAA office called and requested information as well which is the previous content.On reflection things that I can do are: I use a generic checklist that requires steps to be deferred. A landing flow checklist can be developed and used to the actual three phases to an approach. Unexpected obstacles added distraction to an otherwise sterile cockpit. A flyby of new airstrips would disclose the unexpected prior to approach. You can start using my passenger to read and confirm checklist items. This would not assist in solo tripsOutside my control: There are no mention of the high tension wires in the AF/D or airport diagram?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.