Narrative:

We were operating aircraft X on day 2 of a 4 day trip. The first leg was the captain's leg in our rotation. We arrived and had a 2 hour sit. The next leg was supposed to be my leg per our rotation. After review of the weather there was low visibility and possible contamination reports in [destination airport] and I would not be able to land with my status on the 737. We decided it needed to be the captain's leg. While conducting the walk around I found a maintenance issue that would not allow the airplane we had to fly up to [destination airport]. We were given another aircraft and it too had a small maintenance issue that was resolved. We ended up departing about 1.5 hours late. As we flew up to [destination airport] we were checking the weather conditions and it seemed as if we would be able to fly an ILS CAT 3 to runway 12R. We sent for landing data for both 12R and 12L. 12L runway data required us to have braking action 'good' or better for us to use it. The data for runway 12R gave us a better safety margin due to its length. We were assigned the ILS 12R by [destination airport] approach. On downwind leg [destination airport] stated that runway 12R would be shut down for snow removal and to expect runway 12L. We re-sent for new landing data for 12L and it still showed we needed braking action 'good' or better. We kept quarrying [destination airport] approach for a braking action report for 12L and could not get a response. [Destination airport] then told us the braking action for 12L was 'medium' and per our landing data we could not land on that runway. They told us that it would be around 30 minutes to plow runway 12R. At that point we were starting to approach our bingo fuel to divert to our alternate. We were also weight restricted so we did not have a lot of extra fuel in general. We then decided to divert initially; but after loading in the FMC we would land there with 3;000lbs of fuel or less. We realized we needed a much closer divert airport and found ZZZ1 to be a good option. We landed at ZZZ1 with no issues except that there was not going to be fuel services available after [a certain time]. As we found a place on the ramp to talk to operations we were told that the fueler was called back out to the airport and would be there in 10 minutes. Dispatch wanted us to fly back. A flight plan was sent to our ACARS printer and my captain was able to verbally discuss this flight back over to [destination airport]. From what I heard from the phone call; the weather was improving and aircraft were getting into [destination airport] with no problems. The dispatcher also added ZZZ2 as an alternate and it was a good and legal alternate. Our cco (crew critical off) time was getting close to the max duty day but we accepted an extension and there was some back and forth about our max cco time. My captain received another phone call stating we were good. We got our clearance from ATC and had a void time [to comply with]. We decided we could make the void time and the cco time if we hustled for this 1 hour flight back to [destination airport]. The captain was once again the pilot flying for this leg due to our plan to fly a CAT 3 ILS to 12R in [destination airport]. Between ATIS and ATC; we were staying constantly up to date on [destination airport] weather and braking action and it seemed a landing on 12R was going to happen. We were getting vectors for the CAT III ILS 12R and were handed off to tower on final approach and they stated 'braking action poor; cleared to land runway 12R'. I believe we were both shocked by that statement and we had to execute a missed approach. Tower then stated [another aircraft] landed 45 minutes earlier and reported the braking action poor. We then asked tower about the conditions of runway 12L. We never really got a solid report about 12L's conditions other than it was plowed more recent than 12R. We told them we must have braking action 'good' on that runway and they said they were not optimistic about us having that. The captain was showing some signs of fatigue enroute; but at this point I could tell the captain needed a break from flying the airplane. I told him that I felt well rested and would take over aircraft control. So we transferred controls and I became pilot flying. Once again we did not have a lot of fuel to wait out the 30 minutes or more it would take to plow runway 12R. We were told not to expect better than 'medium' braking action on 12L. So we made the decision to divert to our alternate of ZZZ2 and informed our dispatcher. Our dispatcher asked us if we could make [a different alternate]; but once again after looking at the fuel on landing at [a different alternate] we would be 3;000lbs or less. The dispatcher's response was either 'ok' or 'roger' with not much more info such as fuel burn to ZZZ2; current weather; field conditions; or another suggestion of a closer or better alternate. We pressed on to ZZZ2. Looking at the weather we got from ATC as we approached ZZZ2 we had winds 140/09; 5 SM; with br; and overcast at 800ft; temp 00; dew point -02; altimeter 30.15. As we got closer to ZZZ2 the automated weather service also confirmed the same conditions. We requested runway data for 06 and showed we were good to land with brakes 3 and 'good' braking action. We decided on brakes maximum which would give us 1;695 feet of extra distance on the [7;600+] foot runway. We did look at runway 18 because of it being [a little longer]feet longer but the only approach option was an RNAV that took us down to 492 ft AGL. A full RNAV approach brief in my opinion requires a lot more information along with a reference to the QRH that with our current fuel status time was of the essence. Also the fom states preference for instrument approach procedure backup should be from best to worst stating a precision approach as the best option. Runway 06 ILS would take us down to 200 ft AGL. Another factor I thought about was we really did not want to have to perform a go around at that point due to low ceilings and get into an even more critical fuel situation. The runway data for 06 gave us a 2 KT headwind and a 7 KT crosswind which were all legal for my status on the 737. Also the visibility was better than 4;000 RVR or 3/4SM and we had no knowledge of any contamination on the runway and there were no braking action reports. I conducted the ILS approach to 06 and was stable along with a touchdown in the touchdown zone markers with minimum float. I got the thrust reversers to max and the speed brakes were deployed. However; I started to realize we were not slowing down as we should have been for the expected conditions. I started to apply manual braking. I verbalized this to the captain and he commanded; 'max manual brakes; max manual brakes'. The captain also came on the brakes to confirm max manual braking. I did the best I could to maintain directional control and braking but we approached the end of the runway and slid off into the grass. The airplane did come to a stop at this point and we were only 115 ft from the end of the runway to our tail. (Ground personel showed us that exact number with a measuring device). We evaluated the situation; having passengers remain seated and flight attendant (flight attendant) check their condition. No unusual lights or indications came on. The landing gear and aircraft seemed in good shape. We decided an evacuation was not required. We fired up the APU; secured the engines and began coordination with crash rescue; ATC; company; and airport operations. No reported injuries; and all passengers and crew were ok. No immediate signs of aircraft damage. We were able to de-plane everyone off the aircraft through door 1L with air stairs. One of the ground operations personel came into the flight deck and told us we experienced a 'flash freeze' on the runway surface due to the atmospheric conditions in ZZZ2. He said that a 'flash freeze' also occurred around the same time the night before. The captain and I made sure everyone was off the airplane; did our final walk through the cabin; and secured the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported a runway excursion after landing at an airport that experienced a flash freeze just prior to landing.

Narrative: We were operating Aircraft X on day 2 of a 4 day trip. The first leg was the Captain's leg in our rotation. We arrived and had a 2 hour sit. The next leg was supposed to be my leg per our rotation. After review of the weather there was low visibility and possible contamination reports in [Destination Airport] and I would not be able to land with my status on the 737. We decided it needed to be the Captain's leg. While conducting the walk around I found a maintenance issue that would not allow the airplane we had to fly up to [Destination Airport]. We were given another aircraft and it too had a small maintenance issue that was resolved. We ended up departing about 1.5 hours late. As we flew up to [Destination Airport] we were checking the weather conditions and it seemed as if we would be able to fly an ILS CAT 3 to runway 12R. We sent for landing data for both 12R and 12L. 12L runway data required us to have braking action 'Good' or better for us to use it. The data for runway 12R gave us a better safety margin due to its length. We were assigned the ILS 12R by [Destination Airport] approach. On downwind leg [Destination Airport] stated that runway 12R would be shut down for snow removal and to expect runway 12L. We re-sent for new landing data for 12L and it still showed we needed braking action 'Good' or better. We kept quarrying [Destination Airport] approach for a braking action report for 12L and could not get a response. [Destination Airport] then told us the braking action for 12L was 'Medium' and per our landing data we could not land on that runway. They told us that it would be around 30 minutes to plow runway 12R. At that point we were starting to approach our Bingo fuel to divert to our alternate. We were also weight restricted so we did not have a lot of extra fuel in general. We then decided to divert initially; but after loading in the FMC we would land there with 3;000lbs of fuel or less. We realized we needed a much closer divert airport and found ZZZ1 to be a good option. We landed at ZZZ1 with no issues except that there was not going to be fuel services available after [a certain time]. As we found a place on the ramp to talk to operations we were told that the fueler was called back out to the airport and would be there in 10 minutes. Dispatch wanted us to fly back. A flight plan was sent to our ACARS printer and my Captain was able to verbally discuss this flight back over to [Destination Airport]. From what I heard from the phone call; the weather was improving and aircraft were getting into [Destination Airport] with no problems. The Dispatcher also added ZZZ2 as an alternate and it was a good and legal alternate. Our CCO (Crew Critical Off) time was getting close to the max duty day but we accepted an extension and there was some back and forth about our max CCO time. My Captain received another phone call stating we were good. We got our clearance from ATC and had a void time [to comply with]. We decided we could make the void time and the CCO time if we hustled for this 1 hour flight back to [Destination Airport]. The Captain was once again the pilot flying for this leg due to our plan to fly a CAT 3 ILS to 12R in [Destination Airport]. Between ATIS and ATC; we were staying constantly up to date on [Destination Airport] weather and braking action and it seemed a landing on 12R was going to happen. We were getting vectors for the CAT III ILS 12R and were handed off to tower on final approach and they stated 'braking action poor; cleared to land runway 12R'. I believe we were both shocked by that statement and we had to execute a missed approach. Tower then stated [another aircraft] landed 45 minutes earlier and reported the braking action poor. We then asked tower about the conditions of runway 12L. We never really got a solid report about 12L's conditions other than it was plowed more recent than 12R. We told them we must have braking action 'Good' on that runway and they said they were not optimistic about us having that. The Captain was showing some signs of fatigue enroute; but at this point I could tell the Captain needed a break from flying the airplane. I told him that I felt well rested and would take over aircraft control. So we transferred controls and I became pilot flying. Once again we did not have a lot of fuel to wait out the 30 minutes or more it would take to plow runway 12R. We were told not to expect better than 'Medium' braking action on 12L. So we made the decision to divert to our alternate of ZZZ2 and informed our Dispatcher. Our Dispatcher asked us if we could make [a different alternate]; but once again after looking at the fuel on landing at [a different alternate] we would be 3;000lbs or less. The Dispatcher's response was either 'OK' or 'Roger' with not much more info such as fuel burn to ZZZ2; current weather; field conditions; or another suggestion of a closer or better alternate. We pressed on to ZZZ2. Looking at the weather we got from ATC as we approached ZZZ2 we had winds 140/09; 5 SM; with BR; and Overcast at 800ft; temp 00; dew point -02; Altimeter 30.15. As we got closer to ZZZ2 the automated weather service also confirmed the same conditions. We requested runway data for 06 and showed we were good to land with brakes 3 and 'Good' braking action. We decided on brakes MAX which would give us 1;695 feet of extra distance on the [7;600+] foot runway. We did look at runway 18 because of it being [a little longer]feet longer but the only approach option was an RNAV that took us down to 492 ft AGL. A full RNAV approach brief in my opinion requires a lot more information along with a reference to the QRH that with our current fuel status time was of the essence. Also the FOM states preference for instrument approach procedure backup should be from best to worst stating a precision approach as the best option. Runway 06 ILS would take us down to 200 FT AGL. Another factor I thought about was we really did not want to have to perform a go around at that point due to low ceilings and get into an even more critical fuel situation. The runway data for 06 gave us a 2 KT headwind and a 7 KT crosswind which were all legal for my status on the 737. Also the visibility was better than 4;000 RVR or 3/4SM and we had no knowledge of any contamination on the runway and there were no braking action reports. I conducted the ILS approach to 06 and was stable along with a touchdown in the touchdown zone markers with minimum float. I got the thrust reversers to max and the speed brakes were deployed. However; I started to realize we were not slowing down as we should have been for the expected conditions. I started to apply manual braking. I verbalized this to the Captain and he commanded; 'Max manual brakes; max manual brakes'. The Captain also came on the brakes to confirm Max manual braking. I did the best I could to maintain directional control and braking but we approached the end of the runway and slid off into the grass. The airplane did come to a stop at this point and we were only 115 FT from the end of the runway to our tail. (Ground personel showed us that exact number with a measuring device). We evaluated the situation; having passengers remain seated and Flight Attendant (FA) check their condition. No unusual lights or indications came on. The landing gear and aircraft seemed in good shape. We decided an evacuation was not required. We fired up the APU; secured the engines and began coordination with crash rescue; ATC; company; and airport operations. No reported injuries; and all passengers and crew were ok. No immediate signs of aircraft damage. We were able to de-plane everyone off the aircraft through door 1L with air stairs. One of the Ground Operations personel came into the flight deck and told us we experienced a 'flash freeze' on the runway surface due to the atmospheric conditions in ZZZ2. He said that a 'flash freeze' also occurred around the same time the night before. The Captain and I made sure everyone was off the airplane; did our final walk through the cabin; and secured the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.