Narrative:

On the ground while putting flaps down after startup; we noticed the flap indicator was moving slowly. We discussed and decided to keep an eye on it. Flaps indicated 7 for the departure and we took off normally. After takeoff; the pilot flying called for flaps up. I moved the selector to up and the indicator indicated that flaps were up. The hydraulic press light; however; remained on. After reaching a safe altitude; the pilot flying called for the emergency/abnormal checklist to trouble shoot the issue. While I was getting out the checklist; the pilot flying slowed the aircraft to confirm that we did not have a stab/mis-compare or something similar. We ran the emergency/abnormal (QRH) checklist for a steady hydraulic press light. It was not accompanied by a master caution; nor; was it flashing. The checklist stated only that the system was operating normally. I called maintenance control via and explained our light indication and that the checklist did not have any further steps. I asked if they had any suggestions. They advised that the only guidance they could provide was to follow the checklist. We advised that we would call back if there were any other changes.the pilot flying and I discussed the 'lack' of checklist and decided that I would go to the back and visually inspect the flaps; since that was the last system used. Upon visual inspection; I discovered that the left side flaps had not fully retracted by approximately one inch. I returned to the cockpit and advised the captain. The captain wanted to visually inspect the flaps as well. He transferred flight controls to me and went to the back. He took some photos and returned to the cockpit. I transferred back the controls so I could handle speaking with maintenance. I sent maintenance a copy of the photographs along with a narrative of the steps that we had completed thus far. I followed up the email with another phone call. We advised of our 'split flap' condition and asked if they wanted us to do anything special. They advised that as long as the flight characteristics of the aircraft were un-changed then we could continue to our destination (as long as we were comfortable with it). Since the flight characteristics felt normal; we elected to continue to our destination. While en-route; we discussed our options for a safe landing. Since we knew the indicator was moving slowly; and that one side flaps were not fully retracted; we did not know if it was safe to lower the flaps for landing. We elected to perform a no-flap landing. We again went to the QRH to confirm that there was no checklist for a 'split flap' situation. There was not; and we turned to the checklist for a no-flap landing and reviewed the procedures.upon being handed off to approach; we advised that we had a flap issue and would be making a no-flap landing. We asked if they could have air and rescue fire fighting (arff) on standby. They advised that they would. At their request we advised souls onboard and fuel. We began receiving vectors. We discussed as a crew the process that the captain would take for the landing with the increased speeds as well as what his expectations were for me during the process. We made sure that we were both 'on the same page'. ATC asked what runway we would like and when we would like to turn in for the airport. We requested a 10 mile final so that speed management would not be an issue. We made a visual approach after calling the airport in sight and landed without incident. Upon reaching the ramp; we elected to move the flaps to see if there was indeed an issue. We went from 'up' to flaps 7; then to 15; then to 35. The indicator moved; albeit slowly. When we move the selector from 35 to 15; the indicator moved approximately half the distance then stopped. We moved the selector back to 35 and continued with the shutdown procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE-560XL flight crew reported making a no-flap landing after confirming a disparity between the actual flap position and the indicated flap position and a failure of the left flap to fully retract.

Narrative: On the ground while putting flaps down after startup; we noticed the flap indicator was moving slowly. We discussed and decided to keep an eye on it. Flaps indicated 7 for the departure and we took off normally. After takeoff; the Pilot Flying called for flaps up. I moved the selector to up and the indicator indicated that flaps were up. The HYD PRESS light; however; remained on. After reaching a safe altitude; the Pilot Flying called for the Emergency/Abnormal checklist to trouble shoot the issue. While I was getting out the checklist; the Pilot Flying slowed the aircraft to confirm that we did not have a Stab/Mis-compare or something similar. We ran the Emergency/Abnormal (QRH) Checklist for a steady HYD PRESS light. It was NOT accompanied by a master caution; nor; was it flashing. The checklist stated only that the system was operating normally. I called Maintenance Control via and explained our light indication and that the checklist did not have any further steps. I asked if they had any suggestions. They advised that the only guidance they could provide was to follow the checklist. We advised that we would call back if there were any other changes.The pilot flying and I discussed the 'lack' of checklist and decided that I would go to the back and visually inspect the flaps; since that was the last system used. Upon visual inspection; I discovered that the left side flaps had not fully retracted by approximately one inch. I returned to the cockpit and advised the Captain. The Captain wanted to visually inspect the flaps as well. He transferred flight controls to me and went to the back. He took some photos and returned to the cockpit. I transferred back the controls so I could handle speaking with Maintenance. I sent Maintenance a copy of the photographs along with a narrative of the steps that we had completed thus far. I followed up the email with another phone call. We advised of our 'split flap' condition and asked if they wanted us to do anything special. They advised that as long as the flight characteristics of the aircraft were un-changed then we could continue to our destination (as long as we were comfortable with it). Since the flight characteristics felt normal; we elected to continue to our destination. While en-route; we discussed our options for a safe landing. Since we knew the indicator was moving slowly; and that one side flaps were not fully retracted; we did not know if it was safe to lower the flaps for landing. We elected to perform a no-flap landing. We again went to the QRH to confirm that there was no checklist for a 'split flap' situation. There was not; and we turned to the checklist for a no-flap landing and reviewed the procedures.Upon being handed off to Approach; we advised that we had a flap issue and would be making a no-flap landing. We asked if they could have Air and Rescue Fire Fighting (ARFF) on standby. They advised that they would. At their request we advised souls onboard and fuel. We began receiving vectors. We discussed as a crew the process that the Captain would take for the landing with the increased speeds as well as what his expectations were for me during the process. We made sure that we were both 'on the same page'. ATC asked what runway we would like and when we would like to turn in for the airport. We requested a 10 mile final so that speed management would not be an issue. We made a visual approach after calling the airport in sight and landed without incident. Upon reaching the ramp; we elected to move the flaps to see if there was indeed an issue. We went from 'up' to flaps 7; then to 15; then to 35. The indicator moved; albeit slowly. When we move the selector from 35 to 15; the indicator moved approximately half the distance then stopped. We moved the selector back to 35 and continued with the shutdown procedure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.