Narrative:

While approaching on a part 91 corporate mission; ATC advised us to expect a visual approach. VMC weather conditions were encountered along the entire route of flight; and winds at the field indicated roughly 10-15 knots out of the south. My captain was pilot flying (PF) and due to the clear weather gave an exceptionally terse briefing for what we could expect as we transitioned into the terminal area and executed the visual approach.around 10 miles northeast of the airport I suggested programming an instrument procedure into the FMS as a back up aid to situational awareness. However; PF indicated that an instrument backup would not be needed since we could clearly see the field; and he had landed there before. Being relatively new to the company and multi crew cockpit environments; I am still finding my voice in the right seat and left the suggestion at that; turning my attention to other arrival duties. After calling field in sight; ATC cleared us for the visual approach and handed us off to the tower controller who requested that we advise when we were on a left base. In the distance I could clearly see what I understood to be the runway; informing the tower controller when I felt we were on a 2-3 mile left base. Instead of gradually turning left to join the final PF proceeded to obliviously fly straight through the extended runway centerline.this is where the next major breakdown in CRM occurred. I had correctly identified the runway we were supposed to land on; but upon passing it assumed that PF; as the more senior crewmember; must have had a good reason for doing so. Eventually; we incorrectly joined the final for the closely positioned intersecting runway which had been notamed closed for improvements. PF did not see the construction equipment at the end of the runway and realize his mistake until we were roughly at 700 feet. With the aircraft continuing to descend towards the closed pavement; I immediately readied for a missed approach and verbalized to the PF that I was 'ready to call 'go-around.'' from where we were; now no more that 500-600 feet; it seemed impossible to me that we could ever safely correct and maneuver back to the originally assigned runway. What followed was a textbook display of the macho; 'I can do it' attitude as the PF again dismissed my suggestion; insisting that the landing could still be made. The approach quickly destabilized; as he began what essentially amounted to a low altitude circle to land maneuver; involving steep bank angles and inconsistent descent rates. We overshot the centerline for our assigned runway again; this time in the opposite direction. By my estimate; we were no more than 30-50 feet over grass and still trying to correct for centerline before touching down slightly fast. I did my best to relay airspeed and altitude information throughout the duration of the maneuvering; but felt deeply uncomfortable with what the PF was attempting. We made it to the ramp without further incident; other than the passengers onboard wondering why we had executed such an interesting landing.upon reflection; there were many breakdowns in crew coordination that left me feeling unsettled and foolish. While I am very junior to the PF and lack substantial multicrew experience; time and time again my training stressed the importance of strictly adhering to standard operating procedures and remaining within the parameters of a stable approach. After debriefing the incident on the ground; the PF was ultimately aware that he should have executed a missed approach; and indicated that he would have complied had I more aggressively called for one. In hindsight; I would have much more firmly commanded a go-around the moment the approach destabilized; rather than merely suggest I was ready to initiate the maneuver. However; it is the responsibility of both pilots to understand the parameters of safe flying.it is always going to be important to remind myself that there is not a 'power distance relationship' in the cockpit when it comes to safely operating the airplane. Speaking up when you notice deviations from standard operating procedures; safe operations; or just plain feeling uncomfortable can save bad situations from becoming worse. Never become complacent flying visual approaches; and always provide a briefing that includes many of the items you find within a conventional instrument approach briefing. It is up to us pilots to ensure that the highest standards of safety and professionalism are being met every day within every facet of the aviation industry.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE-560XL First Officer reported the Captain lined up with the wrong runway and flew an unstabilized approach when correcting to the assigned runway.

Narrative: While approaching on a Part 91 corporate mission; ATC advised us to expect a visual approach. VMC weather conditions were encountered along the entire route of flight; and winds at the field indicated roughly 10-15 knots out of the South. My Captain was Pilot Flying (PF) and due to the clear weather gave an exceptionally terse briefing for what we could expect as we transitioned into the terminal area and executed the visual approach.Around 10 miles Northeast of the airport I suggested programming an instrument procedure into the FMS as a back up aid to situational awareness. However; PF indicated that an instrument backup would not be needed since we could clearly see the field; and he had landed there before. Being relatively new to the company and multi crew cockpit environments; I am still finding my voice in the right seat and left the suggestion at that; turning my attention to other arrival duties. After calling field in sight; ATC cleared us for the Visual Approach and handed us off to the Tower controller who requested that we advise when we were on a left base. In the distance I could clearly see what I understood to be the runway; informing the tower controller when I felt we were on a 2-3 mile left base. Instead of gradually turning left to join the final PF proceeded to obliviously fly straight through the extended runway centerline.This is where the next major breakdown in CRM occurred. I had correctly identified the runway we were supposed to land on; but upon passing it assumed that PF; as the more senior crewmember; must have had a good reason for doing so. Eventually; we incorrectly joined the final for the closely positioned intersecting runway which had been NOTAMed closed for improvements. PF did not see the construction equipment at the end of the runway and realize his mistake until we were roughly at 700 feet. With the aircraft continuing to descend towards the closed pavement; I immediately readied for a missed approach and verbalized to the PF that I was 'ready to call 'go-around.'' From where we were; now no more that 500-600 feet; it seemed impossible to me that we could ever safely correct and maneuver back to the originally assigned runway. What followed was a textbook display of the Macho; 'I can do it' attitude as the PF again dismissed my suggestion; insisting that the landing could still be made. The approach quickly destabilized; as he began what essentially amounted to a low altitude circle to land maneuver; involving steep bank angles and inconsistent descent rates. We overshot the centerline for our assigned runway again; this time in the opposite direction. By my estimate; we were no more than 30-50 feet over grass and still trying to correct for centerline before touching down slightly fast. I did my best to relay airspeed and altitude information throughout the duration of the maneuvering; but felt deeply uncomfortable with what the PF was attempting. We made it to the ramp without further incident; other than the passengers onboard wondering why we had executed such an interesting landing.Upon reflection; there were many breakdowns in crew coordination that left me feeling unsettled and foolish. While I am very junior to the PF and lack substantial multicrew experience; time and time again my training stressed the importance of strictly adhering to Standard Operating Procedures and remaining within the parameters of a stable approach. After debriefing the incident on the ground; the PF was ultimately aware that he should have executed a missed approach; and indicated that he would have complied had I more aggressively called for one. In hindsight; I would have much more firmly commanded a go-around the moment the approach destabilized; rather than merely suggest I was ready to initiate the maneuver. However; it is the responsibility of both pilots to understand the parameters of safe flying.It is always going to be important to remind myself that there is not a 'power distance relationship' in the cockpit when it comes to safely operating the airplane. Speaking up when you notice deviations from Standard Operating Procedures; safe operations; or just plain feeling uncomfortable can save bad situations from becoming worse. Never become complacent flying visual approaches; and always provide a briefing that includes many of the items you find within a conventional instrument approach briefing. It is up to us pilots to ensure that the highest standards of safety and professionalism are being met every day within every facet of the aviation industry.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.