Narrative:

Two separate issues; both caused by mechanic problems. The window likely had a seal issue; but one that was excessive enough to cause concern and thus a decision to return to the airport. The second issue; total icing system failure in icing conditions; was caused by something mechanical. Upon takeoff; we heard a loud noise coming from first officer's (first officer) window; indicating it wasn't sealed properly. We held pressurization and continued climb to 3000 MSL. We then had wing anti icing fail; followed by stabilizer and then master warning for anti-icing system fail. I continued to fly the aircraft and took the radios; and had first officer run QRH to try to regain icing protection. I notified ATC; set up for the runway; obtained performance; and briefed minimum required items for safe approach. First officer increased approach speed per QRH. We landed uneventfully and aircraft rescue and fire fighting followed us to [the] gate. A functioning aircraft would prevent this; however; I would like to add that a thorough pre-departure briefing that touches on who will accomplish what in an emergency can lead to a more cohesive flight deck and safe outcome. The emergency was handled safely but not as perfectly as I would have preferred. A briefing on specifically this subject; what to do in an emergency; could have alleviated some of the stress. I usually brief this but forgot to as we started our 4-day trip.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing a window seal leak and an icing system failure.

Narrative: Two separate issues; both caused by mechanic problems. The window likely had a seal issue; but one that was excessive enough to cause concern and thus a decision to return to the Airport. The second issue; total icing system failure in icing conditions; was caused by something mechanical. Upon takeoff; we heard a loud noise coming from First Officer's (FO) window; indicating it wasn't sealed properly. We held pressurization and continued climb to 3000 MSL. We then had wing Anti Icing fail; followed by STAB and then Master Warning for anti-icing system fail. I continued to fly the aircraft and took the radios; and had FO run QRH to try to regain icing protection. I notified ATC; set up for the runway; obtained performance; and briefed minimum required items for safe approach. FO increased approach speed per QRH. We landed uneventfully and Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting followed us to [the] gate. A functioning aircraft would prevent this; however; I would like to add that a thorough pre-departure briefing that touches on who will accomplish what in an emergency can lead to a more cohesive flight deck and safe outcome. The emergency was handled safely but not as perfectly as I would have preferred. A briefing on specifically this subject; what to do in an emergency; could have alleviated some of the stress. I usually brief this but forgot to as we started our 4-day trip.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.