Narrative:

I was scheduled for a trip from jackson, mi, to gulf shores, al, in an small transport. This was a part-135 trip scheduled for 5 passengers. With 5 passengers and a pilot, the airplane can not carry full fuel west/O exceeding the gross weight limitations of the airplane. The owner/operator of the company instructed the company lineman to defuel the airplane 30 gals per side. I was at home and off duty during the defueling. In our company manual, the pilot is directly responsible for aircraft fueling when away from home base. However, at the home base, the pilot is not expected or required to personally fuel or supervise the fueling or defueling of his airplane. It was standard procedure for the owner/operator to inform the pilot when he reported for duty, how many gallons were on board the aircraft for a heavy load of passenger or freight. As PIC, I am responsible for determining the amount of fuel needed to safely and legally conduct a flight. The company never questions or interferes in any fueling decisions I make. If I needed fuel, I get it. The company procedure for defueling aircraft is to fill the fuel tanks completely before taking out the desired gallons of fuel. This is the only way to know exactly how much fuel is in the airplane before defueling. At the home base a mistake was made in the defueling process. The owner/operator mistakenly believed that the airplane had been topped off a day or two earlier since he was the last one to fly in that airplane. The airplane was not full of fuel when the owner/operator instructed the lineman to defuel 30 gallons per side. The lineman did not visly check the fuel tanks. He was told to defuel 30 gallons per side and he did. The company had been reliable in the past and I had no reason to suspect that they would be unreliable in this one case. When I checked the cockpit and external fuel gauges, they read about what I expected them to read. This, in conjunction with the company report of the fueling, indicated to me that the fuel on board was as reported, 100 gallons. If the required fuel load had been full fuel it would have been easily verifiable by me. Well into the flight, the fuel gauges read less than I expected. Time wise, I knew that I had ample fuel, but I also knew that when you start with anything less than full tanks there is a possibility of slippage. For this reason I determined that the only absolutely safe procedure was to land and take on more fuel. This, eliminate all doubt about the original fueling. I changed my destination to mobil, al, at about 9000' and 30 mi out. Once I decided to land at mobil, I flew the airplane as if I might lose the engines at any moment. I informed mobil approach that I wanted to land at mobil and was given a vector for the airport. I was told that I would be number 2 for the approach. I then told the controller that I was giving him a fuel alert and I wanted to go directly to the airport. He gave me another vector and an ASR approach. In the turn to the new heading, one of the engines seemed to cough, but kept running all they way to the runway. I called the airport in sight and was cleared for the visibility approach. I landed and taxied to the GA ramp west/O any problem. I refueled and continued to gulf shores with my passengers. The company has implemented a major change in its defueling procedure to see that no defueling uncertainty occurs again in the future. No one will defuel an airplane until the pilot of that plane for that flight visly checks to see that the fuel tanks are full before defueling is begun. Also, the pilot must observe the defueling procedure personally. Both the owner/operator and I will do everything possible to ensure that this does not happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AT ACFT RUNS LOW ON FUEL WHILE AT CRUISE, DIVERTS TO NEARBY ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS SCHEDULED FOR A TRIP FROM JACKSON, MI, TO GULF SHORES, AL, IN AN SMT. THIS WAS A PART-135 TRIP SCHEDULED FOR 5 PAXS. WITH 5 PAXS AND A PLT, THE AIRPLANE CAN NOT CARRY FULL FUEL W/O EXCEEDING THE GROSS WEIGHT LIMITATIONS OF THE AIRPLANE. THE OWNER/OPERATOR OF THE COMPANY INSTRUCTED THE COMPANY LINEMAN TO DEFUEL THE AIRPLANE 30 GALS PER SIDE. I WAS AT HOME AND OFF DUTY DURING THE DEFUELING. IN OUR COMPANY MANUAL, THE PLT IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ACFT FUELING WHEN AWAY FROM HOME BASE. HOWEVER, AT THE HOME BASE, THE PLT IS NOT EXPECTED OR REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY FUEL OR SUPERVISE THE FUELING OR DEFUELING OF HIS AIRPLANE. IT WAS STANDARD PROC FOR THE OWNER/OPERATOR TO INFORM THE PLT WHEN HE RPTED FOR DUTY, HOW MANY GALLONS WERE ON BOARD THE ACFT FOR A HVY LOAD OF PAX OR FREIGHT. AS PIC, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF FUEL NEEDED TO SAFELY AND LEGALLY CONDUCT A FLT. THE COMPANY NEVER QUESTIONS OR INTERFERES IN ANY FUELING DECISIONS I MAKE. IF I NEEDED FUEL, I GET IT. THE COMPANY PROC FOR DEFUELING ACFT IS TO FILL THE FUEL TANKS COMPLETELY BEFORE TAKING OUT THE DESIRED GALLONS OF FUEL. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW MUCH FUEL IS IN THE AIRPLANE BEFORE DEFUELING. AT THE HOME BASE A MISTAKE WAS MADE IN THE DEFUELING PROCESS. THE OWNER/OPERATOR MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THAT THE AIRPLANE HAD BEEN TOPPED OFF A DAY OR TWO EARLIER SINCE HE WAS THE LAST ONE TO FLY IN THAT AIRPLANE. THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT FULL OF FUEL WHEN THE OWNER/OPERATOR INSTRUCTED THE LINEMAN TO DEFUEL 30 GALLONS PER SIDE. THE LINEMAN DID NOT VISLY CHK THE FUEL TANKS. HE WAS TOLD TO DEFUEL 30 GALLONS PER SIDE AND HE DID. THE COMPANY HAD BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST AND I HAD NO REASON TO SUSPECT THAT THEY WOULD BE UNRELIABLE IN THIS ONE CASE. WHEN I CHKED THE COCKPIT AND EXTERNAL FUEL GAUGES, THEY READ ABOUT WHAT I EXPECTED THEM TO READ. THIS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMPANY RPT OF THE FUELING, INDICATED TO ME THAT THE FUEL ON BOARD WAS AS RPTED, 100 GALLONS. IF THE REQUIRED FUEL LOAD HAD BEEN FULL FUEL IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASILY VERIFIABLE BY ME. WELL INTO THE FLT, THE FUEL GAUGES READ LESS THAN I EXPECTED. TIME WISE, I KNEW THAT I HAD AMPLE FUEL, BUT I ALSO KNEW THAT WHEN YOU START WITH ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL TANKS THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SLIPPAGE. FOR THIS REASON I DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY ABSOLUTELY SAFE PROC WAS TO LAND AND TAKE ON MORE FUEL. THIS, ELIMINATE ALL DOUBT ABOUT THE ORIGINAL FUELING. I CHANGED MY DEST TO MOBIL, AL, AT ABOUT 9000' AND 30 MI OUT. ONCE I DECIDED TO LAND AT MOBIL, I FLEW THE AIRPLANE AS IF I MIGHT LOSE THE ENGS AT ANY MOMENT. I INFORMED MOBIL APCH THAT I WANTED TO LAND AT MOBIL AND WAS GIVEN A VECTOR FOR THE ARPT. I WAS TOLD THAT I WOULD BE NUMBER 2 FOR THE APCH. I THEN TOLD THE CTLR THAT I WAS GIVING HIM A FUEL ALERT AND I WANTED TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE ARPT. HE GAVE ME ANOTHER VECTOR AND AN ASR APCH. IN THE TURN TO THE NEW HDG, ONE OF THE ENGS SEEMED TO COUGH, BUT KEPT RUNNING ALL THEY WAY TO THE RWY. I CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WAS CLRED FOR THE VIS APCH. I LANDED AND TAXIED TO THE GA RAMP W/O ANY PROB. I REFUELED AND CONTINUED TO GULF SHORES WITH MY PAXS. THE COMPANY HAS IMPLEMENTED A MAJOR CHANGE IN ITS DEFUELING PROC TO SEE THAT NO DEFUELING UNCERTAINTY OCCURS AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. NO ONE WILL DEFUEL AN AIRPLANE UNTIL THE PLT OF THAT PLANE FOR THAT FLT VISLY CHKS TO SEE THAT THE FUEL TANKS ARE FULL BEFORE DEFUELING IS BEGUN. ALSO, THE PLT MUST OBSERVE THE DEFUELING PROC PERSONALLY. BOTH THE OWNER/OPERATOR AND I WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.