Narrative:

Ca's (captain's) leg; uneventful takeoff and cruise segment. As we got closer to the airport; I noticed we were still left quite high in our descent. The ca asked for direct to the FAF as we descended under FL200. I made a comment that 'it would be close;' on this one; which should've been my personal indication to be even more aware and ready to say something in the event of an unstable approach. As we kept screaming along at 250KTS; approach control cleared us for the visual approach to the airport at almost a 90 degree intercept to the FAF. In order to get the altitude under control; the ca used flch which put us at an almost 4;000 ft/min descent rate through 4;000 ft. At this point; I was beginning to get a bit uncomfortable; but failed to say anything. As our descent rate was arrested at the FAF intercept altitude; we started configuring. I was a bit busy 'inside;' ensuring that flap speed limitations were not broken; when I realized that we had descended below the MSA as the ca disengaged the autopilot to smoothen the transition at the 90 degree intercept angle. At this point; I noticed we were below the glide slope and saw 4 red on the PAPI; with a radar altimeter reading lower than it should have been. The ca then leveled the aircraft and stayed at that altitude until the glide slope was intercepted. At this point a normal final approach to landing occurred without incident within the touchdown zone. Improper descent planning by both ATC and the flight crew in the flight deck; caused this incident. This was an error that caused unnecessarily high workload for us in the flight deck close to the ground and late in the day. I personally should've spoken up and called for a go-around with the first indication that we were below the glide slope. There was definitely a sense of 'get-there-itis;' as it was day 4 of the trip and the last leg as well. As a first officer; I failed in my responsibility to support my ca by suggesting a better outcome. I'm glad that the incident did not cause something more major to happen. In the future; I will be sure to speak up when I feel uncomfortable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-170 First Officer reported landing after an unstabilized approach on a steep descent profile and visual approach.

Narrative: CA's (Captain's) leg; uneventful takeoff and cruise segment. As we got closer to the airport; I noticed we were still left quite high in our descent. The CA asked for direct to the FAF as we descended under FL200. I made a comment that 'it would be close;' on this one; which should've been my personal indication to be even more aware and ready to say something in the event of an unstable approach. As we kept screaming along at 250KTS; approach control cleared us for the visual approach to the airport at almost a 90 degree intercept to the FAF. In order to get the altitude under control; the CA used FLCH which put us at an almost 4;000 ft/min descent rate through 4;000 ft. At this point; I was beginning to get a bit uncomfortable; but failed to say anything. As our descent rate was arrested at the FAF intercept altitude; we started configuring. I was a bit busy 'inside;' ensuring that flap speed limitations were not broken; when I realized that we had descended below the MSA as the CA disengaged the autopilot to smoothen the transition at the 90 degree intercept angle. At this point; I noticed we were below the glide slope and saw 4 red on the PAPI; with a radar altimeter reading lower than it should have been. The CA then leveled the aircraft and stayed at that altitude until the glide slope was intercepted. At this point a normal final approach to landing occurred without incident within the touchdown zone. Improper descent planning by both ATC and the flight crew in the flight deck; caused this incident. This was an error that caused unnecessarily high workload for us in the flight deck close to the ground and late in the day. I personally should've spoken up and called for a go-around with the first indication that we were below the glide slope. There was definitely a sense of 'get-there-itis;' as it was day 4 of the trip and the last leg as well. As a first officer; I failed in my responsibility to support my CA by suggesting a better outcome. I'm glad that the incident did not cause something more major to happen. In the future; I will be sure to speak up when I feel uncomfortable.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.