Narrative:

The crew flew into and out of iah during the weather event. Though the operation was slow and arduous to push and de-ice; there was a lot of inconsistent information influencing decision-making. In many cases; the information was erroneous or outdated and led to making decisions that placed the aircraft out of limits for takeoff and/or landing.first; on arrival; iah closed 33R to treat it chemically for ice; and TRACON left open the option of 27 for landing. [Runway] 27 had crosswinds near limits for a dry runway and a 6-hour-old report with a 5-5-5 field conditions (ficon). This enticed one of our pilots to accept the runway for approach. At some point; that aircraft was re-routed to 33R; 27 was closed due to 'being iced over'; yet the ficon or runway reports indicated the runway was okay for landing and one of our pilots did not properly scrutinize it.second; on departure; there was a long line to de-ice; and departures were suspended for prohibited takeoff conditions (freezing rain and mixed snow pellets). Arrivals continued with a 5-5-5 ficon being reported and braking action advisories in effect. Many arriving aircraft reported fair; and poor braking action after landing; yet the 5-5-5 remained. We were due to takeoff; armed with this information; and using a parallel but untreated runway. Sure; we would have been compliant using 5-5-5; but this wasn't reality; for either us or anyone else taking off or landing. Iah seemingly did not attempt to; or want to; update the runway conditions; as this would affect operations. Anyone operating under the assumption that the runways were simply 'wet' was clearly operating precariously; if not out of limits. Third; iah clearly has responsibility for this. Our aircraft were at a greater risk. Better updates need to take place; certainly after a suspension of operations. Fourth; ACARS 6-hour old reports misled pilots and create poor decision-making. We are fortunate no one departed the prepared surface.please review this event; as it encourages me to not trust my tools; ficon; iah deice; which used inaccurate metar; ACARS field conditions. All of these were not reflective of actual conditions. I believe iah was not responsive or prompt [on] updating and that definitely contributed. If these are the best we have; they should work better than they did in the iah ice event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 Captain reported inaccurate runway condition from ATC; air-field condition reports (FICON); and dispatch; which led to unsafe operations.

Narrative: The crew flew into and out of IAH during the weather event. Though the operation was slow and arduous to push and de-ice; there was a lot of inconsistent information influencing decision-making. In many cases; the information was erroneous or outdated and led to making decisions that placed the aircraft out of limits for takeoff and/or landing.First; on arrival; IAH closed 33R to treat it chemically for ice; and TRACON left open the option of 27 for landing. [Runway] 27 had crosswinds near limits for a dry runway and a 6-hour-old report with a 5-5-5 Field Conditions (FICON). This enticed one of our pilots to accept the runway for approach. At some point; that aircraft was re-routed to 33R; 27 was closed due to 'being iced over'; yet the FICON or runway reports indicated the runway was okay for landing and one of our pilots did not properly scrutinize it.Second; on departure; there was a long line to de-ice; and departures were suspended for prohibited takeoff conditions (freezing rain and mixed snow pellets). Arrivals continued with a 5-5-5 FICON being reported and Braking Action Advisories in effect. Many arriving aircraft reported fair; and poor braking action after landing; yet the 5-5-5 remained. We were due to takeoff; armed with this information; and using a parallel but untreated runway. Sure; we would have been compliant using 5-5-5; but this wasn't reality; for either us or anyone else taking off or landing. IAH seemingly did not attempt to; or want to; update the runway conditions; as this would affect operations. Anyone operating under the assumption that the runways were simply 'wet' was clearly operating precariously; if not out of limits. Third; IAH clearly has responsibility for this. Our aircraft were at a greater risk. Better updates need to take place; certainly after a suspension of operations. Fourth; ACARS 6-hour old reports misled pilots and create poor decision-making. We are fortunate no one departed the prepared surface.Please review this event; as it encourages me to not trust my tools; FICON; IAH deice; which used inaccurate METAR; ACARS field conditions. All of these were not reflective of actual conditions. I believe IAH was not responsive or prompt [on] updating and that definitely contributed. If these are the best we have; they should work better than they did in the IAH ice event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.