Narrative:

During aircraft taxi; north bound on taxiways 'B' and 'right' at kewr; the aircraft crew was cleared by tower to line up and wait on runway 22R at intersection 'west'. The aircraft crew incorrectly turned on 'Y' to line up and wait on runway 22R at intersection 'Y'; the intersection just south of intersection 'west' when heading north bound on 'right' taxiway. The tower alerted the aircraft crew of their error. After consulting the dispatch provided takeoff length required for the flight it was determined that; the required performance from intersection 'Y' was satisfied and a takeoff clearance was subsequently accepted. (Take-off power was never applied prior to accepting a performance verified take-off clearance from ATC.) [my] suggestions [are] continued adherence with company established procedures to confirm runway and intersection prior to entering an active runway. (In this case; the aircrew verified and 'called-out' the lineup and wait clearance well prior to reaching the 'west' intersection. Our flight was very oddly the only aircraft ready for departure in taxi north bound on 'right' with no aircraft in queue waiting for takeoff. Tower issued the lineup and wait clearance and the crew started the lineup checklist prior to reaching 'west' intersection. The aircrew was distracted by running the checklist instead of verifying the correct taxiway for turn. Of further note: airport flow; landing runway 29 earlier; had kewr departing traffic utilizing 22R at intersection 'Y' for departure. While this clearance was not provided to the aircrew by ATC; it may well have played a role in selecting the incorrect intersection when distracted.)second; aircrew rushing to comply with an ATC issued clearance. The aircrew should have continued compliance with ATC instruction while maintaining a workflow pace that ensured adherence with company procedures. Third; a junior captain with limited 'hands-on' taxi experience should take extra time and care during taxi at a complex airfield. Fourth; a window mounted efb airport taxi diagram would have been useful in this circumstance to enhance situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Embraer First Officer reported entering the runway for takeoff at the wrong intersection.

Narrative: During aircraft taxi; North Bound on taxiways 'B' and 'R' at KEWR; the aircraft crew was cleared by Tower to line up and wait on runway 22R at Intersection 'W'. The aircraft crew incorrectly turned on 'Y' to line up and wait on runway 22R at Intersection 'Y'; the intersection just south of intersection 'W' when heading North Bound on 'R' taxiway. The tower alerted the aircraft crew of their error. After consulting the dispatch provided Takeoff length required for the flight it was determined that; the required performance from intersection 'Y' was satisfied and a takeoff clearance was subsequently accepted. (Take-Off Power was never applied prior to accepting a performance verified take-off clearance from ATC.) [My] suggestions [are] continued adherence with Company established procedures to confirm runway and intersection prior to entering an active runway. (In this case; the aircrew verified and 'called-out' the lineup and wait clearance well prior to reaching the 'W' intersection. Our flight was very oddly the only aircraft ready for departure in taxi North Bound on 'R' with no aircraft in queue waiting for takeoff. Tower issued the lineup and wait clearance and the crew started the lineup checklist prior to reaching 'W' intersection. The aircrew was distracted by running the checklist instead of verifying the correct taxiway for turn. Of further note: Airport flow; landing runway 29 earlier; had KEWR departing traffic utilizing 22R at intersection 'Y' for departure. While this clearance was not provided to the aircrew by ATC; it may well have played a role in selecting the incorrect intersection when distracted.)Second; aircrew rushing to comply with an ATC issued clearance. The aircrew should have continued compliance with ATC instruction while maintaining a workflow pace that ensured adherence with Company procedures. Third; a junior Captain with limited 'hands-on' taxi experience should take extra time and care during taxi at a complex airfield. Fourth; a window mounted EFB airport taxi diagram would have been useful in this circumstance to enhance situational awareness.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.