Narrative:

The onboard electronic checklist in the 777 fleet is not accurate regarding the smoke; fire and fumes checklist. A pilot will run the procedure and then come to the end with no indication of further required action when a fire could be burning in the cabin and the information to stop that fire is not referenced nor included in the onboard checklist. The fact that the bulletin is in the QRH after 5 pages of review; during an event where expediency and accuracy may save lives or all lives; requires the pilot to reread all the steps they just accomplished while a plane is burning; and then instead of a checklist style publication that leads you to exactly the procedure needed to save lives. The pilot must read a bulletin style publication to glean to critical steps needed to save lives. This bulletin has been in our publications for 3 years; safety needs to be a priority.during a recent FAA required simulator training session; this procedure was found to fail to address the situation of a fire in the cabin. The procedure added to the workload during an emergency in a way the tem (threat and error management) model would not support; most of all; the procedure in the onboard checklist failed to solve the problem when the information needed does exist. A positive outcome would be unlikely.fix the onboard checklist in accordance with tem goals and safety; put the needed information in the checklist in a manner that enhances safety and efficiency thereby increasing the likelihood of a positive outcome in real life.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Boeing 777 First Officer reported that electronic checklist is not accurate regarding the Smoke; Fire and Fumes Checklist.

Narrative: The onboard electronic checklist in the 777 fleet is not accurate regarding the Smoke; Fire and Fumes Checklist. A pilot will run the procedure and then come to the end with no indication of further required action when a fire could be burning in the cabin and the information to stop that fire is not referenced nor included in the onboard checklist. The fact that the Bulletin is in the QRH after 5 pages of review; during an event where expediency and accuracy may save lives or all lives; requires the pilot to reread all the steps they just accomplished while a plane is burning; and then instead of a checklist style publication that leads you to exactly the procedure needed to save lives. The pilot must read a bulletin style publication to glean to critical steps needed to save lives. This Bulletin has been in our publications for 3 years; safety needs to be a priority.During a recent FAA required simulator training session; this procedure was found to fail to address the situation of a fire in the cabin. The procedure added to the workload during an emergency in a way the TEM (THREAT and ERROR MANAGEMENT) model would not support; most of all; the procedure in the onboard checklist failed to solve the problem when the information needed does exist. A positive outcome would be unlikely.Fix the onboard checklist in accordance with TEM goals and safety; put the needed information in the checklist in a manner that enhances safety and efficiency thereby increasing the likelihood of a positive outcome in real life.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.