Narrative:

Arrival in the tus area was after nightfall. Skies were cloudy with towering cumulus and thunderstorms in the area. Tus approach control was providing radar vectors for an approach to runway 11L. While we were on an assigned heading of 270 degrees, approximately 6 mi northeast of the airport and descending through 6500' to a cleared altitude of 6000', tus approach control asked if we had the runway in sight. I replied that we did and approach control then issued clearance for a visibility approach to runway 11L. He then added that we had air carrier medium large transport Y traffic at our 12-1 O'clock position which would follow us to the airport. I advised that we saw a light in that position. We were then told to change to tus tower frequency. I called tus tower and reported on a visibility approach to runway 11L. Tus tower advised that th wind was 220/12 and asked if we wanted runway 21. I advised that runway 11L was satisfactory and that we would continue for that runway. During this time we had been watching the landing light of the medium large transport Y traffic while maneuvering for the visibility approach and if appeared to be closing in on our position. I then asked tus tower if the spacing on the traffic which was to follow us looked ok. The tower immediately responded, 'air carrier X, turn right immediately to 360 degrees and climb to 6000'.' we immediately responded, 'executing a missed approach,' in accordance with those instructions. A few seconds later the medium large transport Y traffic passed approximately 1/2MI off our 11 O'clock position at the same altitude or slightly below us. We were instructed by tus tower to contact tus approach control for another approach. Subsequently, tus approach control provided radar vectors for another approach which was accomplished west/O incident. I advised the approach controller that a near miss report would be filed and requested to know who was responsible for the mistake. He replied that it was his responsibility and requested a phone call on our arrival. After landing I called the approach controller on the phone to discuss the incident with him. He indicated that he had expected our aircraft to turn immediately toward the airport after being cleared for the visibility approach. I pointed out to him that our distance from the airport (approximately 6 NM) and altitude (approximately 6500') at that time dictated a continuation of our downwind/base leg to allow for a normal rate of descent required to accomplish a stabilized approach to the airport. Had we turned directly toward the airport upon being cleared for the visibility approach, it would have required an average descent rate to T/D of approximately 1800 FPM (650 '/mi). The approach controller indicated that he understood the problem and that he had failed to recognize that fact in providing the spacing between the 2 aircraft. I also contacted tus tower by phone to talk with the tower controller involved. I expressed to him the thanks of the flight crew for his recognition of the conflict and quick action which very likely help us to avoid a midair collision. It should be noted that because of the aircraft maneuvering in progress (both aircraft), night operations, turbulence and cockpit workload, the visibility cues necessary for the flight crews to have avoided this conflict were not available. The single landing light visible to our crew provided inadequate depth perception necessary to judge distance, flight path or closure rate of the oncoming aircraft. Our reliance was necessarily placed primarily on the spacing provided by ATC, the assurance that we were cleared to execute a visibility approach to runway 11L, the assurance that ATC had coordinated and confirmed with the other aircraft that they had our aircraft in sight, that visibility sep would be maintained and that they would maneuver so as to follow our aircraft to the airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRBORNE CONFLICT BETWEEN 2 ACR MLG ACFT AT NIGHT AT TUS.

Narrative: ARR IN THE TUS AREA WAS AFTER NIGHTFALL. SKIES WERE CLOUDY WITH TOWERING CUMULUS AND TSTMS IN THE AREA. TUS APCH CTL WAS PROVIDING RADAR VECTORS FOR AN APCH TO RWY 11L. WHILE WE WERE ON AN ASSIGNED HDG OF 270 DEGS, APPROX 6 MI NE OF THE ARPT AND DSNDING THROUGH 6500' TO A CLRED ALT OF 6000', TUS APCH CTL ASKED IF WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. I REPLIED THAT WE DID AND APCH CTL THEN ISSUED CLRNC FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 11L. HE THEN ADDED THAT WE HAD ACR MLG Y TFC AT OUR 12-1 O'CLOCK POS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW US TO THE ARPT. I ADVISED THAT WE SAW A LIGHT IN THAT POS. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO CHANGE TO TUS TWR FREQ. I CALLED TUS TWR AND RPTED ON A VIS APCH TO RWY 11L. TUS TWR ADVISED THAT TH WIND WAS 220/12 AND ASKED IF WE WANTED RWY 21. I ADVISED THAT RWY 11L WAS SATISFACTORY AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE FOR THAT RWY. DURING THIS TIME WE HAD BEEN WATCHING THE LNDG LIGHT OF THE MLG Y TFC WHILE MANEUVERING FOR THE VIS APCH AND IF APPEARED TO BE CLOSING IN ON OUR POS. I THEN ASKED TUS TWR IF THE SPACING ON THE TFC WHICH WAS TO FOLLOW US LOOKED OK. THE TWR IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED, 'ACR X, TURN RIGHT IMMEDIATELY TO 360 DEGS AND CLB TO 6000'.' WE IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED, 'EXECUTING A MISSED APCH,' IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE INSTRUCTIONS. A FEW SECS LATER THE MLG Y TFC PASSED APPROX 1/2MI OFF OUR 11 O'CLOCK POS AT THE SAME ALT OR SLIGHTLY BELOW US. WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY TUS TWR TO CONTACT TUS APCH CTL FOR ANOTHER APCH. SUBSEQUENTLY, TUS APCH CTL PROVIDED RADAR VECTORS FOR ANOTHER APCH WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED W/O INCIDENT. I ADVISED THE APCH CTLR THAT A NEAR MISS RPT WOULD BE FILED AND REQUESTED TO KNOW WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKE. HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY AND REQUESTED A PHONE CALL ON OUR ARR. AFTER LNDG I CALLED THE APCH CTLR ON THE PHONE TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH HIM. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD EXPECTED OUR ACFT TO TURN IMMEDIATELY TOWARD THE ARPT AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE VIS APCH. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT OUR DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT (APPROX 6 NM) AND ALT (APPROX 6500') AT THAT TIME DICTATED A CONTINUATION OF OUR DOWNWIND/BASE LEG TO ALLOW FOR A NORMAL RATE OF DSNT REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH A STABILIZED APCH TO THE ARPT. HAD WE TURNED DIRECTLY TOWARD THE ARPT UPON BEING CLRED FOR THE VIS APCH, IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED AN AVERAGE DSNT RATE TO T/D OF APPROX 1800 FPM (650 '/MI). THE APCH CTLR INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROB AND THAT HE HAD FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT FACT IN PROVIDING THE SPACING BTWN THE 2 ACFT. I ALSO CONTACTED TUS TWR BY PHONE TO TALK WITH THE TWR CTLR INVOLVED. I EXPRESSED TO HIM THE THANKS OF THE FLT CREW FOR HIS RECOGNITION OF THE CONFLICT AND QUICK ACTION WHICH VERY LIKELY HELP US TO AVOID A MIDAIR COLLISION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE ACFT MANEUVERING IN PROGRESS (BOTH ACFT), NIGHT OPS, TURB AND COCKPIT WORKLOAD, THE VIS CUES NECESSARY FOR THE FLT CREWS TO HAVE AVOIDED THIS CONFLICT WERE NOT AVAILABLE. THE SINGLE LNDG LIGHT VISIBLE TO OUR CREW PROVIDED INADEQUATE DEPTH PERCEPTION NECESSARY TO JUDGE DISTANCE, FLT PATH OR CLOSURE RATE OF THE ONCOMING ACFT. OUR RELIANCE WAS NECESSARILY PLACED PRIMARILY ON THE SPACING PROVIDED BY ATC, THE ASSURANCE THAT WE WERE CLRED TO EXECUTE A VIS APCH TO RWY 11L, THE ASSURANCE THAT ATC HAD COORDINATED AND CONFIRMED WITH THE OTHER ACFT THAT THEY HAD OUR ACFT IN SIGHT, THAT VIS SEP WOULD BE MAINTAINED AND THAT THEY WOULD MANEUVER SO AS TO FOLLOW OUR ACFT TO THE ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.