Narrative:

The 'day' began with an early am departure from dca to mem. We were scheduled for an 11 hour daytime layover at mem with an evening departure from mem to sfo. First officer resides in mem and went home, myself and rest of crew went to hotel I slept maybe 2 hours during afternoon and returned to airport early evening. Flight was delayed approximately 2 hours due to late arrival of outbnd aircraft. First officer arrived and observed how 'tired' he was since he had done 'yardwork' all day at home. Our flight finally departed late pm local time for the 4:30 plus flight to sfo. First officer was PF. En route discussed necessity to request lower altitudes with both oak center and bay approach when approaching sfo due to tendency to be 'caught high' on arrival in this aircraft type. Area arrival progressed smoothly and were cleared for the quiet bridge visibility to runway 28R. Good speed control and vertical descent planning until vicinity of brijj LOM. While changing radio frequency from approach to tower (head down) first officer selected an 'open descent' to 400' MSL. Autoplt was off, both F/ds were engaged, and autothrust was on. While contacting sfo tower I became aware that we were below the G/south, that airspeed was decaying and that we were in an 'open descent'. Instructed first officer to engage the F/south mode in order to stop our descent, restore the speed mode for the autothrust, and continue the approach visly once above the runway 28R ILS G/south. Company procedures explicitly prohibit selecting an altitude below 1500' AGL during an open descent since this places the aircraft close to the ground with engines at idle. It is suspected that this was the cause of the air carrier widebody transport accident in asia. I attempted to explain to the first officer once we were parked at the gate that he had configured the aircraft improperly. Unfortunately he was not receptive to my input and elected to ignore my cautions. Contributing factors. Fatigue, due to inadequate rest at a daytime layover. Crew coordination, recently merged seniority list placed junior/younger captain with older first officer and created uncooperative atmosphere. Lack of adherence to standard operating procedures. 'Highly automated' aircraft demands explicit following of established procedures. Unfortunately it is possible to fly the aircraft numerous ways that will degrade your safety margin rapidly. Adherence to procedures would've prevented this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF ADVANCED TYPE FLY BY WIRE ACR LGT ALLOWS UNSTABILIZED HAND FLOWN APCH, UTILIZING AN 'AUTOFLT' MODE PRESCRIBED AS ILLEGAL BELOW 1500' IN THE ACFT FLT MANUAL.

Narrative: THE 'DAY' BEGAN WITH AN EARLY AM DEP FROM DCA TO MEM. WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR AN 11 HR DAYTIME LAYOVER AT MEM WITH AN EVENING DEP FROM MEM TO SFO. F/O RESIDES IN MEM AND WENT HOME, MYSELF AND REST OF CREW WENT TO HOTEL I SLEPT MAYBE 2 HRS DURING AFTERNOON AND RETURNED TO ARPT EARLY EVENING. FLT WAS DELAYED APPROX 2 HRS DUE TO LATE ARR OF OUTBND ACFT. F/O ARRIVED AND OBSERVED HOW 'TIRED' HE WAS SINCE HE HAD DONE 'YARDWORK' ALL DAY AT HOME. OUR FLT FINALLY DEPARTED LATE PM LCL TIME FOR THE 4:30 PLUS FLT TO SFO. F/O WAS PF. ENRTE DISCUSSED NECESSITY TO REQUEST LOWER ALTS WITH BOTH OAK CTR AND BAY APCH WHEN APCHING SFO DUE TO TENDENCY TO BE 'CAUGHT HIGH' ON ARR IN THIS ACFT TYPE. AREA ARR PROGRESSED SMOOTHLY AND WERE CLRED FOR THE QUIET BRIDGE VIS TO RWY 28R. GOOD SPD CTL AND VERT DSNT PLANNING UNTIL VICINITY OF BRIJJ LOM. WHILE CHANGING RADIO FREQ FROM APCH TO TWR (HEAD DOWN) F/O SELECTED AN 'OPEN DSNT' TO 400' MSL. AUTOPLT WAS OFF, BOTH F/DS WERE ENGAGED, AND AUTOTHRUST WAS ON. WHILE CONTACTING SFO TWR I BECAME AWARE THAT WE WERE BELOW THE G/S, THAT AIRSPD WAS DECAYING AND THAT WE WERE IN AN 'OPEN DSNT'. INSTRUCTED F/O TO ENGAGE THE F/S MODE IN ORDER TO STOP OUR DSNT, RESTORE THE SPD MODE FOR THE AUTOTHRUST, AND CONTINUE THE APCH VISLY ONCE ABOVE THE RWY 28R ILS G/S. COMPANY PROCS EXPLICITLY PROHIBIT SELECTING AN ALT BELOW 1500' AGL DURING AN OPEN DSNT SINCE THIS PLACES THE ACFT CLOSE TO THE GND WITH ENGS AT IDLE. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THIS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ACR WDB ACCIDENT IN ASIA. I ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN TO THE F/O ONCE WE WERE PARKED AT THE GATE THAT HE HAD CONFIGURED THE ACFT IMPROPERLY. UNFORTUNATELY HE WAS NOT RECEPTIVE TO MY INPUT AND ELECTED TO IGNORE MY CAUTIONS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. FATIGUE, DUE TO INADEQUATE REST AT A DAYTIME LAYOVER. CREW COORD, RECENTLY MERGED SENIORITY LIST PLACED JUNIOR/YOUNGER CAPT WITH OLDER F/O AND CREATED UNCOOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE. LACK OF ADHERENCE TO STANDARD OPERATING PROCS. 'HIGHLY AUTOMATED' ACFT DEMANDS EXPLICIT FOLLOWING OF ESTABLISHED PROCS. UNFORTUNATELY IT IS POSSIBLE TO FLY THE ACFT NUMEROUS WAYS THAT WILL DEGRADE YOUR SAFETY MARGIN RAPIDLY. ADHERENCE TO PROCS WOULD'VE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.