Narrative:

An unforecast thunderstorm left us making decisions with less fuel than we often would have had in this situation. Had we more fuel; holding and waiting for the weather to pass and knowing we could still divert if it didn't would have been ideal. That is not the situation in which we found ourselves. We had enough fuel for one approach; a missed; and a diversion. I feel that under the circumstances; our decision-making was appropriate. Our timing was unfortunate. Gusty; shifting; changeable winds in the flare are an extreme hazard. By the time its extent was apparent; we were well past the point at which a go around would have been safe or even successful.there was no alternate for [the] flight; as current and forecast conditions at our time of departure were excellent. The fuel planning was adequate for the expected conditions. The flight was routine and uneventful until we spotted lightning while inbound. We immediately turned on the radar; revealing several cells northwest and moving towards the airport. The ATIS still showed calm winds at the surface. While the first officer (first officer) continued to analyze the twips and the radar images; I assessed our fuel situation; including ability to hold and/or divert; and seated the flight attendants with the advice that it may be rough ahead. As no alternate was planned; our fuel situation would not allow for holding long enough to be confident that the weather would have passed. I determined that an approach; a missed; and the necessary diversion around the weather (which was between us and our impromptu planned diversion airport) was possible; though we would arrive with minimum fuel. As we continued inbound; the storms also continued their advance. I queried approach about the surface winds; and finding them insignificant (less than 10 knots;) requested landing on the runway xx instead; thus saving us the requisite time to fly a downwind and getting us on the ground with a greater distance between us and the oncoming weather. The request was denied due to traffic considerations. The first officer and I briefed the new plan and potential go around.we continued inbound; now via vectors. We remained in VFR conditions throughout. We called the field in sight approximately abeam it; and were cleared for the approach with instructions to follow the preceding aircraft. As anticipated; the first officer kept the speed up until the base turn. We were busy configuring and turning and triple checking everything. On the base turn; we began to experience light turbulence. The tower controller gave us an imprecise wind update; something along the lines of feeling the wind increase. I had to ask him to say again due to workload. We turned approximately a 3 mile final with the storm approximately 6 miles from the field. The first officer rolled out right on localizer and glideslope. We were cleared to land with all checklists complete and increasing turbulence; plus and minus 5 knots. The first officer flew it well; maintaining pitch and airspeed admirably under the circumstances; and I added occasional advice about power settings and speed maintenance due to the challenging conditions and my strong interest in making sure that he continued to fly it well. I followed him on the controls in case I needed to take them at any point; but at no point did I take the controls or did he think that I had. We were alert to the possibility of; and ready for; a windshear caution or warning; but there was none. As he entered the flare; a sustained gust pushed us a bit high and elongated the flare. As the aircraft slowed and the ailerons became less effective; greater control movements were made to maintain control. Quickly shifting winds as the aircraft slowed induced a right roll and contact between the surface and right wingtip just before touchdown.we landed at approximately 69;000 lbs. With 3;700 lbs. Of fuel on board; almost exactly what the flight was planned to land with. We were advised that on landing; the storm was approximately 4 miles from the field.I know weight and fuel savings are an important consideration when running an airline; but a slightly greater fuel buffer might offer pilots more options; particularly as we head into the summer months when storms; including the unforecast variety; will be more frequent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported that a gust from a nearby thunderstorm caused a right roll during the landing flare; which resulted in a wingtip contacting the runway.

Narrative: An unforecast thunderstorm left us making decisions with less fuel than we often would have had in this situation. Had we more fuel; holding and waiting for the weather to pass and knowing we could still divert if it didn't would have been ideal. That is not the situation in which we found ourselves. We had enough fuel for one approach; a missed; and a diversion. I feel that under the circumstances; our decision-making was appropriate. Our timing was unfortunate. Gusty; shifting; changeable winds in the flare are an extreme hazard. By the time its extent was apparent; we were well past the point at which a go around would have been safe or even successful.There was no alternate for [the] flight; as current and forecast conditions at our time of departure were excellent. The fuel planning was adequate for the expected conditions. The flight was routine and uneventful until we spotted lightning while inbound. We immediately turned on the radar; revealing several cells northwest and moving towards the airport. The ATIS still showed calm winds at the surface. While the FO (First Officer) continued to analyze the TWIPS and the radar images; I assessed our fuel situation; including ability to hold and/or divert; and seated the flight attendants with the advice that it may be rough ahead. As no alternate was planned; our fuel situation would not allow for holding long enough to be confident that the weather would have passed. I determined that an approach; a missed; and the necessary diversion around the weather (which was between us and our impromptu planned diversion airport) was possible; though we would arrive with minimum fuel. As we continued inbound; the storms also continued their advance. I queried approach about the surface winds; and finding them insignificant (less than 10 knots;) requested landing on the Runway XX instead; thus saving us the requisite time to fly a downwind and getting us on the ground with a greater distance between us and the oncoming weather. The request was denied due to traffic considerations. The FO and I briefed the new plan and potential go around.We continued inbound; now via vectors. We remained in VFR conditions throughout. We called the field in sight approximately abeam it; and were cleared for the approach with instructions to follow the preceding aircraft. As anticipated; the FO kept the speed up until the base turn. We were busy configuring and turning and triple checking everything. On the base turn; we began to experience light turbulence. The Tower Controller gave us an imprecise wind update; something along the lines of feeling the wind increase. I had to ask him to say again due to workload. We turned approximately a 3 mile final with the storm approximately 6 miles from the field. The FO rolled out right on localizer and glideslope. We were cleared to land with all checklists complete and increasing turbulence; plus and minus 5 knots. The FO flew it well; maintaining pitch and airspeed admirably under the circumstances; and I added occasional advice about power settings and speed maintenance due to the challenging conditions and my strong interest in making sure that he continued to fly it well. I followed him on the controls in case I needed to take them at any point; but at no point did I take the controls or did he think that I had. We were alert to the possibility of; and ready for; a windshear caution or warning; but there was none. As he entered the flare; a sustained gust pushed us a bit high and elongated the flare. As the aircraft slowed and the ailerons became less effective; greater control movements were made to maintain control. Quickly shifting winds as the aircraft slowed induced a right roll and contact between the surface and right wingtip just before touchdown.We landed at approximately 69;000 lbs. with 3;700 lbs. of fuel on board; almost exactly what the flight was planned to land with. We were advised that on landing; the storm was approximately 4 miles from the field.I know weight and fuel savings are an important consideration when running an airline; but a slightly greater fuel buffer might offer pilots more options; particularly as we head into the summer months when storms; including the unforecast variety; will be more frequent.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.