Narrative:

While taxiing out for takeoff both generators failed to come online and we lost electrical power on the aircraft. We were given a 35min takeoff delay so after pushback I elected to single engine taxi because I thought we would have to sit somewhere to absorb the delay. After the pushback crew had disconnected and after engine start the first officer got busy either with ATC or load control and we got an ECAM. I thought it was a routine ECAM because of the single engine start and the first officer was busy so I cleared it. The first officer was relatively new on the airbus so I thought I was helping. We then proceeded to taxi but with the high workload of the low viz taxi I instructed the first officer to start the second engine.at some point the first officer said that he did not think that it was a routine ECAM but because of the high workload and difficulty of low viz taxiing we never discussed it further. After starting the second engine we lost all electrical power on the aircraft. I stopped the aircraft and reset #1 generator which restored power then I reset #2 generator. I then instructed the first officer to tell ground we would be returning to the gate. Ground arranged for a vehicle escort to the ramp because of the low viz. We had adequate viz at this point but it was required for their procedures. While waiting for gate assignment we received an ECAM message: engine 2 sensor fault- eng 2 master switch off. We followed ECAM procedures and shut the engine down and then taxied to a gate. Once at the gate maintenance personnel had us start both engines and neither generator would come online automatically. They did not retrieve any canceled messages from the ECAM or electronically.by electing to single engine taxi I increased our work load and by canceling the first ECAM may have delayed the realization that this aircraft had electrical malfunctions. We would have ended up returning to the gate anyway. If I had this flight to do over I would not have elected to single engine taxi and I would have waited for the first officer to address the first ECAM.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew reported returning to the gate after experiencing a total loss of electrical power during taxi out.

Narrative: While taxiing out for takeoff both generators failed to come online and we lost electrical power on the aircraft. We were given a 35min takeoff delay so after pushback I elected to single engine taxi because I thought we would have to sit somewhere to absorb the delay. After the pushback crew had disconnected and after engine start the FO got busy either with ATC or Load Control and we got an ECAM. I thought it was a routine ECAM because of the single engine start and the FO was busy so I cleared it. The FO was relatively new on the Airbus so I thought I was helping. We then proceeded to taxi but with the high workload of the low viz taxi I instructed the FO to start the second engine.At some point the FO said that he did not think that it was a routine ECAM but because of the high workload and difficulty of low viz taxiing we never discussed it further. After starting the second engine we lost all electrical power on the aircraft. I stopped the aircraft and reset #1 generator which restored power then I reset #2 generator. I then instructed the FO to tell ground we would be returning to the gate. Ground arranged for a vehicle escort to the ramp because of the low viz. We had adequate viz at this point but it was required for their procedures. While waiting for gate assignment we received an ECAM message: ENG 2 Sensor Fault- Eng 2 Master Switch Off. We followed ECAM procedures and shut the engine down and then taxied to a gate. Once at the gate Maintenance personnel had us start both engines and neither generator would come online automatically. They did not retrieve any canceled messages from the ECAM or electronically.By electing to single engine taxi I increased our work load and by canceling the first ECAM may have delayed the realization that this aircraft had electrical malfunctions. We would have ended up returning to the gate anyway. If I had this flight to do over I would not have elected to single engine taxi and I would have waited for the FO to address the first ECAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.