|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : q61|
|Altitude||msl bound lower : 4800|
msl bound upper : 4800
|Controlling Facilities||tower : phx|
|Operator||general aviation : personal|
|Make Model Name||Helicopter|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Function||other personnel other|
|Qualification||other other : other|
|Anomaly||non adherence : far|
|Independent Detector||other other : unspecified|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
This aircraft was operated with a part that was past its finite life. The problem arose due to the difficulty of interpreting the data recording system of all of the finite lives on each of the parts within a component. Components are normally tracked by their time between overhaul (tbo) and if a part within that component cannot last until the next overhaul the overhaul limit should be reduced to coincide with the life limit of the part. In this case it was not performed correctly and the component overflew the finite life of the part and therefore making the rotor head unairworthy. Contributing factors are the busy schedule at this time of the yr. Also the fact that the log cards do not have a place to record the component time when a piece part should be removed. Another contributing factor was the failure to highlight (draw attention to) the lower time on a singular part. Corrective actions in this case are to incorporate a revised log card which will identify the specific component time at which a part will become time expired and therefore the assembly must be removed. Also if any part is due replacement prior to the next overhaul time it will be written on the front page of the log card and will be highlighted so that it will be quite obvious that the part will become time expired and therefore the assembly must be removed. Also if any part is due replacement prior to the next overhaul time it will be written on the front page of the log card and will be highlighted so that it will be quite obvious that the part must be removed at a specific component time. This information is also being added to a new computer system which will continually update and track all of the parts within an assembly that are placed in operation on an aircraft. In summary the fault lies in inadequate record management and record keeping and steps have been taken to tighten up the discipline regarding the documentation management to eliminate faults such as this in the future. The aircraft was shut down with two and a half hours of flying remaining.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A PART WITHIN A COMPONENT ASSEMBLY REACHED ITS FINITE LIFE WITHOUT BEING NOTED. FLEW PAST FINITE LIFE.
Narrative: THIS ACFT WAS OPERATED WITH A PART THAT WAS PAST ITS FINITE LIFE. THE PROB AROSE DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETING THE DATA RECORDING SYS OF ALL OF THE FINITE LIVES ON EACH OF THE PARTS WITHIN A COMPONENT. COMPONENTS ARE NORMALLY TRACKED BY THEIR TIME BTWN OVERHAUL (TBO) AND IF A PART WITHIN THAT COMPONENT CANNOT LAST UNTIL THE NEXT OVERHAUL THE OVERHAUL LIMIT SHOULD BE REDUCED TO COINCIDE WITH THE LIFE LIMIT OF THE PART. IN THIS CASE IT WAS NOT PERFORMED CORRECTLY AND THE COMPONENT OVERFLEW THE FINITE LIFE OF THE PART AND THEREFORE MAKING THE ROTOR HEAD UNAIRWORTHY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE THE BUSY SCHEDULE AT THIS TIME OF THE YR. ALSO THE FACT THAT THE LOG CARDS DO NOT HAVE A PLACE TO RECORD THE COMPONENT TIME WHEN A PIECE PART SHOULD BE REMOVED. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE FAILURE TO HIGHLIGHT (DRAW ATTN TO) THE LOWER TIME ON A SINGULAR PART. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN THIS CASE ARE TO INCORPORATE A REVISED LOG CARD WHICH WILL IDENT THE SPECIFIC COMPONENT TIME AT WHICH A PART WILL BECOME TIME EXPIRED AND THEREFORE THE ASSEMBLY MUST BE REMOVED. ALSO IF ANY PART IS DUE REPLACEMENT PRIOR TO THE NEXT OVERHAUL TIME IT WILL BE WRITTEN ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE LOG CARD AND WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED SO THAT IT WILL BE QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE PART WILL BECOME TIME EXPIRED AND THEREFORE THE ASSEMBLY MUST BE REMOVED. ALSO IF ANY PART IS DUE REPLACEMENT PRIOR TO THE NEXT OVERHAUL TIME IT WILL BE WRITTEN ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE LOG CARD AND WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED SO THAT IT WILL BE QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE PART MUST BE REMOVED AT A SPECIFIC COMPONENT TIME. THIS INFO IS ALSO BEING ADDED TO A NEW COMPUTER SYS WHICH WILL CONTINUALLY UPDATE AND TRACK ALL OF THE PARTS WITHIN AN ASSEMBLY THAT ARE PLACED IN OPERATION ON AN ACFT. IN SUMMARY THE FAULT LIES IN INADEQUATE RECORD MGMNT AND RECORD KEEPING AND STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO TIGHTEN UP THE DISCIPLINE REGARDING THE DOCUMENTATION MGMNT TO ELIMINATE FAULTS SUCH AS THIS IN THE FUTURE. THE ACFT WAS SHUT DOWN WITH TWO AND A HALF HRS OF FLYING REMAINING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.