Narrative:

Late push due to being fueled 5000 pounds over request; needing a new weight and balance for accurate fuel; and a live calculation from dispatch for a requested full thrust takeoff. Pushback and start were normal. Completed after start flow and turned off APU. Just prior to taxi; we noticed both packs indicated packs off despite being in automatic. Duct pressure showed zero both sides. We cycled the packs controllers; isolation valves; and engine bleed switches with no effect. Prior to returning to the gate; I called maintenance control. The ddg (dispatch deviations guide) for the right hi stage deferral notes that to clear the message; you need to advance throttles to 80% N1; but the fcom (flight crew operations manual) also limits us to 40% N1 for breakaway thrust and FOD concerns. That the right side showed zero duct pressure was expected; but I did not see a reason that the left side would also. Maintenance control advised following the QRH; but it is designed for in flight and offered no help. This airplane has a history of repeat right hi stage deferrals; as well as C hydraulic dem pump messages. For this flight; a new hpsov (high pressure shut-off valve) had been installed on the right engine; but for some reason the mechanics [at departure airport] elected not to perform engine runs and sign off the deferral. It would be done [at our destination]. I returned to the gate because we could not determine a reason for the lack of left duct pressure. Interestingly; at the gate with the APU on; duct pressure returned and operated normally. Mechanics also isolated the center duct and started an engine at the gate - everything worked properly.we prepared to push back and continue our flight. Just prior to push (I had to call for another live calculation as runway 9 was now closed); the APU died unexpectedly at the gate. That was deferred and we proceeded to [destination]. All told; I made a dozen calls to dispatch over deferrals (the hi stage deferral wasn't listed and we added the APU later); three calls for the live calculation; one for runway 9; one for 8R and then another for 8R with a deferred APU. To add to the confusion; up until we were ready to push with the APU deferred; we did not know if we were going to [our second leg]; as a recovery flight had been launched to [for the second leg]. We were told to fly to [destination] as planned; but be prepared to be rerouted to our [a second destination] enroute. As we are fueled for both legs; it wasn't an issue. We landed [at destination] and the recovery flight was turned around. The next leg was normal until landing. I have flown this route for the last two months and I am very familiar with it; but we were hours late and had faced a slew of unexpected changes and challenges. I had slept great prior to the flight and felt sharp but as we approached [the airport] a bit of mental fatigue was setting in; likely due to the adrenaline wearing off. To help minimize potential threats; I elected to brief a CAT I auto-land. Weather was clear and unrestricted; winds 190/10. The airplane overshot localizer intercept due to strong quartering tailwinds; but corrected and was lined up properly. However; on short final; the airplane was increasingly right of centerline. It appeared as if we would touchdown with the left main gear on or right of centerline. Our wheelbase is 30 feet and runway 9 is 150 feet wide; so I knew we would land on the runway; but I was not happy with landing so far to the right. I elected to turn off the autopilot and land manually. I am unsure of my altitude when I disconnected; as I was focused on our lateral track. This is a challenging run to begin with. Three legs a night is draining and delays remove any chance of a break during our planned 3-hour stop. We typically change planes in [our second destination] and for the two months I've been flying it; it seems that one of the aircraft has issues with repeated write-ups. This flight had an unusual number of distractions; from being over fueled; needed a max thrust takeoff and a live calculation (three times...) ; plus the right hi stage deferral; which should've been on the release; the unexpected lack of duct pressure with no explanation; and then the APU suddenly dying as we tried to depart again.as a crew; I felt we dealt well with the constant changes. We have flown together all this month; and my first officer; although in his first year at [company]; flew the 767 at a previous carrier has been a great resource on every leg. The first two legs this night felt like the check ride that wouldn't end. It is becoming a rare relief to get an airplane with no deferrals that behaves as expected. (Thankfully; the last leg of this day was the low-key; good airplane leg we needed after a long night.) although things went normally once we departed until the landing; we were hours late; which compressed our scheduled turns.as a crew; we verbalized taking our time and making sure everything was right; without regard to time pressure and pushed back when we were ready. My biggest regret of the evening was the landing [last landing]. I may have turned off the autopilot below 100 AGL; I honestly don't know. I should've gone around and set up for another approach. It was a split second decision that I felt comfortable with because the weather was not a threat; visibility was excellent; and most likely; even letting the airplane auto-land right of centerline probably would have been fine but I did not like the airplane landing much farther to the right than I was expecting. The problem was I had briefed an auto-land; and turning off the autopilot at low altitude wasn't what I had told the first officer to expect. Certainly I would've gone around under those conditions had weather been any kind of a factor. I was happy with the result; a landing closer to centerline; but not with doing something contrary to what my partner was expecting. The main point of this [report] is the effect repeat write-ups is having on operations. But I do have to recognize the effect the current atmosphere at my airline is having on our behavior out on line. This had no conscious effect on my decision to land manually instead of going around; but lately I have been taking notes on each departure to explain delays; to defend myself in case I am questioned. Certainly; that thought crossed my mind during the gate return. Are they going to question whether this was a legitimate return? Did I miss something? I'm pretty good at compartmentalizing; but that is increasingly becoming a contributing factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Boeing 767 Captain reported that they returned to the gate because the Right Hand side did not have duct pressure; which started a chain of events prior to takeoff.

Narrative: Late push due to being fueled 5000 LBS over request; needing a new weight and balance for accurate fuel; and a live calculation from Dispatch for a requested full thrust takeoff. Pushback and start were normal. Completed after start flow and turned off APU. Just prior to taxi; we noticed both packs indicated PACKS OFF despite being in AUTO. Duct pressure showed zero both sides. We cycled the PACKS controllers; Isolation valves; and engine bleed switches with no effect. Prior to returning to the gate; I called Maintenance control. The DDG (Dispatch Deviations Guide) for the R HI STAGE deferral notes that to clear the message; you need to advance throttles to 80% N1; but the FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual) also limits us to 40% N1 for breakaway thrust and FOD concerns. That the right side showed zero duct pressure was expected; but I did not see a reason that the left side would also. Maintenance control advised following the QRH; but it is designed for in flight and offered no help. This airplane has a history of repeat R HI STAGE deferrals; as well as C HYD DEM PUMP messages. For this flight; a new HPSOV (High Pressure Shut-Off Valve) had been installed on the Right Engine; but for some reason the mechanics [at departure airport] elected not to perform engine runs and sign off the deferral. It would be done [at our destination]. I returned to the gate because we could not determine a reason for the lack of Left duct pressure. Interestingly; at the gate with the APU on; duct pressure returned and operated normally. Mechanics also isolated the center duct and started an engine at the gate - everything worked properly.We prepared to push back and continue our flight. Just prior to push (I had to call for another live calculation as Runway 9 was now closed); the APU died unexpectedly at the gate. That was deferred and we proceeded to [destination]. All told; I made a dozen calls to Dispatch over deferrals (the HI STAGE deferral wasn't listed and we added the APU later); three calls for the live calculation; one for runway 9; one for 8R and then another for 8R with a deferred APU. To add to the confusion; up until we were ready to push with the APU deferred; we did not know if we were going to [our second leg]; as a recovery flight had been launched to [for the second leg]. We were told to fly to [destination] as planned; but be prepared to be rerouted to our [a second destination] enroute. As we are fueled for both legs; it wasn't an issue. We landed [at destination] and the recovery flight was turned around. The next leg was normal until landing. I have flown this route for the last two months and I am very familiar with it; but we were hours late and had faced a slew of unexpected changes and challenges. I had slept great prior to the flight and felt sharp but as we approached [the airport] a bit of mental fatigue was setting in; likely due to the adrenaline wearing off. To help minimize potential threats; I elected to brief a CAT I auto-land. Weather was clear and unrestricted; winds 190/10. The airplane overshot LOC intercept due to strong quartering tailwinds; but corrected and was lined up properly. However; on short final; the airplane was increasingly right of centerline. It appeared as if we would touchdown with the left main gear on or right of centerline. Our wheelbase is 30 feet and runway 9 is 150 feet wide; so I knew we would land on the runway; but I was not happy with landing so far to the right. I elected to turn off the autopilot and land manually. I am unsure of my altitude when I disconnected; as I was focused on our lateral track. This is a challenging run to begin with. Three legs a night is draining and delays remove any chance of a break during our planned 3-hour stop. We typically change planes in [our second destination] and for the two months I've been flying it; it seems that one of the aircraft has issues with repeated write-ups. This flight had an unusual number of distractions; from being over fueled; needed a max thrust takeoff and a live calculation (three times...) ; plus the R HI STAGE deferral; which should've been on the release; the unexpected lack of duct pressure with no explanation; and then the APU suddenly dying as we tried to depart again.As a crew; I felt we dealt well with the constant changes. We have flown together all this month; and my First Officer; although in his first year at [company]; flew the 767 at a previous carrier has been a great resource on every leg. The first two legs this night felt like the check ride that wouldn't end. It is becoming a rare relief to get an airplane with no deferrals that behaves as expected. (Thankfully; the last leg of this day was the low-key; good airplane leg we needed after a long night.) Although things went normally once we departed until the landing; we were hours late; which compressed our scheduled turns.As a crew; we verbalized taking our time and making sure everything was right; without regard to time pressure and pushed back when we were ready. My biggest regret of the evening was the landing [last landing]. I may have turned off the autopilot below 100 AGL; I honestly don't know. I should've gone around and set up for another approach. It was a split second decision that I felt comfortable with because the weather was not a threat; visibility was excellent; and most likely; even letting the airplane auto-land right of centerline probably would have been fine but I did not like the airplane landing much farther to the right than I was expecting. The problem was I had briefed an auto-land; and turning off the autopilot at low altitude wasn't what I had told the First Officer to expect. Certainly I would've gone around under those conditions had weather been any kind of a factor. I was happy with the result; a landing closer to centerline; but not with doing something contrary to what my partner was expecting. The main point of this [report] is the effect repeat write-ups is having on operations. But I do have to recognize the effect the current atmosphere at my airline is having on our behavior out on line. This had no conscious effect on my decision to land manually instead of going around; but lately I have been taking notes on each departure to explain delays; to defend myself in case I am questioned. Certainly; that thought crossed my mind during the gate return. Are they going to question whether this was a legitimate return? Did I miss something? I'm pretty good at compartmentalizing; but that is increasingly becoming a contributing factor.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.