Narrative:

The mission was planned as a local area sortie for me to log instrument approaches. I invited another pilot along as my safety pilot and he was in the right seat. My three approaches and landings were uneventful and we departed ZZZ1 VFR back to ZZZ under tower control. Once I had ZZZ in sight; I informed ZZZ1 tower and they switched me to advisory.my safety pilot flew one pattern and landing and I elected to fly the full stop landing. On the full stop landing; I decided to practice a no-flap landing. I retracted the landing gear on departure leg and as we turned to downwind; the conversation turned away from flying the airplane. I arrived on downwind; abeam the approach end without performing my landing checks and I failed to lower the landing gear. At this point; I was still involved in the non-flying conversation.I rolled out on final concentrating on making the no-flap landing and failed to confirm the gear was down. I expected a lower than normal power setting due to having the flaps retracted. My first indication of my error was the scraping noise as we contacted the runway. I moved the mixture to cutoff as we were sliding on the runway and we egressed after the airplane stopped. I called the FBO at ZZZ and told them to shut down the runway.I think there are several contributing factors to this incident. First; I failed to maintain a sterile cockpit in the airport environment. Second; I had a lapse of checklist discipline and the no-flap pattern disrupted my habit pattern. I normally perform the landing checklist abeam the approach end and then re-confirm a gear down indication rolling out on final; however I was overly concentrating on the no-flap approach.finally; after recent engine maintenance; I discovered the landing gear warning horn was sounding at an abnormally high power setting (roughly 18-inch manifold pressure). I asked my mechanic to readjust it; which he did. I failed to adequately operations check the new setting to ensure the horn was sounding at the appropriate power setting (approximately 14-inch manifold pressure). As a result; the warning horn did not sound on this approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182 pilot reported a gear-up landing occurred due to distractions and the lack of gear warning horn.

Narrative: The mission was planned as a local area sortie for me to log instrument approaches. I invited another pilot along as my safety pilot and he was in the right seat. My three approaches and landings were uneventful and we departed ZZZ1 VFR back to ZZZ under tower control. Once I had ZZZ in sight; I informed ZZZ1 tower and they switched me to advisory.My safety pilot flew one pattern and landing and I elected to fly the full stop landing. On the full stop landing; I decided to practice a no-flap landing. I retracted the landing gear on departure leg and as we turned to downwind; the conversation turned away from flying the airplane. I arrived on downwind; abeam the approach end without performing my landing checks and I failed to lower the landing gear. At this point; I was still involved in the non-flying conversation.I rolled out on final concentrating on making the no-flap landing and failed to confirm the gear was down. I expected a lower than normal power setting due to having the flaps retracted. My first indication of my error was the scraping noise as we contacted the runway. I moved the mixture to cutoff as we were sliding on the runway and we egressed after the airplane stopped. I called the FBO at ZZZ and told them to shut down the runway.I think there are several contributing factors to this incident. First; I failed to maintain a sterile cockpit in the airport environment. Second; I had a lapse of checklist discipline and the no-flap pattern disrupted my habit pattern. I normally perform the landing checklist abeam the approach end and then re-confirm a gear down indication rolling out on final; however I was overly concentrating on the no-flap approach.Finally; after recent engine maintenance; I discovered the landing gear warning horn was sounding at an abnormally high power setting (roughly 18-inch Manifold Pressure). I asked my mechanic to readjust it; which he did. I failed to adequately operations check the new setting to ensure the horn was sounding at the appropriate power setting (approximately 14-inch Manifold Pressure). As a result; the warning horn did not sound on this approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.