Narrative:

Aircraft X was cleared for the ZZZ RNAV approach; was given cancellation instructions; and was switched to advisory frequency. On short final I observed the aircraft make a left turn consistent with the published missed approach. The low altitude alert began flashing with the aural alarm as the aircraft was still descending. I reached out to the aircraft to see if he was on my frequency; but with no response. I continued working my other traffic. Aircraft X started to make a left turn to the east no longer consistent with the published missed approach. I reached out to the aircraft and this time he was now on my frequency. The pilot advised he was 'trying to get back on top'. I told the aircraft to fly his present heading and climb and maintain 3000 feet. The aircraft was at 1000 feet and the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) is 2300 feet. I should have issued a safety alert for a climb immediately. The aircraft began making a left turn to the north. Again I advised the pilot to fly his present heading and climb and maintain 3000 feet. This was a vector below the MVA but as the pilot continued to make turns; I was trying to help the pilot get above the layer. I obtained pilot reports that nearby airports were clear despite the low ceiling indicated on the ATIS. Once the pilot was back above the layer I turned him toward a different airport. I gave him the weather and pilot reports and asked for his intentions. The pilot decided to land at ZZZ1. I re-cleared the pilot and coordinated with the tower to make a visual approach with no restrictions. The pilot landed safely. I need to make sure that I issue the correct safety alerts. I felt the pilot was in distress and treated him as an emergency although I did not ask the pilot if this was the case I only advised them of an IFR change of destination. I was still trying to comprehend what I was seeing and my judgment was a little bit behind. I try to think of what to do in situations like these but the stress of the moment is hard to be prepared for.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182 pilot and TRACON Controller reported a pilot deviation from the published missed approach and flight below Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Narrative: Aircraft X was cleared for the ZZZ RNAV approach; was given cancellation instructions; and was switched to advisory frequency. On short final I observed the aircraft make a left turn consistent with the published missed approach. The Low Altitude Alert began flashing with the aural alarm as the aircraft was still descending. I reached out to the aircraft to see if he was on my frequency; but with no response. I continued working my other traffic. Aircraft X started to make a left turn to the east no longer consistent with the published missed approach. I reached out to the aircraft and this time he was now on my frequency. The pilot advised he was 'trying to get back on top'. I told the aircraft to fly his present heading and climb and maintain 3000 feet. The aircraft was at 1000 feet and the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) is 2300 feet. I should have issued a safety alert for a climb immediately. The aircraft began making a left turn to the North. Again I advised the pilot to fly his present heading and climb and maintain 3000 feet. This was a vector below the MVA but as the pilot continued to make turns; I was trying to help the pilot get above the layer. I obtained pilot reports that nearby airports were clear despite the low ceiling indicated on the ATIS. Once the pilot was back above the layer I turned him toward a different airport. I gave him the weather and pilot reports and asked for his intentions. The pilot decided to land at ZZZ1. I re-cleared the pilot and coordinated with the Tower to make a Visual Approach with no restrictions. The pilot landed safely. I need to make sure that I issue the correct safety alerts. I felt the pilot was in distress and treated him as an emergency although I did not ask the pilot if this was the case I only advised them of an IFR change of destination. I was still trying to comprehend what I was seeing and my judgment was a little bit behind. I try to think of what to do in situations like these but the stress of the moment is hard to be prepared for.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.