Narrative:

The captain (pilot flying) and IOE instructor (pilot monitoring) noticed a loud noise and vibration coming from the avionics compartment. This was followed by very strong electrical (burning) fumes requiring the use of oxygen on the flight deck. At the time of occurrence; I was an hour into my break; asleep in the crew bunk. The 'FO2' (scheduled on the flight due to IOE) was awake and sitting in the courier area. There were no fumes in either the bunk or the courier area. We advised ATC; coordinated with dispatch; and diverted to ZZZZ. Although as we approached ZZZZ; the fumes seemed to subside somewhat; we maintained our urgent status. Arff and equipment were out at the runway; standing by for our arrival and followed us in to parking. The divert; landing; and taxi-in were uneventful. After block-in; our maintenance technician jumpseater informed us that the avionics cooling fan #2 had failed and was likely the cause of the fumes. He had obtained this information from the aircraft health management system. It was also available through cfds (centralized fault display system) on the aircraft. While we had suspected an avionics cooling fan; we had no way to confirm it as we had no alerts displayed and all circuit breakers remained closed. It would have been helpful to know that avionics cooling fan #2 was the probable cause of the fumes. Had the situation become worse (fan actively burning; for example) this information would have been absolutely critical. When a crew contacts dispatch with an urgent or emergency situation; part of the dispatcher's 'checklist' should be to coordinate with maintenance control to provide any relevant information to the crew. In addition; flight crews should have basic instruction and familiarity with cfds so they can identify problem components in situations such as this. The smoke/fire/fumes checklist in our aircraft states that if you can identify a problem component; attempt to isolate it. We have the ability; in many cases; to do just that. The information is at our fingertips but we are not trained to access it. This needs to be fixed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 flight crew reported fumes in the cockpit coming from the avionics compartment at cruise and diverted. They highlight the need for training on use of the onboard Centralized Fault Display System.

Narrative: The Captain (pilot flying) and IOE instructor (pilot monitoring) noticed a loud noise and vibration coming from the avionics compartment. This was followed by very strong electrical (burning) fumes requiring the use of oxygen on the flight deck. At the time of occurrence; I was an hour into my break; asleep in the crew bunk. The 'FO2' (scheduled on the flight due to IOE) was awake and sitting in the courier area. There were no fumes in either the bunk or the courier area. We advised ATC; coordinated with dispatch; and diverted to ZZZZ. Although as we approached ZZZZ; the fumes seemed to subside somewhat; we maintained our urgent status. ARFF and equipment were out at the runway; standing by for our arrival and followed us in to parking. The divert; landing; and taxi-in were uneventful. After block-in; our maintenance technician jumpseater informed us that the avionics cooling fan #2 had failed and was likely the cause of the fumes. He had obtained this information from the aircraft health management system. It was also available through CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) on the aircraft. While we had suspected an avionics cooling fan; we had no way to confirm it as we had no alerts displayed and all circuit breakers remained closed. It would have been helpful to know that avionics cooling fan #2 was the probable cause of the fumes. Had the situation become worse (fan actively burning; for example) this information would have been absolutely critical. When a crew contacts dispatch with an urgent or emergency situation; part of the dispatcher's 'checklist' should be to coordinate with Maintenance Control to provide any relevant information to the crew. In addition; flight crews should have basic instruction and familiarity with CFDS so they can identify problem components in situations such as this. The smoke/fire/fumes checklist in our aircraft states that if you can identify a problem component; attempt to isolate it. We have the ability; in many cases; to do just that. The information is at our fingertips but we are not trained to access it. This needs to be fixed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.