Narrative:

Descending through the zzzzz fix on the ILS approach; the first officer (first officer) was maintaining a speed of 210 knots using full boards. We hit turbulence while descending through the clouds and the load factor increased and quickly the speed dropped and the stick shaker came on. I quickly called for the command of the controls and the first officer quickly removed his hands from the controls. I then added power and lowered the nose and removed the boards to close and thus regain full control authority. I then re-intercepted the glide slope and then gave the controls back to the first officer. I then continued with the gear and flap settings and by the 1000 feet call all was configured and by 500 was stable and the landing was spot on. I believe that I have been noticing a trend where the fos do not really understand the use of flight boards; especially when inputting full amount. They seem to fixate on the descent and omit the visual indications such as the yellow band and incremental pitch limit indicator (pli). For some reason; these visual indications are either omitted or not used as an impending warning to probable events such as a stall. I notice that in almost every flight I have to discuss the use of boards or in some cases I have had to assist in closing boards because the yellow band turned red. In some cases fos have taken the assist personally and have increased tension in the cockpit because in their perception the assist was taken as intrusion. I further believe that CRM has been taken out of context and has made fos the premier flying pilot that 'is the sole manipulator of controls.' for example; I had an first officer; recently; who thought that having an emb 190 type certificate made him loggable PIC when flying. They seem to look at themselves as PIC rather than first officers who are still flying and assisting the captain. I believe this false sense of understanding; hierarchy; has misguided fos and thus relied on a false sense of a pilot who never has the need to ask questions.I think that during training or initial operating experience (IOE); the first officer needs to be reminded of the need to keep learning and that just because they passed IOE is by no means an excuse to overlook the captain's experience. CRM should be shared information that allows for safety but in some cases new fos are relying less on sharing and more on acting as individuals in command authority when the sole manipulator of controls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ175 flight crew reported receiving a stick shaker warning when intercepting the glideslope from above with the speed brakes deployed.

Narrative: Descending through the ZZZZZ fix on the ILS approach; the First Officer (FO) was maintaining a speed of 210 Knots using Full Boards. We hit turbulence while descending through the clouds and the load factor increased and quickly the speed dropped and the stick shaker came on. I quickly called for the command of the controls and the FO quickly removed his hands from the controls. I then added power and lowered the nose and removed the boards to close and thus regain full control authority. I then re-intercepted the Glide Slope and then gave the controls back to the FO. I then continued with the gear and flap settings and by the 1000 feet call all was configured and by 500 was stable and the landing was spot on. I believe that I have been noticing a trend where the FOs do not really understand the use of flight boards; especially when inputting full amount. They seem to fixate on the descent and omit the visual indications such as the yellow band and incremental Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI). For some reason; these visual indications are either omitted or not used as an impending warning to probable events such as a stall. I notice that in almost every flight I have to discuss the use of Boards or in some cases I have had to assist in closing boards because the yellow band turned RED. In some cases FOs have taken the assist personally and have increased tension in the cockpit because in their perception the assist was taken as intrusion. I further believe that CRM has been taken out of context and has made FOs the premier Flying pilot that 'is the sole manipulator of controls.' For example; I had an FO; recently; who thought that having an EMB 190 type certificate made him loggable PIC when flying. They seem to look at themselves as PIC rather than first officers who are still flying and assisting the Captain. I believe this false sense of understanding; hierarchy; has misguided FOs and thus relied on a false sense of a pilot who never has the need to ask questions.I think that during training or Initial Operating Experience (IOE); the FO needs to be reminded of the need to keep learning and that just because they passed IOE is by no means an excuse to overlook the Captain's experience. CRM should be shared information that allows for Safety but in some cases new FOs are relying less on sharing and more on acting as individuals in command authority when the sole manipulator of controls.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.