Narrative:

Cleared for the stadium visibility approach at lax. The first officer had incorrectly dialed in runway 25R ILS as a backup while the captain had the correct runway 24 ILS dialed on. The first officer was flying the aircraft. On a base leg to dog leg, traffic was called out and idented by both pilots. A radio change was then made to tower but an incorrect frequency was used by the PNF (captain), which resulted in the captain being heads down for approximately 1 min. At this time the first officer flew through the extended centerline of runway 24R while keeping in sight of the traffic. Once it was determined visually that sep didn't appear adequate, a diverging course was set. At approximately the same time tower notified us that the traffic (air carrier widebody transport) was on final for runway 25L. The first officer realized he had overshot runway 24R and was using the incorrect ILS to runway 25R as a backup. A correction was made for runway 24R centerline and an uneventful approach and landing was made. Contributing factors included incorrect ILS frequency selection by the first officer, incorrect radio selection that lead to a 'heads down' situation during a turn to final by the captain, first officer visually missing runway 24R centerline. Poor depth perception at night that led the first officer to fly the aircraft closer to traffic than he had originally thought. Pilots should have both verified ILS frequency even if it is to be used as a backup to a visibility. Both pilots should have been 'eyes outside' looking for the runway and keeping an eye on traffic. Supplemental information from acn 146186. I think that not checking the first officer's ILS frequency combined with my preoccupation with a frequency change and widebody transport's close proximity prevented me from noticing the runway overshoot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A POTENTIAL CONFLICT ARISES OUT OF A VISUAL APCH TO ARPT WITH TRAFFIC IN SIGHT.

Narrative: CLRED FOR THE STADIUM VIS APCH AT LAX. THE F/O HAD INCORRECTLY DIALED IN RWY 25R ILS AS A BACKUP WHILE THE CAPT HAD THE CORRECT RWY 24 ILS DIALED ON. THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT. ON A BASE LEG TO DOG LEG, TFC WAS CALLED OUT AND IDENTED BY BOTH PLTS. A RADIO CHANGE WAS THEN MADE TO TWR BUT AN INCORRECT FREQ WAS USED BY THE PNF (CAPT), WHICH RESULTED IN THE CAPT BEING HEADS DOWN FOR APPROX 1 MIN. AT THIS TIME THE F/O FLEW THROUGH THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 24R WHILE KEEPING IN SIGHT OF THE TFC. ONCE IT WAS DETERMINED VISUALLY THAT SEP DIDN'T APPEAR ADEQUATE, A DIVERGING COURSE WAS SET. AT APPROX THE SAME TIME TWR NOTIFIED US THAT THE TFC (ACR WDB) WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 25L. THE F/O REALIZED HE HAD OVERSHOT RWY 24R AND WAS USING THE INCORRECT ILS TO RWY 25R AS A BACKUP. A CORRECTION WAS MADE FOR RWY 24R CTRLINE AND AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG WAS MADE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED INCORRECT ILS FREQ SELECTION BY THE F/O, INCORRECT RADIO SELECTION THAT LEAD TO A 'HEADS DOWN' SITUATION DURING A TURN TO FINAL BY THE CAPT, F/O VISUALLY MISSING RWY 24R CTRLINE. POOR DEPTH PERCEPTION AT NIGHT THAT LED THE F/O TO FLY THE ACFT CLOSER TO TFC THAN HE HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. PLTS SHOULD HAVE BOTH VERIFIED ILS FREQ EVEN IF IT IS TO BE USED AS A BACKUP TO A VIS. BOTH PLTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN 'EYES OUTSIDE' LOOKING FOR THE RWY AND KEEPING AN EYE ON TFC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 146186. I THINK THAT NOT CHKING THE F/O'S ILS FREQ COMBINED WITH MY PREOCCUPATION WITH A FREQ CHANGE AND WDB'S CLOSE PROX PREVENTED ME FROM NOTICING THE RWY OVERSHOOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.