Narrative:

During departure from san on cleared route ZZOOO1.ipl aircraft climbed on heading 275 deg to initial altitude of 520 MSL and continued climb but instead of continuing on course to jetti waypoint the crew began an early left turn toward zzooo waypoint approximately 2.7NM prior to reaching waypoint jetti while continuing climb to 12000 MSL. Upon reaching the initial altitude of 520 MSL and prior to switching from ksan tower to socal departure control the co pilot (cp)/pilot not flying (PNF) queried the pilot in command (PIC)/pilot flying (PF) if we were supposed to begin a turn and the PIC incorrectly assessed that we were required to turn left and changed the flight director from navigation to heading mode (which was preselected for a left turn) rather than continue follow the FMS programed SID in the flight director navigation mode. Deviation began approximately 1 minute into flight; error identified by crew with 10-15 seconds upon query by socal approach and initial input for correction made within 15-20 seconds after identification of deviation.upon notification from socal approach that radar track showed our aircraft deviating from the published SID in an early left turn the PIC/PF; assessed his situational awareness of aircraft location in relation to the published departure was not accurate; reviewed position on FMS map; determined was in an incorrect early left turn prior to waypoint jetti and began correction to a right turn towards the published SID course when socal approach cleared to continue turn toward zzooo waypoint. PIC/PF selected a direct to zzooo waypoint and continued route.incorrect interpretation of SID procedure by cp/PNF; failure to maintain adequate situational awareness by pc/PF at time of incident and incorrect decision of pc/PF upon query by cp/PNF.contributing factors: perceived 'rushed' environment and reduction in time planned for thorough briefing departure and planned procedures to execute it due to passengers arriving unannounced 30 min prior to scheduled departure. Assigned crew on this flight had not recently flown as a crew and typically pc would operate as PNF to manage navigation duties during high workload however based on co-pilots high experience level pc made decision to act as PF.pc was overconfident of cp decision/recommendation process. Pc did not take the time adequately brief planned departure route and procedure planned to execute. Action by pc to accept recommendation of early turn without a more thorough assessment/cross check of correctly programed onboard navigation equipment was the incorrect action.a thorough crew de-brief was conducted by PIC and cp following completion of flight. We reviewed our flight tracks from web based resources on foreflight and flight aware and openly discussed the chain of events and key moments in the flight where the deviation actually occurred ; what we should have done prior to; during and after the deviation to mitigate its occurrence in the future.PIC review crew resource management study material from recent recurrent flight training. PIC will also complete online training courses applicable to crew resource management.as the director of operations and primary pilot; I will discuss options with owner to utilize outside crewmembers more frequently to help build greater familiarity among crews.when operating as PIC I will more actively evaluate my decision to operate as PNF or PF based on a more detailed evaluation of the anticipated flight workload; crew experience and familiarity with the planned flight route.always make time to conduct a thorough brief of planned routes focusing on SID procedures and focus on key navigation steps and planned utilization of flight director modes throughout critical segments of the procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate Jet Captain reported he made an early turn on the ZZOOO 1 departure from SAN and corrected back to course after query by SCT TRACON.

Narrative: During departure from SAN on cleared route ZZOOO1.IPL aircraft climbed on heading 275 deg to initial ALT of 520 MSL and continued climb but instead of continuing on course to JETTI waypoint the crew began an early left turn toward ZZOOO waypoint approximately 2.7NM prior to reaching waypoint JETTI while continuing climb to 12000 MSL. Upon reaching the initial altitude of 520 MSL and prior to switching from KSAN tower to SOCAL Departure Control the Co Pilot (CP)/Pilot not Flying (PNF) queried the Pilot in Command (PIC)/Pilot Flying (PF) if we were supposed to begin a turn and the PIC incorrectly assessed that we were required to turn left and changed the Flight Director from NAV to HDG mode (which was preselected for a left turn) rather than continue follow the FMS programed SID in the Flight Director NAV mode. Deviation began approximately 1 minute into flight; error identified by crew with 10-15 seconds upon query by SOCAL approach and initial input for correction made within 15-20 seconds after identification of deviation.Upon notification from SOCAL approach that radar track showed our aircraft deviating from the published SID in an early left turn the PIC/PF; assessed his situational awareness of aircraft location in relation to the published departure was not accurate; reviewed position on FMS Map; determined was in an incorrect early left turn prior to waypoint JETTI and began correction to a right turn towards the published SID course when SOCAL approach cleared to continue turn toward ZZOOO waypoint. PIC/PF selected a DIRECT TO ZZOOO waypoint and continued route.Incorrect interpretation of SID procedure by CP/PNF; failure to maintain adequate situational Awareness by PC/PF at time of incident and incorrect decision of PC/PF upon query by CP/PNF.Contributing Factors: Perceived 'rushed' environment and reduction in time planned for thorough briefing departure and planned procedures to execute it due to passengers arriving unannounced 30 min prior to scheduled departure. Assigned crew on this flight had not recently flown as a crew and typically PC would operate as PNF to manage navigation duties during high workload however based on co-pilots high experience level PC made decision to act as PF.PC was overconfident of CP decision/recommendation process. PC did not take the time adequately brief planned departure route and procedure planned to execute. Action by PC to accept recommendation of early turn without a more thorough assessment/cross check of correctly programed onboard navigation equipment was the incorrect action.A thorough crew de-brief was conducted by PIC and CP following completion of flight. We reviewed our flight tracks from web based resources on Foreflight and Flight Aware and openly discussed the chain of events and key moments in the flight where the deviation actually occurred ; what we should have done prior to; during and after the deviation to mitigate its occurrence in the future.PIC review Crew Resource Management study material from recent recurrent flight training. PIC will also complete online training courses applicable to Crew Resource Management.As the Director of Operations and primary pilot; I will discuss options with owner to utilize outside crewmembers more frequently to help build greater familiarity among crews.When operating as PIC I will more actively evaluate my decision to operate as PNF or PF based on a more detailed evaluation of the anticipated flight workload; crew experience and familiarity with the planned flight route.Always make time to conduct a thorough brief of planned routes focusing on SID procedures and focus on key navigation steps and planned utilization of Flight Director modes throughout critical segments of the procedure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.