Narrative:

Just after takeoff from runway 01 in dca the aircraft entered into prohibited airspace P-56A and P-56B. It was a fairly quick turn in dca that required the flight crew to start the engines at the gate with the jet bridge still attached for external power. Because this was the captain's leg to fly he gave the briefing on our departure from dca. In his brief he gave specific instructions on the complex engine failure procedure that accompanied runway 01. In these instructions it states that dca 0.4 DME is the decision point for how the flight crew should react to an engine failure just after takeoff. In order to identify the 0.4 DME the captain decided to takeoff with green needles on his side so that he could identify the turning point; should it be necessary. The first officer stayed in white needles because the flight crew was planning on an RNAV departure procedure. The flight crew also discussed the proximity of the prohibited airspace to the northeast of the field and noted that the main goal of the complex engine failure procedure and the RNAV departure procedure was to avoid this airspace. Just prior to push back the flight crew was advised by ground control that they were to contact clearance for a full reroute; this was the start of a series of events that began to increase the flight crew's work load. The flight crew decided that they should proceed with the engine start process at the gate so that the ground crew could disconnect the jet bridge while they talked with clearance. A new routing was given and it included a new RNAV departure procedure; the captain loaded the new route and briefed on the differences. The push began then normal procedures and checklists were accomplished. Taxiing out to runway 01 was fairly simple; upon reaching the runway we were number 1 for departure after what turned out to be two arrivals. Takeoff clearance was received with some hesitation due to the tower giving the wrong call sign. Just after takeoff the captain calls for gear up; speed mode; navigation mode which was briefed. Just after the first officer executed these commands tower gave the switch to contact potomac departure. During this time the first officer first noticed that something was wrong with the flight director's instructions and noticed that it was not making the turn that the SID required. After checking in with departure the first officer noticed that the captain was off course and tried to bring his attention to how close they were getting to the prohibited airspace by questioning 'what is the FMS doing?' hoping that that this would make him realize he was not on the right heading. Then tried to further warn and remind the captain that they cannot go any further to the right. The first officer pointed to the left but incorrectly said 'we need to go to the right'. The captain acknowledged and corrected by saying 'left'. The departure controller called inquiring about the flight crews efforts to get back on course and the first officer replied 'we are turning now'. The captain was just starting to realize why he was off course and started asking for heading mode in order to get flight director guidance back to the SID. Once in heading mode the plane began to fly on the correct direction but due to the multiple turns in the SID the plane went across course while the crew was working to get the FMS programmed appropriately and to get back to navigation mode on the fcp. Finally once navigation mode was selected and the FMS1 was armed and captured the plane was turning back on the routing of the SID then the captain called for autopilot on and the first officer got back to finishing the after takeoff procedure/checklist. Then the crew was notified via ATC on the deviation from course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported entering prohibited airspace on departure from DCA due to an improper instrument set up prior to departure. ATC corrected the flight's assigned heading.

Narrative: Just after takeoff from runway 01 in DCA the aircraft entered into prohibited airspace P-56A and P-56B. It was a fairly quick turn in DCA that required the flight crew to start the engines at the gate with the jet bridge still attached for external power. Because this was the Captain's leg to fly he gave the briefing on our departure from DCA. In his brief he gave specific instructions on the complex engine failure procedure that accompanied runway 01. In these instructions it states that DCA 0.4 DME is the decision point for how the flight crew should react to an engine failure just after takeoff. In order to identify the 0.4 DME the Captain decided to takeoff with green needles on his side so that he could identify the turning point; should it be necessary. The first officer stayed in white needles because the flight crew was planning on an RNAV departure procedure. The flight crew also discussed the proximity of the prohibited airspace to the northeast of the field and noted that the main goal of the complex engine failure procedure and the RNAV departure procedure was to avoid this airspace. Just prior to push back the flight crew was advised by ground control that they were to contact clearance for a full reroute; this was the start of a series of events that began to increase the flight crew's work load. The flight crew decided that they should proceed with the engine start process at the gate so that the ground crew could disconnect the jet bridge while they talked with clearance. A new routing was given and it included a new RNAV departure procedure; the Captain loaded the new route and briefed on the differences. The push began then normal procedures and checklists were accomplished. Taxiing out to runway 01 was fairly simple; upon reaching the runway we were number 1 for departure after what turned out to be two arrivals. Takeoff clearance was received with some hesitation due to the tower giving the wrong call sign. Just after takeoff the Captain calls for gear up; speed mode; NAV mode which was briefed. Just after the first officer executed these commands tower gave the switch to contact Potomac departure. During this time the first officer first noticed that something was wrong with the flight director's instructions and noticed that it was not making the turn that the SID required. After checking in with departure the first officer noticed that the Captain was off course and tried to bring his attention to how close they were getting to the prohibited airspace by questioning 'what is the FMS doing?' hoping that that this would make him realize he was not on the right heading. Then tried to further warn and remind the Captain that they cannot go any further to the right. The first officer pointed to the left but incorrectly said 'we need to go to the right'. The Captain acknowledged and corrected by saying 'left'. The departure controller called inquiring about the flight crews efforts to get back on course and the first officer replied 'we are turning now'. The Captain was just starting to realize why he was off course and started asking for heading mode in order to get flight director guidance back to the SID. Once in heading mode the plane began to fly on the correct direction but due to the multiple turns in the SID the plane went across course while the crew was working to get the FMS programmed appropriately and to get back to NAV mode on the FCP. Finally once NAV mode was selected and the FMS1 was armed and captured the plane was turning back on the routing of the SID then the Captain called for autopilot on and the first officer got back to finishing the after takeoff procedure/checklist. Then the crew was notified via ATC on the deviation from course.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.