Narrative:

Aircraft X was crossing our airspace at 37000 feet we had to reroute the aircraft over bikkr intersection to remain clear of the panamint MOA which was active. I initiated a handoff to ZLA sector 16 about 70 miles from the jcf/ZLA boundary. About 20 miles from the boundary ZLA sector 16 called instructing us to 'spin' aircraft X. I immediately alerted the radar controller sector 16's instructions and aircraft X was issued a left turn heading 250. About 30 seconds after the turn we observed an aircraft northwest of bikkr also at 37000 feet and figured that this was why 16 spun aircraft X as they were a tie at bikkr. However this is not the aircraft the possible loss occurred with.aircraft X began a slow gradual wide left turn to the 250 heading and was going to penetrate ZLA 16 airspace so I initiated a pointout with ZLA 16 and it was subsequently approved. About halfway through the turn ZLA 16 called wanting us to turn aircraft X faster however the pilot reported that they couldn't turn any faster than what they were doing. ZLA 16 had a second aircraft also at 37000 feet. I alerted sector 16 that aircraft X couldn't make a harder turn and they told me the beacon code of the other aircraft and I observed it northwest of bty and advised we would attempt to climb aircraft X. ZLA 16 advised they were descending their traffic. The pilot advised that they could not climb as they were at their service limit and I attempted to alert ZLA 16. I observed the second aircraft begin a descent out of 37000 feet prior to lateral separation being less than 5 miles but may have not reached 36000 feet prior to reestablishing the 5 mile lateral separation. Aircraft X at the closest point appeared to be turning away from the conflicted aircraft. I believe poor planning on the part of ZLA 16 may have contributed to this event by not recognizing the situation earlier. Also the performance of aircraft X by making such a slow wide turn exasperated the situation. The r-side did advise aircraft X to make the turn without delay. But maybe I could have told the r-side to use immediate or expedite to indicate to the pilot more abrupt action was needed. This was one of the those situations where I felt we had no way out given the factors above and it was all about the recovery.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JCF TRACON Controller reported an aircraft was directed to make a 360 degree turn by the adjacent facility; but the turn was not sufficient to maintain separation from the adjacent traffic.

Narrative: Aircraft X was crossing our airspace at 37000 feet we had to reroute the aircraft over BIKKR intersection to remain clear of the Panamint MOA which was active. I initiated a handoff to ZLA sector 16 about 70 miles from the JCF/ZLA boundary. About 20 miles from the boundary ZLA Sector 16 called instructing us to 'spin' Aircraft X. I immediately alerted the Radar Controller Sector 16's instructions and Aircraft X was issued a left turn heading 250. About 30 seconds after the turn we observed an aircraft NW of BIKKR also at 37000 feet and figured that this was why 16 spun Aircraft X as they were a tie at BIKKR. However this is not the aircraft the possible loss occurred with.Aircraft X began a slow gradual wide left turn to the 250 heading and was going to penetrate ZLA 16 airspace so I initiated a pointout with ZLA 16 and it was subsequently approved. About halfway through the turn ZLA 16 called wanting us to turn Aircraft X faster however the pilot reported that they couldn't turn any faster than what they were doing. ZLA 16 had a second aircraft also at 37000 feet. I alerted Sector 16 that Aircraft X couldn't make a harder turn and they told me the beacon code of the other aircraft and I observed it northwest of BTY and advised we would attempt to climb Aircraft X. ZLA 16 advised they were descending their traffic. The pilot advised that they could not climb as they were at their service limit and I attempted to alert ZLA 16. I observed the second aircraft begin a descent out of 37000 feet prior to lateral separation being less than 5 miles but may have not reached 36000 feet prior to reestablishing the 5 mile lateral separation. Aircraft X at the closest point appeared to be turning away from the conflicted aircraft. I believe poor planning on the part of ZLA 16 may have contributed to this event by not recognizing the situation earlier. Also the performance of Aircraft X by making such a slow wide turn exasperated the situation. The R-side did advise Aircraft X to make the turn without delay. But maybe I could have told the R-Side to use immediate or expedite to indicate to the pilot more abrupt action was needed. This was one of the those situations where I felt we had no way out given the factors above and it was all about the recovery.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.