Narrative:

We were instructed to descend via the [clt] CHSLY2 RNAV arrival landing 18L. Prior to the top of descent; we completed an arrival verification per sops. It correctly depicted the appropriate restrictions found on the chart. At some point during the managed descent; at an altitude above FL270; 280kts; and with the autopilot on; the mcdu and pfd displayed the incorrect crossing at burrz. It had us leveling off below FL240. I manually made burrz a hard altitude of FL240. The airplane then leveled off as planned and we both again verified the arrival. We intervened; [employed the cami (confirm; activate; monitor; intervene) procedure] and did not bust any restrictions. This is a known airbus anomaly. This is a result of the S7A software glitch. I was aware of this because of a previous fleet bulletin and was familiar with what to watch for. However; not all crews are aware of this. We remained alert and cami allowed us to intervene. It is my suggestion that [our airline] discontinues use of the CHSLY2 RNAV arrival until a permanent solution is achieved. In my opinion; with regards to safety; it's not worth the risk of a possible deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported they had to intervene manually to avoid an altitude deviation on the CHSLY2 arrival into CLT. Crew stated this was a known Airbus anomaly.

Narrative: We were instructed to descend via the [CLT] CHSLY2 RNAV arrival landing 18L. Prior to the top of descent; we completed an arrival verification per SOPs. It correctly depicted the appropriate restrictions found on the chart. At some point during the managed descent; at an altitude above FL270; 280kts; and with the autopilot on; the MCDU and PFD displayed the incorrect crossing at BURRZ. It had us leveling off below FL240. I manually made BURRZ a hard altitude of FL240. The airplane then leveled off as planned and we both again verified the arrival. We intervened; [employed the CAMI (Confirm; Activate; Monitor; Intervene) procedure] and did not bust any restrictions. This is a known Airbus anomaly. This is a result of the S7A software glitch. I was aware of this because of a previous fleet bulletin and was familiar with what to watch for. However; not all crews are aware of this. We remained alert and CAMI allowed us to intervene. It is my suggestion that [our airline] discontinues use of the CHSLY2 RNAV arrival until a permanent solution is achieved. In my opinion; with regards to safety; it's not worth the risk of a possible deviation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.