Narrative:

We were dispatched during winter storm. We briefed a cat ii approach for runway 01C but we broke out and saw the runway about 1000 ft AGL. The tower gave us several reports of runway [condition] 2/2/2. Our performance was well within limits and there was very little if no crosswind. As we were turning off at Y4; tower asked us for a braking action report. Initially I told the first officer 'good' but we decided to tell ground 'medium' to be on the conservative side. There was no noticeable roughness in the runway. We taxied in to gate. The ramp was slow loading the freight for the return flight due to the conditions. The conditions got worse after we had landed and shutdown the conditions consisted of snow; ice pellets; and other mixed precipitation. The first officer did a full preflight noting several chunks of ice inside both engine intakes. He tried to grab some of it but it was clear we would need to inform maintenance. Everything seemed completely normal except for that. The first officer informed me what he had found and that we also needed water- absorbing pads for the galley. While he was completing the cabin inspection; I called and informed ops that we would need maintenance to ensure the intakes were clear of the ice and asked for the pads. Maintenance came up a little later and told us they would take care of the ice in the intakes by simply spraying deice fluid in the intakes when we started the engines-off deice process. I didn't know that was the procedure for ice removal of the intakes but he was the mechanic and we took him at his word that he would take care of it (especially after a lengthy discussion about it in person). I continued my preflight prep and the first officer ran numbers for the departure runway 30.the performance computer said that we exceeded the allowable crosswind given the conditions he had input for takeoff: >1/8' to <1/4' slush; engine anti-ice on. I then called ground and told them we would need 01C. The controller said it was open and we could plan on that. At the time it was not in the departure ATIS as in-use for takeoff but it was not NOTAM'd closed either as several corporate aircraft were using it for landing. During our brief; I decided even though it was the first officer leg that I would do the takeoff given the contamination and conditions and give him the airplane once we were out of the terminal area. We pushed back with much difficulty initially. After we pushed back onto the ramp we ran the QRH for deicing; configured for deicing and began the 2-step deicing process [engines shutdown]. We completed the process approximately 20 minutes later; copied the deice information; and prepared to start up and taxi out. With -sn and > 2 1/2sm visibility; the hold over time was 110-155 minutes. As we were getting ready to start the left engine; I overheard ground talking to emergency vehicles about [an MD80] that had just taken off of 01C several minutes earlier. The pilot was reporting that they had experienced a partial engine failure on takeoff and that they were returning to land. At this point I emphasized that we would start up; taxi out with flaps up; and configure at the end. We also discussed the 30-second run up as well per the QRH. Before we started; we made one more call to ground and told them that we would be starting up and taxiing out unless the runway 01C would be closed for the MD80 returning. The controller said that the crew was still running their checklists and he would try to get us out prior to the MD80 returning. We acknowledged and started both engines; waiting briefly for a fire truck to move from Y4.we taxied down Z to 01C at Y9 (the end of the runway); configured flaps 5 for takeoff and completed all checklist to the before-takeoff-down-to-the-line. We waited for an additional 5; maybe 10 minutes; for trucks that were on 01C doing a debris check. Once the check was complete; we were cleared for takeoff. Once in position; we advised the tower that we would need 30 seconds on the runway for an engine run up which they acknowledged and approved. It may also be worth noting that the performance computer had given us a max power takeoff solution and TO1 for the previously stated inputs. We started the takeoff roll. I had in the back of my mind the MD80 and was very careful about monitoring engine parameters during the takeoff. I observed no engine abnormalities; vibration issues; or abnormal indication of any kind. The runway did feel rough due to the icy patches. After we cleaned up I noticed we had a speed lim (amber) with amber line where the upper black and red zipper is usually located to show the upper speed limit on the airspeed tape. On the status page of the lower EICAS was also a message; warn elex; that had not been there before takeoff during the flight control check. There was no checklist for it in the QRH but we did find a description in the fault isolation manual and airplane systems manual for both issues. I wrote up both separately because it was hard to tell if they were related in any way. We proceeded to destination since all other indications were completely normal; landed on 27 and taxied to the gate; commenting that the morning had actually gone much better than anticipated given the hype of the winter storm. I am unsure exactly what caused the damage to the airplane. I can only surmise at this point that the damage caused to the engines and beacon was done during the takeoff roll due to an icy runway. The airport had the runway open and available for both takeoff and landing. It is also possible that there was damage done to the engines from maintenance personnel not sufficiently removing ice from the intake even though we specifically requested removal; both over the ops radio and in person. I believe that the airport is at fault if; in fact; the damage occurred during the takeoff roll; which seems most plausible. If the runway was not suitable for takeoff; it should have been NOTAM'd closed and departures should have been halted until more information was obtained from the MD80 crew about the possible cause of their engine issues.as it were; a detailed debris check was performed just prior to our takeoff; leaving us with no reason to assume the runway was unsafe. As far as what we; as a crew could have done better to mitigate the damage; I'm not sure what we could have done after discussing it with the first officer. I felt we worked together well to mitigate threats for landing; pre-flight issues prior to leaving; deicing; who would fly in and out; getting information from ground control; providing instructions to maintenance; delaying flap configuration for taxi; the debris check just prior to our takeoff clearance; engine run up prior to takeoff; our trouble-shooting inflight; our maintenance write ups after the speed lim abnormal indication; etc. I know it must sound as though I'm trying to project blame here but I am at a sincere loss as to how serious damage to the airplane could have occurred and yet we had no engine indications that would have suggested anything other than a normal flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew reported that maintenance had discovered significant damage to both engines along with the rotating beacon after landing. The crew suspected that icy runway conditions at the departure airport may have caused the damage.

Narrative: We were dispatched during Winter Storm. We briefed a Cat II approach for runway 01C but we broke out and saw the runway about 1000 FT AGL. The tower gave us several reports of runway [condition] 2/2/2. Our performance was well within limits and there was very little if no crosswind. As we were turning off at Y4; Tower asked us for a braking action report. Initially I told the FO 'Good' but we decided to tell Ground 'Medium' to be on the conservative side. There was no noticeable roughness in the runway. We taxied in to gate. The ramp was slow loading the freight for the return flight due to the conditions. The conditions got worse after we had landed and shutdown the conditions consisted of snow; ice pellets; and other mixed precipitation. The FO did a full preflight noting several chunks of ice inside both engine intakes. He tried to grab some of it but it was clear we would need to inform maintenance. Everything seemed completely normal except for that. The FO informed me what he had found and that we also needed water- absorbing pads for the galley. While he was completing the cabin inspection; I called and informed ops that we would need maintenance to ensure the intakes were clear of the ice and asked for the pads. Maintenance came up a little later and told us they would take care of the ice in the intakes by simply spraying deice fluid in the intakes when we started the engines-off deice process. I didn't know that was the procedure for ice removal of the intakes but he was the mechanic and we took him at his word that he would take care of it (especially after a lengthy discussion about it in person). I continued my preflight prep and the FO ran numbers for the departure runway 30.The performance computer said that we exceeded the allowable crosswind given the conditions he had input for takeoff: >1/8' to <1/4' slush; engine anti-ice on. I then called ground and told them we would need 01C. The controller said it was open and we could plan on that. At the time it was not in the departure ATIS as in-use for takeoff but it was not NOTAM'd closed either as several corporate aircraft were using it for landing. During our brief; I decided even though it was the FO leg that I would do the takeoff given the contamination and conditions and give him the airplane once we were out of the terminal area. We pushed back with much difficulty initially. After we pushed back onto the ramp we ran the QRH for Deicing; configured for deicing and began the 2-step deicing process [engines shutdown]. We completed the process approximately 20 minutes later; copied the deice information; and prepared to start up and taxi out. With -SN and > 2 1/2sm visibility; the Hold Over Time was 110-155 minutes. As we were getting ready to start the left engine; I overheard ground talking to emergency vehicles about [an MD80] that had just taken off of 01C several minutes earlier. The pilot was reporting that they had experienced a partial engine failure on takeoff and that they were returning to land. At this point I emphasized that we would start up; taxi out with flaps up; and configure at the end. We also discussed the 30-second run up as well per the QRH. Before we started; we made one more call to ground and told them that we would be starting up and taxiing out unless the runway 01C would be closed for the MD80 returning. The controller said that the crew was still running their checklists and he would try to get us out prior to the MD80 returning. We acknowledged and started both engines; waiting briefly for a fire truck to move from Y4.We taxied down Z to 01C at Y9 (the end of the runway); configured flaps 5 for takeoff and completed all checklist to the Before-Takeoff-down-to-the-line. We waited for an additional 5; maybe 10 minutes; for trucks that were on 01C doing a debris check. Once the check was complete; we were cleared for takeoff. Once in position; we advised the tower that we would need 30 seconds on the runway for an engine run up which they acknowledged and approved. It may also be worth noting that the performance computer had given us a Max power takeoff solution and TO1 for the previously stated inputs. We started the takeoff roll. I had in the back of my mind the MD80 and was very careful about monitoring engine parameters during the takeoff. I observed no engine abnormalities; vibration issues; or abnormal indication of any kind. The runway did feel rough due to the icy patches. After we cleaned up I noticed we had a SPD LIM (amber) with amber line where the upper black and red zipper is usually located to show the upper speed limit on the airspeed tape. On the status page of the lower EICAS was also a message; WARN ELEX; that had not been there before takeoff during the flight control check. There was no checklist for it in the QRH but we did find a description in the Fault Isolation Manual and Airplane Systems Manual for both issues. I wrote up both separately because it was hard to tell if they were related in any way. We proceeded to destination since all other indications were completely normal; landed on 27 and taxied to the gate; commenting that the morning had actually gone much better than anticipated given the hype of the winter storm. I am unsure exactly what caused the damage to the airplane. I can only surmise at this point that the damage caused to the engines and beacon was done during the takeoff roll due to an icy runway. The airport had the runway open and available for both takeoff and landing. It is also possible that there was damage done to the engines from maintenance personnel not sufficiently removing ice from the intake even though we specifically requested removal; both over the ops radio and in person. I believe that the airport is at fault if; in fact; the damage occurred during the takeoff roll; which seems most plausible. If the runway was not suitable for takeoff; it should have been NOTAM'd closed and departures should have been halted until more information was obtained from the MD80 crew about the possible cause of their engine issues.As it were; a detailed debris check was performed just prior to our takeoff; leaving us with no reason to assume the runway was unsafe. As far as what we; as a crew could have done better to mitigate the damage; I'm not sure what we could have done after discussing it with the FO. I felt we worked together well to mitigate threats for landing; pre-flight issues prior to leaving; deicing; who would fly in and out; getting information from ground control; providing instructions to maintenance; delaying flap configuration for taxi; the debris check just prior to our takeoff clearance; engine run up prior to takeoff; our trouble-shooting inflight; our maintenance write ups after the SPD LIM abnormal indication; etc. I know it must sound as though I'm trying to project blame here but I am at a sincere loss as to how serious damage to the airplane could have occurred and yet we had no engine indications that would have suggested anything other than a normal flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.