Narrative:

Our aircraft had an inoperative auxiliary power unit (APU) requiring us to perform an air start. During the air start I; the captain; accidentally commanded the first officer to start engine number one (left engine). The ground crew had cleared us to start engine number two (right engine). The ground crew was within the hazard area of engine number one in order to attach the air start cart. Fortunately; as the engine was starting the supervisor noticed it and removed himself from the hazard area. I had fully intended to command the start of engine number two; but had accidentally verbalized 'engine one' without thinking and due to inattention had not caught my verbal error. We then shut down engine number one and after reconfirming that engine two was clear we started it instead. We then pushed back safely from the gate and performed a cross bleed start of engine number one in a deice pad; away from equipment and personnel.the ultimate cause of this event was just inattention. As stated above I fully intended to command the start of engine number two; but due to a mental lapse; I verbalized 'engine one' and didn't even realize my error. The first officer was inexperienced in the irregular starting procedures associated with an air start. Had I more thoroughly briefed him on the need to start engine two and not engine one perhaps he would have caught my error and queried me on it.as stated above it was simply my inattention to my verbal command mistake; and once I caught it the engine was already starting. In the future; I will be sure to include the criticality of starting engine number two only; during an external air start in my briefings. Especially with a new first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported the crew started the wrong engine during an air start procedure.

Narrative: Our aircraft had an inoperative Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) requiring us to perform an air start. During the air start I; the Captain; accidentally commanded the First Officer to start engine number one (left engine). The ground crew had cleared us to start engine number two (right engine). The ground crew was within the hazard area of engine number one in order to attach the air start cart. Fortunately; as the engine was starting the supervisor noticed it and removed himself from the hazard area. I had fully intended to command the start of engine number two; but had accidentally verbalized 'engine one' without thinking and due to inattention had not caught my verbal error. We then shut down engine number one and after reconfirming that engine two was clear we started it instead. We then pushed back safely from the gate and performed a cross bleed start of engine number one in a deice pad; away from equipment and personnel.The ultimate cause of this event was just inattention. As stated above I fully intended to command the start of engine number two; but due to a mental lapse; I verbalized 'engine one' and didn't even realize my error. The First Officer was inexperienced in the irregular starting procedures associated with an air start. Had I more thoroughly briefed him on the need to start engine two and not engine one perhaps he would have caught my error and queried me on it.As stated above it was simply my inattention to my verbal command mistake; and once I caught it the engine was already starting. In the future; I will be sure to include the criticality of starting engine number two only; during an external air start in my briefings. Especially with a new First Officer.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.