Narrative:

We were a little more than halfway into our flight when our flight attendant (flight attendant) called concerning a semi responsive 57 year old female passenger foaming at the mouth and vomiting. Under the request of the patient; the patient's sister gave her a nitroglycerin tablet. There were two doctors onboard helping the fas with the patient. I called arinc and established a phone patch with medlink and dispatch. We had to wait at least 10 minutes before the medlink doctor was able to get to her phone. In the meantime; the two onboard doctors were suggesting that we land soon because of the possibility of the patient having a heart attack. In my mind I was planning on a possible diversion to [nearby airport]. When the medlink doctor's finally came online; her accent was hard to understand and the squeal on the radio added to the communication issues. Another issue was the fact that neither onboard doctor could get a blood pressure reading. They explained to me that the quality of the blood pressure cuff and stethoscope was in question. The cuff was too tight and they were not able to hear through the scope; therefore they could not get the pertinent vital signs. After relaying the patient's current condition to the medlink doctor; the doctor said to continue to ZZZ. So acting in accordance with our fom we continued to ZZZ. I was having trouble understanding one of the requests from the medlink doctor. After asking a few times for the doctor to repeat the request; and between myself and my first officer (first officer) we still could not understand her instructions. I ACARS'd my dispatcher to see he was able to understand her instructions. He thought she was saying 2 benadryl tablets. Which in fact was what medlink was ordering. The onboard doctors thought this was an odd request and asked to speak personally to me on the flight attendant's phone. Under the request of the onboard doctors; I asked the medlink doctor why the benadryl? She said it was for the vomiting. The doctors still thought it was a strange thing to order since the passenger was throwing up. I was making every attempt to make sure the medlink had complete understanding of the condition and symptoms of our passenger. I still thought we had some misunderstandings and I wanted to do everything I could to avoid a mistake. There were a few times I asked my first officer to listen along with me. I also gave ATC the heads up that we were busy talking with medlink in case we missed a call. He understood and said no problem.during all of the stressful communications; we were cleared direct to ZZZ; then given a crossing restriction; cross 85 miles southwest at FL230. I watched my first officer dial in FL230 into the altitude sel and said 'FL230 blue'. I watched him then build a fix off the VOR and add the 230 into the altitude box. My oversight was not seeing that he had programmed the wrong distance into his pfd. So basically our fix and our top of descent arrow was incorrect. Also the ATC instructions seemed to have us at a low altitude far from the airport so I asked ATC to confirm the restriction which he did. All of this was happening while I was trying to relay a lot info between medlink and our doctors. We also [advised ATC of] a medical emergency and notified dispatch. I wanted to keep our speed up and get on the ground. When things calmed down my first officer then noticed he built the wrong fix and started down in attempt to make the restriction. I was back on radio duties and told ATC of our mistake. He said not a problem. It was in the early morning hours and hardly any traffic.in the future; I am going to compartmentalize my actions and treat the situation like we treat our emergency procedures when we work our way to the status page on the ECAM. The flying pilot says 'stop ECAM actions...after takeoff checklist'. I will brief my fos to do the same thing. Get my attention; then and make sure I watch and confirm the fix was built correctly and all restrictions were entered not just the correct altitude. Also thisis not the first time I have had a medical professional complain about the poor quality of our stethoscope and blood pressure cuff. I will talk to my chief pilot and make him aware of this issue. Things would have gone smoother and there would be fewer distractions if we had vital signs to work with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported they had a medical emergency onboard; difficulty understanding the Medlink Doctor and the Doctors onboard complained about the poor quality of the stethoscope and blood pressure cuff.

Narrative: We were a little more than halfway into our flight when our Flight Attendant (FA) called concerning a semi responsive 57 year old female passenger foaming at the mouth and vomiting. Under the request of the patient; the patient's sister gave her a nitroglycerin tablet. There were two doctors onboard helping the FAs with the patient. I called ARINC and established a phone patch with MedLink and dispatch. We had to wait at least 10 minutes before the Medlink doctor was able to get to her phone. In the meantime; the two onboard Doctors were suggesting that we land soon because of the possibility of the patient having a heart attack. In my mind I was planning on a possible diversion to [nearby airport]. When the Medlink doctor's finally came online; her accent was hard to understand and the squeal on the radio added to the communication issues. Another issue was the fact that neither onboard doctor could get a blood pressure reading. They explained to me that the quality of the blood pressure cuff and stethoscope was in question. The cuff was too tight and they were not able to hear through the scope; therefore they could not get the pertinent vital signs. After relaying the patient's current condition to the Medlink Doctor; the doctor said to continue to ZZZ. So acting in accordance with our FOM we continued to ZZZ. I was having trouble understanding one of the requests from the Medlink Doctor. After asking a few times for the doctor to repeat the request; and between myself and my First Officer (FO) we still could not understand her instructions. I ACARS'd my dispatcher to see he was able to understand her instructions. He thought she was saying 2 Benadryl tablets. Which in fact was what Medlink was ordering. The onboard doctors thought this was an odd request and asked to speak personally to me on the FA's phone. Under the request of the onboard doctors; I asked the Medlink doctor why the Benadryl? She said it was for the vomiting. The doctors still thought it was a strange thing to order since the passenger was throwing up. I was making every attempt to make sure the medlink had complete understanding of the condition and symptoms of our passenger. I still thought we had some misunderstandings and I wanted to do everything I could to avoid a mistake. There were a few times I asked my FO to listen along with me. I also gave ATC the heads up that we were busy talking with Medlink in case we missed a call. He understood and said no problem.During all of the stressful communications; we were cleared direct to ZZZ; then given a crossing restriction; cross 85 miles southwest at FL230. I watched my FO dial in FL230 into the ALT SEL and said 'FL230 blue'. I watched him then build a fix off the VOR and add the 230 into the altitude box. My oversight was not seeing that he had programmed the wrong distance into his PFD. So basically our fix and our top of descent arrow was incorrect. Also the ATC instructions seemed to have us at a low altitude far from the airport so I asked ATC to confirm the restriction which he did. All of this was happening while I was trying to relay a lot info between Medlink and our doctors. We also [advised ATC of] a medical emergency and notified dispatch. I wanted to keep our speed up and get on the ground. When things calmed down my FO then noticed he built the wrong fix and started down in attempt to make the restriction. I was back on radio duties and told ATC of our mistake. He said not a problem. It was in the early morning hours and hardly any traffic.In the future; I am going to compartmentalize my actions and treat the situation like we treat our emergency procedures when we work our way to the status page on the ECAM. The flying pilot says 'Stop ECAM actions...after takeoff checklist'. I will brief my FOs to do the same thing. Get my attention; then and make sure I watch and confirm the fix was built correctly and all restrictions were entered not just the correct altitude. Also thisis not the first time I have had a medical professional complain about the poor quality of our stethoscope and blood pressure cuff. I will talk to my chief pilot and make him aware of this issue. Things would have gone smoother and there would be fewer distractions if we had vital signs to work with.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.