Narrative:

I was flying in the right seat of a king air 250 for a pilot with whom I fly regularly. He was being evaluated by an FAA inspector in a passenger seat for a part 135.297 ipc. After takeoff and upon reaching 500 feet and heading of 140 degrees departing ZZZ in IMC and after engaging the autopilot; the inspector stated 'the right engine has failed.' he expected either the pilot or me to simulate an engine failure despite the fact that neither the pilot nor I had actually been trained to reconfigure the right power and propeller levers to zero thrust. We knew ahead of time there would be a simulated engine failure but had never experienced that scenario in the actual aircraft. The pilot pulled the right power lever back thinking that was adequate to simulate engine failure while we simulated the memory items to secure the 'failed' engine.at this point we realized the right engine was creating enough drag that full left rudder could not overcome the adverse yaw and the autopilot kicked off. I was communicating with departure and was queried twice about our heading as we continued in a right turn. As the airspeed decayed and the aircraft could not be brought around to our assigned heading; we were told we could have our engine back and upon setting normal power we were able to fly normally and were vectored for an ILS approach back into ZZZ. I; along with the pilot and charter operator; will be meeting with the FAA tomorrow to discuss this incident. I have been informed the FAA is critical of my cockpit resource management during the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE20 flight crew reported being unable to maintain heading or airspeed during a simulated engine failure in IMC while under FAA evaluation.

Narrative: I was flying in the right seat of a King Air 250 for a pilot with whom I fly regularly. He was being evaluated by an FAA inspector in a passenger seat for a part 135.297 IPC. After takeoff and upon reaching 500 feet and heading of 140 degrees departing ZZZ in IMC and after engaging the autopilot; the inspector stated 'the right engine has failed.' He expected either the pilot or me to simulate an engine failure despite the fact that neither the pilot nor I had actually been trained to reconfigure the right power and propeller levers to zero thrust. We knew ahead of time there would be a simulated engine failure but had never experienced that scenario in the actual aircraft. The pilot pulled the right power lever back thinking that was adequate to simulate engine failure while we simulated the memory items to secure the 'failed' engine.At this point we realized the right engine was creating enough drag that full left rudder could not overcome the adverse yaw and the autopilot kicked off. I was communicating with departure and was queried twice about our heading as we continued in a right turn. As the airspeed decayed and the aircraft could not be brought around to our assigned heading; we were told we could have our engine back and upon setting normal power we were able to fly normally and were vectored for an ILS approach back into ZZZ. I; along with the pilot and charter operator; will be meeting with the FAA tomorrow to discuss this incident. I have been informed the FAA is critical of my cockpit resource management during the flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.