Narrative:

We departed tul on a VFR flight to dca with a planned stop at hoc. Two VFR rated, private pilots shared cockpit duties. The PIC generally hand-flew the aircraft and communicated with appropriate radio contacts while the copilot generally managed navigation. Our chief means of navigation was via the LORAN. We were about 10 NM northwest of nabb VOR in radio contact with ZID. ZID advised us of a possible conflict with the southern border of restr area R-3403-a and recommended a course deviation of 20 degrees to the right. We complied with this recommendation and accepted further course vectors to safely navigation around the restr area and then return to our course. At this time, the copilot asked ZID about the status of restr area R-5503-a which overlays our fuel stop ahead, hoc. ZID reported that R-5503-a was cold at the present time, but would activate within a short time. How the problem arose. Our ground time at hoc was brief, probably no more than about 30 mins. We considered calling it a day there in hoc, perhaps waiting to return to dca in daylight and perhaps better VFR. After a brief discussion we elected to resume our trip home. We launched out of hoc and once off the airport, the PIC turned eastward and began a roughly spiral climb to avoid numerous scattered clouds drifting through the area and to get a picture of what conditions lay ahead. As we continued our VFR climb, the copilot contacted ZID. In the process, we were evaluating WX conditions and happily observed two layers of scattered clouds and good visibility. Hoping these conditions also prevailed ahead, we decided to continue our climb to 9500' MSL to take best advantage of the forecast winds aloft. I believe our altitude when the copilot first made contact with ZID was about 7000' MSL. By the time we understood our position to be confirmed and possibly within the now active restr area R-5503-a we were climbing through about 8500' MSL. This was the first time it dawned on us what we might have done! A quick discussion of the situation between the copilot and ZID ensued. Te safest course of action was agreed upon and the PIC leveled off at 9000' MSL and turned due north to expedite termination of the asserted inadvertent restr airspace intrusion. Within 5 to 10 mins, ZID advised us we were clear to resume our own navigation on course to dca. ZID also gave the copilot a telephone number to contact ZID regarding the incident. Reflecting on this incident and its causes, chief is the mindset that apparently settled upon both the PIC and copilot that restr area R-5503-a was not active. Clearly, we were aware of the existence of the restr area, as it was the copilot who initially queried ZID about the status of R-5503-a earlier in the flight. Obviously forgotten was the ZID controller's admonition that the restr area would activate within an hour or so. Neither did the PIC bother to double check the status of the restr area during the preflight WX briefing. A contributing factor to our apparent mental lapse regarding the status of the restr airspace was our concern and apparent concentration on the WX conditions. It's easy to think of plenty of actions others could have taken to avoid finding ourselves in this situation. I could say that cincinnati should have reminded us about R-5503-a when we contacted them on climb out from hoc. I could blame my copilot who was supposed to be minding the store regarding navigation. Someone told me to say that restr areas should be highlighted more prominently on sectional charts. Right. But the bottom line in life is the same as it is in the regulations, I'm the PIC flying the airplane. It is my responsibility to take each and every required action to conduct flight in a safe and legal manner, from preflight briefing to shutdown. Maybe we were too tired to continue the flight. Perhaps we should have waited for better WX if we were so concerned about it. I suppose there are an infinite number of ifs, ands and buts. What happened was that I made a mistake. I have mentally kicked myself in the rear a thousand times since that evening and will do everything humanly possible to avoid a similar error in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA, VFR, MAKES UNAUTH PENETRATION OF RESTRICTED AREA.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED TUL ON A VFR FLT TO DCA WITH A PLANNED STOP AT HOC. TWO VFR RATED, PRIVATE PLTS SHARED COCKPIT DUTIES. THE PIC GENERALLY HAND-FLEW THE ACFT AND COMMUNICATED WITH APPROPRIATE RADIO CONTACTS WHILE THE COPLT GENERALLY MANAGED NAV. OUR CHIEF MEANS OF NAV WAS VIA THE LORAN. WE WERE ABOUT 10 NM NW OF NABB VOR IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ZID. ZID ADVISED US OF A POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF RESTR AREA R-3403-A AND RECOMMENDED A COURSE DEVIATION OF 20 DEGS TO THE R. WE COMPLIED WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION AND ACCEPTED FURTHER COURSE VECTORS TO SAFELY NAV AROUND THE RESTR AREA AND THEN RETURN TO OUR COURSE. AT THIS TIME, THE COPLT ASKED ZID ABOUT THE STATUS OF RESTR AREA R-5503-A WHICH OVERLAYS OUR FUEL STOP AHEAD, HOC. ZID RPTED THAT R-5503-A WAS COLD AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT WOULD ACTIVATE WITHIN A SHORT TIME. HOW THE PROB AROSE. OUR GND TIME AT HOC WAS BRIEF, PROBABLY NO MORE THAN ABOUT 30 MINS. WE CONSIDERED CALLING IT A DAY THERE IN HOC, PERHAPS WAITING TO RETURN TO DCA IN DAYLIGHT AND PERHAPS BETTER VFR. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION WE ELECTED TO RESUME OUR TRIP HOME. WE LAUNCHED OUT OF HOC AND ONCE OFF THE ARPT, THE PIC TURNED EASTWARD AND BEGAN A ROUGHLY SPIRAL CLB TO AVOID NUMEROUS SCATTERED CLOUDS DRIFTING THROUGH THE AREA AND TO GET A PICTURE OF WHAT CONDITIONS LAY AHEAD. AS WE CONTINUED OUR VFR CLB, THE COPLT CONTACTED ZID. IN THE PROCESS, WE WERE EVALUATING WX CONDITIONS AND HAPPILY OBSERVED TWO LAYERS OF SCATTERED CLOUDS AND GOOD VISIBILITY. HOPING THESE CONDITIONS ALSO PREVAILED AHEAD, WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE OUR CLB TO 9500' MSL TO TAKE BEST ADVANTAGE OF THE FORECAST WINDS ALOFT. I BELIEVE OUR ALT WHEN THE COPLT FIRST MADE CONTACT WITH ZID WAS ABOUT 7000' MSL. BY THE TIME WE UNDERSTOOD OUR POS TO BE CONFIRMED AND POSSIBLY WITHIN THE NOW ACTIVE RESTR AREA R-5503-A WE WERE CLBING THROUGH ABOUT 8500' MSL. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IT DAWNED ON US WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE DONE! A QUICK DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION BTWN THE COPLT AND ZID ENSUED. TE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS AGREED UPON AND THE PIC LEVELED OFF AT 9000' MSL AND TURNED DUE N TO EXPEDITE TERMINATION OF THE ASSERTED INADVERTENT RESTR AIRSPACE INTRUSION. WITHIN 5 TO 10 MINS, ZID ADVISED US WE WERE CLR TO RESUME OUR OWN NAV ON COURSE TO DCA. ZID ALSO GAVE THE COPLT A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT ZID REGARDING THE INCIDENT. REFLECTING ON THIS INCIDENT AND ITS CAUSES, CHIEF IS THE MINDSET THAT APPARENTLY SETTLED UPON BOTH THE PIC AND COPLT THAT RESTR AREA R-5503-A WAS NOT ACTIVE. CLRLY, WE WERE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE RESTR AREA, AS IT WAS THE COPLT WHO INITIALLY QUERIED ZID ABOUT THE STATUS OF R-5503-A EARLIER IN THE FLT. OBVIOUSLY FORGOTTEN WAS THE ZID CTLR'S ADMONITION THAT THE RESTR AREA WOULD ACTIVATE WITHIN AN HR OR SO. NEITHER DID THE PIC BOTHER TO DOUBLE CHK THE STATUS OF THE RESTR AREA DURING THE PREFLT WX BRIEFING. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO OUR APPARENT MENTAL LAPSE REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE RESTR AIRSPACE WAS OUR CONCERN AND APPARENT CONCENTRATION ON THE WX CONDITIONS. IT'S EASY TO THINK OF PLENTY OF ACTIONS OTHERS COULD HAVE TAKEN TO AVOID FINDING OURSELVES IN THIS SITUATION. I COULD SAY THAT CINCINNATI SHOULD HAVE REMINDED US ABOUT R-5503-A WHEN WE CONTACTED THEM ON CLBOUT FROM HOC. I COULD BLAME MY COPLT WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO BE MINDING THE STORE REGARDING NAV. SOMEONE TOLD ME TO SAY THAT RESTR AREAS SHOULD BE HIGHLIGHTED MORE PROMINENTLY ON SECTIONAL CHARTS. RIGHT. BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IN LIFE IS THE SAME AS IT IS IN THE REGS, I'M THE PIC FLYING THE AIRPLANE. IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE EACH AND EVERY REQUIRED ACTION TO CONDUCT FLT IN A SAFE AND LEGAL MANNER, FROM PREFLT BRIEFING TO SHUTDOWN. MAYBE WE WERE TOO TIRED TO CONTINUE THE FLT. PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE WAITED FOR BETTER WX IF WE WERE SO CONCERNED ABOUT IT. I SUPPOSE THERE ARE AN INFINITE NUMBER OF IFS, ANDS AND BUTS. WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT I MADE A MISTAKE. I HAVE MENTALLY KICKED MYSELF IN THE REAR A THOUSAND TIMES SINCE THAT EVENING AND WILL DO EVERYTHING HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO AVOID A SIMILAR ERROR IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.