Narrative:

In cruise at FL360; I was the pilot monitoring and the first officer (first officer) was pilot flying. I suddenly felt my ears pop significantly; and looked at the EICAS for any pressurization indications. I observed the cabin pressure rising rapidly through approximately 10;000 feet and we then received the cabin aural warning. We immediately donned O2 masks and I attempted to establish crew communications; but my mask mic was not working as it had at the gate when I tested it. My first officer had his mask on and was trying to hear/understand me; when I opted to take the flight controls by instinct. We had a positive transfer of controls via hand signals; and I proceeded with the emergency descent memory items. Though only a few seconds had past; I observed the cabin altitude rising rapidly through 13;000 feet. I completed the memory items except for the cabin notification due to my mic not working; and the noise from the landing gear now made communications even more difficult. As we descended; the flight attendant called up and my first officer handled communication with her and ATC; informing them we were performing an emergency descent. They cleared us to 11;000 feet. I then noticed the cabin altitude was pegged at 14;000 feet and steady. Through approximately 20;000; we got an EICAS caution 'presn automatic fail'. The controller then cleared us to 10;000 feet. The cabin altitude began to come back down at that point. We came off masks at approximately 11;000 feet as the cabin alt was below 10;000 feet. Once we were able to communicate more effectively; we ran the QRH for emergency descent to back up our memory items and the QRH for pressurization auto system fail. Upon contact with dispatch; they advised us to continue to destination.having a rapid depressurization is a threat; but added to that our inability to establish communications elevated that threat exponentially. We were severely limited in our ability to coordinate actions and set expectations and manage work load with masks on; no intercom; and an incredible amount of noise from the gear being out; all during an instantaneous spike in workload. Thankfully; I believe that our training helped us to know what to do; and even to anticipate what the other pilot would be doing despite our inability to talk. We proceeded deliberately and methodically as two individual pilots rather than a coordinated crew.I instinctually took the controls; and may not have communicated effectively that I was indeed flying the aircraft. It was a momentary loss of situational awareness due to the disorientation caused by the sudden [loss of] cabin pressure. We quickly reestablished some communication between us through use of hand signals. A brief confusion took place when I took the controls without being able to verbally express that to my first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 flight crew reported a rapid decompression at FL360 and donning oxygen masks; but communications could not be established through the Captain's mask mic.

Narrative: In cruise at FL360; I was the pilot monitoring and the First Officer (FO) was pilot flying. I suddenly felt my ears pop significantly; and looked at the EICAS for any pressurization indications. I observed the cabin pressure rising rapidly through approximately 10;000 feet and we then received the Cabin aural warning. We immediately donned O2 masks and I attempted to establish crew communications; but my mask mic was not working as it had at the gate when I tested it. My FO had his mask on and was trying to hear/understand me; when I opted to take the flight controls by instinct. We had a positive transfer of controls via hand signals; and I proceeded with the emergency descent memory items. Though only a few seconds had past; I observed the cabin altitude rising rapidly through 13;000 feet. I completed the memory items except for the cabin notification due to my mic not working; and the noise from the landing gear now made communications even more difficult. As we descended; the Flight Attendant called up and my FO handled communication with her and ATC; informing them we were performing an emergency descent. They cleared us to 11;000 feet. I then noticed the cabin altitude was pegged at 14;000 feet and steady. Through approximately 20;000; we got an EICAS Caution 'PRESN AUTO FAIL'. The controller then cleared us to 10;000 feet. The cabin altitude began to come back down at that point. We came off masks at approximately 11;000 feet as the cabin alt was below 10;000 feet. Once we were able to communicate more effectively; we ran the QRH for emergency descent to back up our memory items and the QRH for Pressurization Auto System Fail. Upon contact with Dispatch; they advised us to continue to destination.Having a rapid depressurization is a threat; but added to that our inability to establish communications elevated that threat exponentially. We were severely limited in our ability to coordinate actions and set expectations and manage work load with masks on; no intercom; and an incredible amount of noise from the gear being out; all during an instantaneous spike in workload. Thankfully; I believe that our training helped us to know what to do; and even to anticipate what the other pilot WOULD be doing despite our inability to talk. We proceeded deliberately and methodically as two individual pilots rather than a coordinated crew.I instinctually took the controls; and may not have communicated effectively that I was indeed flying the aircraft. It was a momentary loss of Situational Awareness due to the disorientation caused by the sudden [loss of] cabin pressure. We quickly reestablished some communication between us through use of hand signals. A brief confusion took place when I took the controls without being able to verbally express that to my FO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.