Narrative:

I had a check airman in my jump seat; he was performing a line check. Everything went very well; at and out of the gate. Wind shear advisories were in effect so we opted for a no flex takeoff. While lining up for takeoff of runway 22L ord; tower cleared us for takeoff. As I transferred controls to the first officer and he advanced the thrust levers for takeoff. I heard ord tower say '[company; company] are you still with me [no numbers]?' not hearing the call sign and not sure if he was calling us. I then simultaneously called take off go around (toga) set as I reached forward to the FMS to push radio so that I could see our call sign. Watching for all my power; airspeed cues and making my call outs while my mind was trying to solve that very unusual call from the tower.... The check airman bumped my arm and pointed at my hand. My finger was still on the FMS and not guarding the thrust levers. This all happened very fast; we were light with only fifty passages; no flex; gusting winds; the unusual call form the tower (that almost sounded distressful). I was reaching forward but not guarding the thrust levers. I then guarded them and proceeded with the remaining calls V1; vr. On climb out tower called us [full call sign]; sorry about that turn heading 160. I believe that's what he wanted all along; to change out heading after he cleared us for takeoff. The check airman said he wasn't happy how the controller handled that and understood the confusion it caused. From my view point; I wasn't sure if he was calling us during that short time because he was calling while we were making our; toga; toga set call outs. Thus getting distracted.it happened so quickly; I was still making all the appropriate call outs; my hand froze in the wrong place as my mind tried to solve the incomplete tower call. If I had heard cancel take off clearance; I would have rejected. If I felt unsafe; I would have rejected. I didn't feel that a rejected takeoff was necessary or clearly I would have done one.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 Captain reported hearing his company call; without numbers; after being cleared for takeoff by the Tower. At the time the aircraft was accelerating rapidly and the call could not be clarified before V1 was announced.

Narrative: I had a check airman in my jump seat; he was performing a line check. Everything went very well; at and out of the gate. Wind shear advisories were in effect so we opted for a no flex takeoff. While lining up for takeoff of runway 22L ORD; tower cleared us for takeoff. As I transferred controls to the First Officer and he advanced the Thrust levers for takeoff. I heard ORD tower say '[Company; Company] are you still with me [no numbers]?' Not hearing the call sign and not sure if he was calling us. I then simultaneously called Take Off Go Around (TOGA) set as I reached forward to the FMS to push radio so that I could see our call sign. Watching for all my power; airspeed cues and making my call outs while my mind was trying to solve that very unusual call from the tower.... the check airman bumped my arm and pointed at my hand. My finger was still on the FMS and not guarding the thrust levers. This all happened very fast; we were light with only fifty passages; no flex; gusting winds; the unusual call form the tower (that almost sounded distressful). I was reaching forward but not guarding the thrust levers. I then guarded them and proceeded with the remaining calls V1; Vr. On climb out tower called us [full call sign]; sorry about that turn heading 160. I believe that's what he wanted all along; to change out heading after he cleared us for takeoff. The check airman said he wasn't happy how the controller handled that and understood the confusion it caused. From my view point; I wasn't sure if he was calling us during that short time because he was calling while we were making our; TOGA; TOGA set call outs. Thus getting distracted.It happened so quickly; I was still making all the appropriate call outs; my hand froze in the wrong place as my mind tried to solve the incomplete tower call. If I had heard cancel take off clearance; I would have rejected. If I felt unsafe; I would have rejected. I didn't feel that a rejected takeoff was necessary or clearly I would have done one.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.