Narrative:

I was training someone on the non radar sectors of 87 and 89; and decided due to the amount of weather and deviations to split the sector as the trainee couldn't keep up with the flow of traffic at the time. We decided to stay with the south sector as that was the busier of the two and had the weather and deviations; more complexity that would be good for him to see. Before we split the sectors; I took control of the sector and gave a position relief briefing to my relief; and had explained to him that aircraft X was requesting higher than what he was currently at (FL350). There were multiple aircraft head on with aircraft X at FL360 so in my opinion; a climb clearance was not possible with the time constraint that he needed to be level.as soon as myself and the trainee sat down and started back to working on the south side; the controller who took the north sector sent a clearance to aircraft X to climb to FL370. Aircraft X was connected via controller pilot data link communications (cpdlc) and automatic dependent surveillance (ads); so he felt that there was enough time to issue the clearance and have the plane be level before the conflict started. A clearance was sent at xx+00 to be level at FL370 by xx+2; which I feel was unsafe to issue a climb clearance to be level in two minutes. The pilot did not respond to the clearance right away as there may have been a lag in the time the clearance was sent to when it was received. When the controller did not receive a wilco from the pilot; he sent a new message at xx+3 to disregard the climb clearance and to maintain FL350. Five seconds later the pilot sent a wilco message; followed by a second wilco at xx+3.35. Therefore it was uncertain what the aircraft was actually doing.because the controller cleared him to maintain FL350; there was no conflict window that popped up when aircraft X sent a downlink at xx+4:15 that the plane was at 36;172. The controller received a trial probe error because the plane was profiled at being at FL350. This is when I stopped training and kicked the trainee out as I tried to figure out what the other controller was doing. The downlink we received at xx+4:15 said the aircraft was at 36;172; but had a vertical rate of -688 feet per minute; so the pilot was confused by the multiple quick clearances and had already been through FL365 and descended back down. The controller at sector 87 then sent a message to aircraft X at xx+04:33 asking if the pilot was climbing to FL370; and then attempted to get a phone patch with the pilot to clarify the clearance. As he was attempting to get the phone patch; it appeared that aircraft X had been in level flight at FL360 for over 4 minutes; with the head on traffic. At this point I told that controller to just send him a climb clearance instead of waiting for the patch as it would be quicker since he was connected via cpdlc; just anything to get him out of FL360.it took two minutes for the controller to decide to climb aircraft X to FL370; and the clearance should have included immediately so the plane would get to a safe altitude. I could not legally descend aircraft Y to FL340 as aircraft X was profiled to be at level flight of FL350. According to the ads reports from the plane; aircraft X had been level at FL360 from xx:03 until xx:08:21 when the pilot reported level at FL370.the conflict between aircraft X and aircraft Y started at xx:04; but because of the controller's change of clearance; the conflict did not appear on my screen until xx:06:49 when the loss of separation had already begun. The second conflict with aircraft Z started at xx:15; and there was a third aircraft on that route northbound also at FL360; but I do not recall the call sign.I issued the brasher warning to aircraft X as soon as he entered my airspace as there was a loss of separation. I do not know for sure if aircraft X was really level at FL360 for four minutes or if he had descended back to FL350; however the ads reports showed him FL360. The delay between the ads reports made this more confusing.I would suggest to never; ever send a clearance if there is such a short time frame for the plane to be level. This was a 'safe' clearance; but a stupid one to make. If this was a radar sector; I still would not issue a clearance like that; but especially in non-radar where you don't have accurate positions it was completely unsafe in my opinion. Also the controller should have added to the clearance; 'if unable climb by time issued; maintain FL350 and advise'. The pilot was confused by the multiple clearances sent so closely together; especially for someone whose first language is not english.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZNY Controller reported of an unsafe situation when a fellow Controller climbed an aircraft to avoid a loss of separation. The other Controller climbed the aircraft in what the reporter thought was too short of a time period.

Narrative: I was training someone on the non radar sectors of 87 and 89; and decided due to the amount of weather and deviations to split the sector as the trainee couldn't keep up with the flow of traffic at the time. We decided to stay with the south sector as that was the busier of the two and had the weather and deviations; more complexity that would be good for him to see. Before we split the sectors; I took control of the sector and gave a position relief briefing to my relief; and had explained to him that Aircraft X was requesting higher than what he was currently at (FL350). There were multiple aircraft head on with Aircraft X at FL360 so in my opinion; a climb clearance was not possible with the time constraint that he needed to be level.As soon as myself and the trainee sat down and started back to working on the south side; the controller who took the north sector sent a clearance to Aircraft X to climb to FL370. Aircraft X was connected via Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS); so he felt that there was enough time to issue the clearance and have the plane be level before the conflict started. A clearance was sent at XX+00 to be level at FL370 by XX+2; which I feel was unsafe to issue a climb clearance to be level in two minutes. The pilot did not respond to the clearance right away as there may have been a lag in the time the clearance was sent to when it was received. When the controller did not receive a wilco from the pilot; he sent a new message at XX+3 to disregard the climb clearance and to maintain FL350. Five seconds later the pilot sent a wilco message; followed by a second wilco at XX+3.35. Therefore it was uncertain what the aircraft was actually doing.Because the controller cleared him to maintain FL350; there was no conflict window that popped up when Aircraft X sent a downlink at XX+4:15 that the plane was at 36;172. The controller received a trial probe error because the plane was profiled at being at FL350. This is when I stopped training and kicked the trainee out as I tried to figure out what the other controller was doing. The downlink we received at XX+4:15 said the aircraft was at 36;172; but had a vertical rate of -688 feet per minute; so the pilot was confused by the multiple quick clearances and had already been through FL365 and descended back down. The controller at sector 87 then sent a message to Aircraft X at XX+04:33 asking if the pilot was climbing to FL370; and then attempted to get a phone patch with the pilot to clarify the clearance. As he was attempting to get the phone patch; it appeared that Aircraft X had been in level flight at FL360 for over 4 minutes; with the head on traffic. At this point I told that controller to just send him a climb clearance instead of waiting for the patch as it would be quicker since he was connected via CPDLC; just anything to get him out of FL360.It took two minutes for the controller to decide to climb Aircraft X to FL370; and the clearance should have included immediately so the plane would get to a safe altitude. I could not legally descend Aircraft Y to FL340 as Aircraft X was profiled to be at level flight of FL350. According to the ADS reports from the plane; Aircraft X had been level at FL360 from XX:03 until XX:08:21 when the pilot reported level at FL370.The conflict between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y started at XX:04; but because of the controller's change of clearance; the conflict did not appear on my screen until XX:06:49 when the loss of separation had already begun. The second conflict with Aircraft Z started at XX:15; and there was a third aircraft on that route northbound also at FL360; but I do not recall the call sign.I issued the brasher warning to Aircraft X as soon as he entered my airspace as there was a loss of separation. I do not know for sure if Aircraft X was really level at FL360 for four minutes or if he had descended back to FL350; however the ADS reports showed him FL360. The delay between the ADS reports made this more confusing.I would suggest to never; ever send a clearance if there is such a short time frame for the plane to be level. This was a 'safe' clearance; but a stupid one to make. If this was a radar sector; I still would not issue a clearance like that; but especially in non-radar where you don't have accurate positions it was completely unsafe in my opinion. Also the controller should have added to the clearance; 'if unable climb by time issued; maintain FL350 and advise'. The pilot was confused by the multiple clearances sent so closely together; especially for someone whose first language is not English.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.