Narrative:

I assumed control of the combined positions R56/R42. I was working a [military] aircraft at 38;000 feet (either a kc-135 or C-17 I can't remember) heading to a destination beyond ZZZ. My assist controller instructed me that his routing was incorrect so he was issued direct to ZZZ in order to prevent an unsafe situation. The handoff was initiated to R75 and a point was initiated to R73. In my judgment; R75 did not have traffic for this aircraft ZZZ direct should not have been a problem. The R75 controller refused to take the handoff on the aircraft causing me to 'spin' the airplane to avoid entering R75 for an airspace violation.this action caused a chain reaction because the abrupt 'spin' of the aircraft was unexpected and caused R39 to have to abruptly take action to stop a climbing aircraft from conflicting with the [military] aircraft. Had the [military aircraft] not been 'spun'; no traffic situation would have existed between it and any of R39's traffic. This R75 controller is well known around the facility for refusing 'directs' for questionable reasons. [The military aircraft] at FL380 was not in conflict with any of R75's traffic; and therefore the controller was not operating in accordance within faah 7110.65 para:2-1-1 the primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to provide a safe; orderly and expeditious flow of traffic; and to provide support for national security and homeland defense. Or faah 7110.65 para: 2-1-2 b. Provide support to national security and homeland defense activities to include; but not be limited to; reporting of suspicious and/or unusual aircraft/pilot activities.the [military] aircraft was rerouted over J60 and around R75 all together. The sector remained busy for the next hour or so. I informed the front line manager that I had been on position for 1:45 minutes without being offered a break. At this point I was becoming noticeably fatigued due to the complexity; volume; bad ride reports being issued; and time on position. Finally I was offered my first break and was relieved of R56/42.I recommend that staffing is improved. I recommend that supervisors pay attention to the time on position. I recommend that controllers are rewarded for staying on position for over 2 hours when they are forced to do so because we are ultimately the ones that will be punished if the unthinkable happens. I recommend that controllers be held accountable when they refuse to work traffic for unjust reasons.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Center controller reported a refusal of a handoff by another Center controller for unknown reasons that resulted in clearance changes for several subsequent aircraft.

Narrative: I assumed control of the combined positions R56/R42. I was working a [military] aircraft at 38;000 feet (either a KC-135 or C-17 I can't remember) heading to a destination beyond ZZZ. My Assist controller instructed me that his routing was incorrect so he was issued direct to ZZZ in order to prevent an unsafe situation. The handoff was initiated to R75 and a point was initiated to R73. In my judgment; R75 did not have traffic for this aircraft ZZZ direct should not have been a problem. The R75 controller refused to take the handoff on the aircraft causing me to 'spin' the airplane to avoid entering R75 for an airspace violation.This action caused a chain reaction because the abrupt 'spin' of the aircraft was unexpected and caused R39 to have to abruptly take action to stop a climbing aircraft from conflicting with the [military] aircraft. Had the [military aircraft] not been 'spun'; no traffic situation would have existed between it and any of R39's traffic. This R75 controller is well known around the facility for refusing 'directs' for questionable reasons. [The military aircraft] at FL380 was not in conflict with any of R75's traffic; and therefore the controller was not operating in accordance within FAAH 7110.65 Para:2-1-1 The primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to provide a safe; orderly and expeditious flow of traffic; and to provide support for National Security and Homeland Defense. Or FAAH 7110.65 Para: 2-1-2 b. Provide support to national security and homeland defense activities to include; but not be limited to; reporting of suspicious and/or unusual aircraft/pilot activities.The [military] aircraft was rerouted over J60 and around R75 all together. The sector remained busy for the next hour or so. I informed the Front Line Manager that I had been on position for 1:45 minutes without being offered a break. At this point I was becoming noticeably fatigued due to the complexity; volume; bad ride reports being issued; and time on position. Finally I was offered my first break and was relieved of R56/42.I recommend that staffing is improved. I recommend that supervisors pay attention to the time on position. I recommend that controllers are rewarded for staying on position for over 2 hours when they are forced to do so because we are ultimately the ones that will be punished if the unthinkable happens. I recommend that controllers be held accountable when they refuse to work traffic for unjust reasons.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.