Narrative:

This was a low speed abort made because of some loud banging or clanking noises with no indication of any problems in the cockpit. After we exited the runway someone on tower frequency stated we had a lot of smoke coming from #2 engine. We completed a fire shutdown on the #2 engine and while cleaning up the checklist someone else reported on tower frequency that the #3 engine was on fire. We completed a fire shutdown on the #3 engine and when more flames were reported on the right side of the aircraft I made the decision to evacuate the aircraft. It was a good evacuation with only a few minor injuries. The fire department people were there almost immediately to help with the evacuation and put out the remaining fire. Crew performance was excellent with 2 minor exceptions. One F/a disarmed her slide before opening her door and the F/east did not call out a #3 engine vibration light. Most of the decisions concerning this incident had to be made from information coming from outside the aircraft. It now appears as if the only problem was with the #3 engine and the callout about the #2 engine was in error. There was a lot of information to be processed in the 2 or 3 mins from abort to evacuation. I think it is important that we not stop processing information when we think we have found the problem. We have to keep looking around and make timely decisions in the most conservative way. I always give my crews a good briefing before we take off including conduct during an abort. This was a big help in bringing this incident to a successful conclusion. Airport response was excellent. Crash, paramedics, airport officials, and even state police were there immediately. The passenger were bussed back to the terminal in a timely fashion. Supplemental information from acn 140746: the F/east said he noticed that both generator #2 and #3 field and generator breakers were opened. There were no cockpit warnings. We noticed #3 engine's tgt was increasing, so captain shut down the #3 engine, pulled the fire pail, and discharged a bottle. When all were evacuated we double-checked the cabin and left the aircraft. The fire department was extinguishing the fire on the right wing engine as we cleared the area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED AND PASSENGERS EVACUATED WHEN LOUD NOISES HEARD DURING TKOF AND ADVISED OF FIRE IN #2 AND #3 ENGINES.

Narrative: THIS WAS A LOW SPEED ABORT MADE BECAUSE OF SOME LOUD BANGING OR CLANKING NOISES WITH NO INDICATION OF ANY PROBLEMS IN THE COCKPIT. AFTER WE EXITED THE RWY SOMEONE ON TWR FREQ STATED WE HAD A LOT OF SMOKE COMING FROM #2 ENGINE. WE COMPLETED A FIRE SHUTDOWN ON THE #2 ENGINE AND WHILE CLEANING UP THE CHECKLIST SOMEONE ELSE REPORTED ON TWR FREQ THAT THE #3 ENGINE WAS ON FIRE. WE COMPLETED A FIRE SHUTDOWN ON THE #3 ENGINE AND WHEN MORE FLAMES WERE REPORTED ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ACFT I MADE THE DECISION TO EVACUATE THE ACFT. IT WAS A GOOD EVACUATION WITH ONLY A FEW MINOR INJURIES. THE FIRE DEPT PEOPLE WERE THERE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO HELP WITH THE EVACUATION AND PUT OUT THE REMAINING FIRE. CREW PERFORMANCE WAS EXCELLENT WITH 2 MINOR EXCEPTIONS. ONE F/A DISARMED HER SLIDE BEFORE OPENING HER DOOR AND THE F/E DID NOT CALL OUT A #3 ENGINE VIBRATION LIGHT. MOST OF THE DECISIONS CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT HAD TO BE MADE FROM INFO COMING FROM OUTSIDE THE ACFT. IT NOW APPEARS AS IF THE ONLY PROBLEM WAS WITH THE #3 ENGINE AND THE CALLOUT ABOUT THE #2 ENGINE WAS IN ERROR. THERE WAS A LOT OF INFO TO BE PROCESSED IN THE 2 OR 3 MINS FROM ABORT TO EVACUATION. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT STOP PROCESSING INFO WHEN WE THINK WE HAVE FOUND THE PROBLEM. WE HAVE TO KEEP LOOKING AROUND AND MAKE TIMELY DECISIONS IN THE MOST CONSERVATIVE WAY. I ALWAYS GIVE MY CREWS A GOOD BRIEFING BEFORE WE TAKE OFF INCLUDING CONDUCT DURING AN ABORT. THIS WAS A BIG HELP IN BRINGING THIS INCIDENT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. ARPT RESPONSE WAS EXCELLENT. CRASH, PARAMEDICS, ARPT OFFICIALS, AND EVEN STATE POLICE WERE THERE IMMEDIATELY. THE PAX WERE BUSSED BACK TO THE TERMINAL IN A TIMELY FASHION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 140746: THE F/E SAID HE NOTICED THAT BOTH GENERATOR #2 AND #3 FIELD AND GENERATOR BREAKERS WERE OPENED. THERE WERE NO COCKPIT WARNINGS. WE NOTICED #3 ENGINE'S TGT WAS INCREASING, SO CAPT SHUT DOWN THE #3 ENGINE, PULLED THE FIRE PAIL, AND DISCHARGED A BOTTLE. WHEN ALL WERE EVACUATED WE DOUBLE-CHECKED THE CABIN AND LEFT THE ACFT. THE FIRE DEPT WAS EXTINGUISHING THE FIRE ON THE RIGHT WING ENGINE AS WE CLRED THE AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.