Narrative:

On departure ca called for ap at about 600-800 ft. I engaged the ap. As we accelerated through 200KIAS; we both noticed a loud noise that we could attribute to increased airspeed; as though the noise was coming from airflow over an open panel on the aircraft. I assumed; and the captain agreed it was likely the headset and nose gear door switch panel. We continued our climb out following the SID. Ca had called for 'flaps up; climb thrust; after takeoff checklist.' I conducted my flow/procedure. After completing the procedure; I read through the checklist silently and then called 'after takeoff checklist complete.' around 4;000-8;000 MSL; or around 3-5 minutes after takeoff; the ap disconnected on its own. Ca re-engaged the autopilot. Within a minute; the ap disconnected again. We tried to troubleshoot why it was disengaging; as we had no EICAS message or other indications as to why our autopilot wouldn't engage. We tried engaging the ap on my side; and we tried disconnecting the ap from my side (occasionally the disconnect button on the control wheel will get stuck). After a few attempts at re-engaging the autopilot and the autopilot disconnecting; ca chose to hand-fly the aircraft. In addition to this; we noticed that my (first officer's side) FMS needles had disappeared from my pfd. I cycled my navigation selector to 'green needles' and back to FMS and the FMS course re-appeared. A few moments later my FMS needles disappeared. Passing through 10;000 feet I switched the 'no smoking' sign switch to signal to our flight attendants (flight attendant) that we were through 10;000 feet. The switch did not chime. I tried the 'fasten seatbelts' switch which also did not chime. I transferred the radios to the ca and called the flight attendants and advised that we were through 10;000 feet. It was at this point we began to notice we had extremely diminished climb performance and were not able to accelerate past 260-270KIAS. We advised ATC we needed to level off; and leveled off at 12;000 feet. We knew something was wrong; but we could not figure out what. Ca asked me to begin reviewing all of the system status pages to see if there were any other indications to give us a clue as to why we did not have any climb performance. After reviewing the systems; we began communicating our issue with dispatch. We advised dispatch of our new altitude and that we were suffering performance loss. We also advised that the autopilot would not stay engaged. We began calculating our fuel burn as discovered we were burning about 400lbs of fuel every 5 minutes; or about 4;800 lbs. An hour. With about 5;000 lbs. Of fuel and about 40 minutes of flight time remaining; we decided it was best to divert. At this point; we had resolved that a panel of some sort on the aircraft was hanging open and needed to focus on diverting as our fuel burn rate would not permit us to continue much longer. I called the flight attendant and advised him of our problem and that we would be landing in about 15 minutes and this was a non-emergency situation. I then made a PA to the passengers in the cabin advising them that we believed we had a loose panel on the aircraft and that it was degrading our fuel burn and performance to the point that we would not be able to make it to ZZZ. Ca continued to hand-fly while I prepared the performance numbers and FMS for the arrival. Upon entering final; ca called for 'gear down.' at this point; I reached for the gear handle and noticed that it was down. I verified the indications on the EICAS which confirmed down and three green. We immediately realized our mistake which was that I had never selected the gear up on departure. I am not sure what to attribute this mistake to other than complacency and distractions. On departure; I do recall reaching for the gear handle. I believe I became distracted by reaching for the 'speed' mode button and 'navigation' button. We became distracted by the noise generated by the gear and attributed it to an open panel instead. We further became distracted by an autopilot that wouldn't stay engaged and having to hand-fly the aircraft. It was a 'tunnel-vision' situation where we became fixated on only one possible problem while dealing with other small; seemingly unassociated problems. We were becoming worried and baffled as to what was wrong with the aircraft. The max gear extended speed was exceeded by approximately 10-20KIAS. There was also a flap over-speed on final and the thrust reversers were not armed for landing (I don't recall completing the landing checklist). This can be attributed to our state of embarrassment and distraction by discovering our mistake on final. While I did read the checklist and look through the flight deck to verify (I was more concerned with making sure the APU had shutdown; the bleeds were switched; the cargo air switch was in the correct position; and the thruster reversers were disarmed); I failed to notice that the gear indicated down and three green. To prevent this from happening again; I will need to pay particular attention to all of my checklist items. It is one thing to miss a flow; it is another to read and verify a checklist and still miss an item - that is what the checklist is for. Additionally; once an issue is discovered in-flight; you must also sit back and review even the most basic reasons why a problem is occurring. We failed to notice that our gear was down for the entire hour we were in flight. We were very focused on other possible issues; and failed to sit back and evaluate the big picture.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported failing to retract the landing gear on departure; interpreted the gear noise as a possible open panel; and diverted due to reduced performance and increased fuel burn. The extended gear was noted when performing the landing checklist.

Narrative: On departure CA called for AP at about 600-800 ft. I engaged the AP. As we accelerated through 200KIAS; we both noticed a loud noise that we could attribute to increased airspeed; as though the noise was coming from airflow over an open panel on the aircraft. I assumed; and the captain agreed it was likely the Headset and Nose Gear Door switch panel. We continued our climb out following the SID. CA had called for 'flaps up; climb thrust; after takeoff checklist.' I conducted my flow/procedure. After completing the procedure; I read through the checklist silently and then called 'After Takeoff Checklist Complete.' Around 4;000-8;000 MSL; or around 3-5 minutes after takeoff; the AP disconnected on its own. CA re-engaged the autopilot. Within a minute; the AP disconnected again. We tried to troubleshoot why it was disengaging; as we had no EICAS message or other indications as to why our autopilot wouldn't engage. We tried engaging the AP on my side; and we tried disconnecting the AP from my side (occasionally the disconnect button on the control wheel will get stuck). After a few attempts at re-engaging the autopilot and the autopilot disconnecting; CA chose to hand-fly the aircraft. In addition to this; we noticed that my (FO's side) FMS needles had disappeared from my PFD. I cycled my NAV selector to 'green needles' and back to FMS and the FMS course re-appeared. A few moments later my FMS needles disappeared. Passing through 10;000 feet I switched the 'No Smoking' sign switch to signal to our Flight Attendants (FA) that we were through 10;000 feet. The switch did not chime. I tried the 'Fasten Seatbelts' switch which also did not chime. I transferred the radios to the CA and called the flight attendants and advised that we were through 10;000 feet. It was at this point we began to notice we had extremely diminished climb performance and were not able to accelerate past 260-270KIAS. We advised ATC we needed to level off; and leveled off at 12;000 feet. We knew something was wrong; but we could not figure out what. CA asked me to begin reviewing all of the system status pages to see if there were any other indications to give us a clue as to why we did not have any climb performance. After reviewing the systems; we began communicating our issue with Dispatch. We advised Dispatch of our new altitude and that we were suffering performance loss. We also advised that the autopilot would not stay engaged. We began calculating our fuel burn as discovered we were burning about 400lbs of fuel every 5 minutes; or about 4;800 lbs. an hour. With about 5;000 lbs. of fuel and about 40 minutes of flight time remaining; we decided it was best to divert. At this point; we had resolved that a panel of some sort on the aircraft was hanging open and needed to focus on diverting as our fuel burn rate would not permit us to continue much longer. I called the FA and advised him of our problem and that we would be landing in about 15 minutes and this was a non-emergency situation. I then made a PA to the passengers in the cabin advising them that we believed we had a loose panel on the aircraft and that it was degrading our fuel burn and performance to the point that we would not be able to make it to ZZZ. CA continued to hand-fly while I prepared the performance numbers and FMS for the arrival. Upon entering final; CA called for 'Gear Down.' At this point; I reached for the gear handle and noticed that it was down. I verified the indications on the EICAS which confirmed down and three green. We immediately realized our mistake which was that I had never selected the gear up on departure. I am not sure what to attribute this mistake to other than complacency and distractions. On departure; I do recall reaching for the gear handle. I believe I became distracted by reaching for the 'SPEED' mode button and 'NAV' button. We became distracted by the noise generated by the gear and attributed it to an open panel instead. We further became distracted by an autopilot that wouldn't stay engaged and having to hand-fly the aircraft. It was a 'tunnel-vision' situation where we became fixated on only one possible problem while dealing with other small; seemingly unassociated problems. We were becoming worried and baffled as to what was wrong with the aircraft. The max gear extended speed was exceeded by approximately 10-20KIAS. There was also a flap over-speed on final and the thrust reversers were not armed for landing (I don't recall completing the landing checklist). This can be attributed to our state of embarrassment and distraction by discovering our mistake on final. While I did read the checklist and look through the flight deck to verify (I was more concerned with making sure the APU had shutdown; the bleeds were switched; the CARGO AIR switch was in the correct position; and the Thruster Reversers were disarmed); I failed to notice that the gear indicated Down and Three Green. To prevent this from happening again; I will need to pay particular attention to all of my checklist items. It is one thing to miss a flow; it is another to read and verify a checklist and still miss an item - that is what the checklist is for. Additionally; once an issue is discovered in-flight; you must also sit back and review even the most basic reasons why a problem is occurring. We failed to notice that our gear was down for the entire hour we were in flight. We were very focused on other possible issues; and failed to sit back and evaluate the big picture.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.