Narrative:

ILS approachs in use to runways 18L and 18R only due to WX. Air carrier X on ILS 18L and air carrier Y on il 18R. Air carrier Y, medium large transport, closed within 1 mi of air carrier X, small transport, and were not broke out. Both the supervisor and local controller were aware and made verbal statements to each other. The supervisor looked through binoculars and finally air carrier X came out of the clouds however not before the 2 aircraft on different locs were already too close. I observed this on the BRITE display in the tower as did the supervisor and controller. The lack of leadership in the area of quality assurance and expected use of the rules, especially on the final radar position, encourages controllers to cheat. Both retaliation and negative fallout keeps people from reporting errors. This scenario is a very common occurrence at this facility. Both supervisors and controller are well aware if you could get them to admit it. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated mem is a combined facility where controllers are qualified in both tower and TRACON. Parallel ILS approachs are used with 3500' between runway centerlines. Standard radar sep is 2 mi. The reporter stated that system errors are routinely not reported. Controllers are intimidated by supervisors if they report system errors. Mem has had 13 reported operrors this yr. This analyst thinks the reporter may be the proverbial 'thorn in the side' of the facility supervisor's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION FROM ACR Y. SYSTEM ERROR. SITUATION: CTLRS AND SUPVRS NOT REPORTING OPERATIONAL ERRORS BECAUSE OF REPRISAL BY FAC MANAGEMENT.

Narrative: ILS APCHS IN USE TO RWYS 18L AND 18R ONLY DUE TO WX. ACR X ON ILS 18L AND ACR Y ON IL 18R. ACR Y, MLG, CLOSED WITHIN 1 MI OF ACR X, SMT, AND WERE NOT BROKE OUT. BOTH THE SUPVR AND LCL CTLR WERE AWARE AND MADE VERBAL STATEMENTS TO EACH OTHER. THE SUPVR LOOKED THROUGH BINOCULARS AND FINALLY ACR X CAME OUT OF THE CLOUDS HOWEVER NOT BEFORE THE 2 ACFT ON DIFFERENT LOCS WERE ALREADY TOO CLOSE. I OBSERVED THIS ON THE BRITE DISPLAY IN THE TWR AS DID THE SUPVR AND CTLR. THE LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN THE AREA OF QUALITY ASSURANCE AND EXPECTED USE OF THE RULES, ESPECIALLY ON THE FINAL RADAR POS, ENCOURAGES CTLRS TO CHEAT. BOTH RETALIATION AND NEGATIVE FALLOUT KEEPS PEOPLE FROM RPTING ERRORS. THIS SCENARIO IS A VERY COMMON OCCURRENCE AT THIS FAC. BOTH SUPVRS AND CTLR ARE WELL AWARE IF YOU COULD GET THEM TO ADMIT IT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED MEM IS A COMBINED FAC WHERE CTLRS ARE QUALIFIED IN BOTH TWR AND TRACON. PARALLEL ILS APCHS ARE USED WITH 3500' BETWEEN RWY CENTERLINES. STANDARD RADAR SEP IS 2 MI. THE RPTR STATED THAT SYS ERRORS ARE ROUTINELY NOT RPTED. CTLRS ARE INTIMIDATED BY SUPVRS IF THEY RPT SYS ERRORS. MEM HAS HAD 13 RPTED OPERRORS THIS YR. THIS ANALYST THINKS THE RPTR MAY BE THE PROVERBIAL 'THORN IN THE SIDE' OF THE FAC SUPVR'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.