Narrative:

I was scheduled to fly to ZZZ before continuing on to ZZZ1. The aircraft was late to the gate because maintenance was towing it from the hangar. When it finally arrived; maintenance was on board finishing up the paperwork that would clear one of the mels on the aircraft (a broken seat). I was only able to take a quick look at the logbook but continued to check the other aircraft documents and safety equipment. As I started my initial preflight; the mechanic completed the required logbook entries and I started a more in-depth review of the paperwork and called the dispatcher to amend the release. After the mechanic left I restarted my preflight flow and discovered a note located next to the captain's headset jack. It started off with 'dear crew' and discussed the pilots experience of hot starts with engine 2. It continued with the author describing his discussions with maintenance control and having to work out a modified procedure in order to get the engine started. -Packs outs-affected eng ignition to override-eng 1 about 48-50 psii rechecked the logbook a third time and did not see anything in the logbook to suspect a problem. I also discussed this issue with the first officer and we both agreed to continue but we would pay close attention to the engine start. I considered sending the note I found to the chief pilots and to call maintenance control but decided that it would be handled better through the aviation safety action program. Pushback and start up were uneventful. Engine 2 started normally but we noticed that the engine was idling higher than engine 1. I could not tell you an exact number because it did not appear unusual and the engine was running normally and the flight continued without incident. Preflight in ZZZ started normally. The temperature was about 94 degrees; calm winds; and the flight was full including another [airline] captain in the jumpseat. The pushback was uneventful and we started engine 1 normally. When I cleared the first officer to start engine two; I was dividing my attention between the engine start and the push crew getting clear of the aircraft. I noticed the first officer shutting down engine 2 but could not recall how high the itt (interstage turbine temperature) reached. Both the jumpseat pilot and the first officer agreed that the itt gauge was approaching the limit and did not appear to be slowing down. I called for the abnormal start checklist and to review the mechanical irregularity chart. I then called dispatch in order to talk with maintenance control. Unfortunately; while talking with maintenance control I told them that the engine was shut down at a much higher temperature than it actually was which caused them to think I overtemped it. I taxied to the gate and called maintenance to which I apologized for giving them the wrong temperature and to figure out what our next steps were going to be (while dealing with maintenance control and dispatch; a few passengers decided to deplane). Maintenance control informed me that there is no need to write up the engine start since the plane did not exceed a limitation. They began to ask me questions regarding the temperature outside; psi from the APU; and if we attempted to start the engine with a tailwind. I told them about the note I had found to which the maintenance controllers gave me a brief history of this engine including an issue the day prior (90 degree day) where the crew was having issues starting the number 2 engine. They told me that we needed to have more airflow into the engine for it to start and provided me with two options. A crossbleed start or start the engine while taxing into the wind (as a crossbleed start) to get more volume into the engine. No matter which method I used; the bleeds would need to be turned off and the ignition would be switched to override. I told the maintenance controller that I was not willing to do a procedure that was not in my manual and would get back to him with the method iwould use to attempt another start. I asked the flight attendant to close the cockpit door and I conferred with the other pilots in the cockpit. I was unable to find a psi requirement to start the engine within our publications except for what is required for an external start and the maintenance controller told me that the APU was producing enough psi to start the engine. The airport was reporting the wind to be blowing directly down the taxiway (250/4kts) I needed to use to get to the runway. After conferring with the pilots; I decided that I was willing to start the engine as we taxied to the runway since it was a normal when trying to save fuel and the headwind would meet the volume requirement maintenance suggested. I informed maintenance control of my decision and was told to let the engine reach 815 before shutting it down. I told the controller that I am not willing to let the engine exceed the limitation and do not feel comfortable with allowing the itt to continue to 815 if the rate of increase will exceed the limitation. I was told about the fact there are buffers built into the manuals and we need the engine to get to 815. I told the first officer what they said and that since it is on a recorded line; we are going to stop the engine if the itt reaches 815. Pushback was uneventful and engine 1 started normally. As we taxied; I had the first officer start engine 2. It appeared that the engine was going to reach the limitation but started to roll back and shut down when the itt reached 806. We ran our checklists and returned to the gate. After we arrived to the gate and deplaned; I called maintenance control to write up the engine. We were told that a mechanic would inspect the engine and that they would like us to do an engine run utilizing the crossbleed start; packs out; and the affected engine ignition to override. It was around this point that I decided to call my dispatcher and have him connect me to the chief pilot on duty. I explained to him what was going on; the note I discovered on the airplane; and that I am not comfortable trying to start the engine using a procedure that was not in my manual or one to which we were not trained to perform. The chief pilot told me that maintenance has procedures that I do not have and it is acceptable to start the engine using the methods that they suggest. Since we had a mechanic on the flight deck talking with maintenance control and after talking to the chief pilot; we attempted an engine start using the crossbleed start checklist in the QRH but including the added steps of the packs off and the ignition to override. The engine shut down on its own and I left the plane in the hands of the mechanic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 Captain reported that after several attempts at starting the #2 engine; the engine shut down due to approaching high Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT).

Narrative: I was scheduled to fly to ZZZ before continuing on to ZZZ1. The aircraft was late to the gate because Maintenance was towing it from the hangar. When it finally arrived; Maintenance was on board finishing up the paperwork that would clear one of the MELs on the aircraft (a broken seat). I was only able to take a quick look at the logbook but continued to check the other Aircraft Documents and safety equipment. As I started my initial preflight; the Mechanic completed the required logbook entries and I started a more in-depth review of the paperwork and called the dispatcher to amend the release. After the Mechanic left I restarted my preflight flow and discovered a note located next to the Captain's headset jack. It started off with 'Dear Crew' and discussed the pilots experience of Hot Starts with Engine 2. It continued with the Author describing his discussions with Maintenance control and having to work out a modified procedure in order to get the engine started. -Packs outs-Affected Eng ignition to override-Eng 1 about 48-50 PSII rechecked the logbook a third time and did not see anything in the logbook to suspect a problem. I also discussed this issue with the First Officer and we both agreed to continue but we would pay close attention to the engine start. I considered sending the note I found to the Chief Pilots and to call Maintenance Control but decided that it would be handled better through the Aviation Safety Action Program. Pushback and start up were uneventful. Engine 2 started normally but we noticed that the engine was idling higher than Engine 1. I could not tell you an exact number because it did not appear unusual and the engine was running normally and the flight continued without incident. Preflight in ZZZ started normally. The temperature was about 94 degrees; calm winds; and the flight was full including another [Airline] Captain in the jumpseat. The pushback was uneventful and we started Engine 1 normally. When I cleared the First Officer to start Engine Two; I was dividing my attention between the engine start and the push crew getting clear of the aircraft. I noticed the First Officer shutting down Engine 2 but could not recall how high the ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) reached. Both the Jumpseat Pilot and the First Officer agreed that the ITT gauge was approaching the limit and did not appear to be slowing down. I called for the Abnormal Start Checklist and to review the Mechanical Irregularity Chart. I then called Dispatch in order to talk with Maintenance Control. Unfortunately; while talking with Maintenance Control I told them that the engine was shut down at a much higher temperature than it actually was which caused them to think I overtemped it. I taxied to the gate and called Maintenance to which I apologized for giving them the wrong temperature and to figure out what our next steps were going to be (while dealing with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; a few passengers decided to deplane). Maintenance Control informed me that there is no need to write up the engine start since the plane did not exceed a limitation. They began to ask me questions regarding the temperature outside; PSI from the APU; and if we attempted to start the engine with a tailwind. I told them about the note I had found to which the Maintenance Controllers gave me a brief history of this engine including an issue the day prior (90 degree day) where the crew was having issues starting the number 2 Engine. They told me that we needed to have more airflow into the engine for it to start and provided me with two options. A crossbleed start or start the engine while taxing into the wind (as a crossbleed start) to get more volume into the engine. No matter which method I used; the bleeds would need to be turned off and the ignition would be switched to override. I told the Maintenance controller that I was not willing to do a procedure that was not in my manual and would get back to him with the method Iwould use to attempt another start. I asked the FA to close the cockpit door and I conferred with the other pilots in the cockpit. I was unable to find a PSI requirement to start the engine within our publications except for what is required for an external start and the Maintenance controller told me that the APU was producing enough PSI to start the engine. The Airport was reporting the wind to be blowing directly down the taxiway (250/4kts) I needed to use to get to the Runway. After conferring with the pilots; I decided that I was willing to start the engine as we taxied to the runway since it was a normal when trying to save fuel and the headwind would meet the volume requirement Maintenance suggested. I informed Maintenance control of my decision and was told to let the engine reach 815 before shutting it down. I told the controller that I am not willing to let the engine exceed the limitation and do not feel comfortable with allowing the ITT to continue to 815 if the rate of increase will exceed the limitation. I was told about the fact there are buffers built into the manuals and we need the engine to get to 815. I told the First Officer what they said and that since it is on a recorded line; we are going to stop the engine if the ITT reaches 815. Pushback was uneventful and Engine 1 started normally. As we taxied; I had the FO start Engine 2. It appeared that the engine was going to reach the limitation but started to roll back and shut down when the ITT reached 806. We ran our checklists and returned to the gate. After we arrived to the gate and deplaned; I called Maintenance control to write up the engine. We were told that a mechanic would inspect the engine and that they would like us to do an engine run utilizing the crossbleed start; packs out; and the affected engine ignition to override. It was around this point that I decided to call my dispatcher and have him connect me to the Chief Pilot on duty. I explained to him what was going on; the note I discovered on the airplane; and that I am not comfortable trying to start the engine using a procedure that was not in my manual or one to which we were not trained to perform. The Chief Pilot told me that Maintenance has procedures that I do not have and it is acceptable to start the engine using the methods that they suggest. Since we had a mechanic on the flight deck talking with Maintenance Control and after talking to the Chief Pilot; we attempted an engine start using the Crossbleed Start checklist in the QRH but including the added steps of the Packs off and the ignition to override. The engine shut down on its own and I left the plane in the hands of the mechanic.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.