Narrative:

This report is not associated with a specific event. It is regarding a safety concern about how we; as line crews and dispatchers; handle obstacle notams. As I understand it (based on conversations with engineering); obstacle notams (towers; cranes; etc.) are analyzed by engineering. If the analysis determines that the obstacle in the NOTAM penetrates the obstacle clearance plane of a given departure (or arrival) runway; then that NOTAM and obstacle is highlighted on the weather packet cover sheet. Via the cover sheet; the crew is instructed to input the obstacle height and distance from the runway into the performance computer for consideration in the takeoff and landing data. The problem is that our pilots are only loosely aware of the above obstacle analysis process; and only by word of mouth rather than from our publications. Our publications explain how to input an obstacle into the performance computer; but not under what circumstances to do so. We have no guidance about it. Generally speaking; pilots 'assume' that if an obstacle presents a hazard to takeoff or landing; that 'somebody' will put it on the weather packet cover sheet and tell them about it. As a result; obstacle notams that are not highlighted on the cover sheet are largely ignored by pilots. But there is a hole in this process. The loop is not closed. As pilots; we have no way of knowing if engineering; dispatch; or anyone else has analyzed a given obstacle NOTAM and determined that it is or is not a threat to our departure or arrival. We simply assume that if it is not specifically brought to our attention by 'somebody' via the cover sheet; then it must not be a threat. Hopefully that is true; but what if something is missed? In our CRM vernacular; we have not followed the model because we have not 'verified'. Instead we have assumed. And 'assuming' doesn't fit well into CRM. So if and when one of these obstacle notams gets past the engineering and also goes unnoticed by dispatch; and if it is just a bad day for a crew and for company; we could end up flying an aircraft into an obstacle that we 'should have known about' because it was in the notams but the crew assumed it was not a threat. My opinion is that in our weather packet/NOTAM packet we need to 'close the loop'. We need to have some indication that any given obstacle NOTAM has been analyzed by engineering and deemed to be either a threat (on the cover sheet) or specifically not a threat (perhaps a note preceding or following the NOTAM 'obstacle not a factor'). But the crew needs to know that is has been looked at. Further; in our fom and/or aom (aircraft operations manual) we need a brief description of what engineering does with obstacles; how the crew can know that engineering has indeed done an analysis and did not 'miss this one'; and who to call if there is a question about an obstacle NOTAM. Our current lack of guidance and reliance on a word of mouth process leads crews to ignore notams; hope for the best; and rely on the 'it's a big sky' theory and leave obstacle clearance to chance. In my mind that is clearly 'accepting unnecessary risk' and contrary to the CRM model.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Check Airman does not believe that the current method of dealing with obstacle NOTAMs by the Engineering Department of his company is adequate to ensure that all of the NOTAMs have been addressed and the pertinent ones identified.

Narrative: This report is not associated with a specific event. It is regarding a safety concern about how we; as line Crews and Dispatchers; handle obstacle NOTAMs. As I understand it (based on conversations with Engineering); obstacle NOTAMs (towers; cranes; etc.) are analyzed by engineering. If the analysis determines that the obstacle in the NOTAM penetrates the obstacle clearance plane of a given departure (or arrival) runway; then that NOTAM and obstacle is highlighted on the weather packet cover sheet. Via the cover sheet; the Crew is instructed to input the obstacle height and distance from the runway into the performance computer for consideration in the takeoff and landing data. The problem is that our Pilots are only loosely aware of the above obstacle analysis process; and only by word of mouth rather than from our publications. Our publications explain HOW to input an obstacle into the performance computer; but not under what circumstances to do so. We have no guidance about it. Generally speaking; Pilots 'assume' that if an obstacle presents a hazard to takeoff or landing; that 'somebody' will put it on the weather packet cover sheet and tell them about it. As a result; obstacle NOTAMs that are NOT highlighted on the cover sheet are largely ignored by Pilots. But there is a hole in this process. The loop is not closed. As Pilots; we have no way of knowing if Engineering; Dispatch; or anyone else has analyzed a given obstacle NOTAM and determined that it is or is not a threat to our departure or arrival. We simply assume that if it is not specifically brought to our attention by 'somebody' via the cover sheet; then it must not be a threat. Hopefully that is true; but what if something is missed? In our CRM vernacular; we have not followed the model because we have not 'verified'. Instead we have assumed. And 'assuming' doesn't fit well into CRM. So if and when one of these obstacle NOTAMs gets past the Engineering and also goes unnoticed by Dispatch; and if it is just a bad day for a Crew and for Company; we could end up flying an aircraft into an obstacle that we 'should have known about' because it was in the NOTAMs but the Crew assumed it was not a threat. My opinion is that in our weather packet/NOTAM packet we need to 'close the loop'. We need to have some indication that any given obstacle NOTAM has been analyzed by engineering and deemed to be either a threat (on the cover sheet) or specifically NOT a threat (perhaps a note preceding or following the NOTAM 'OBSTACLE NOT A FACTOR'). But the crew needs to know that is has been looked at. Further; in our FOM and/or AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual) we need a brief description of what Engineering does with obstacles; how the crew can know that Engineering has indeed done an analysis and did not 'miss this one'; and who to call if there is a question about an obstacle NOTAM. Our current lack of guidance and reliance on a word of mouth process leads crews to ignore NOTAMs; hope for the best; and rely on the 'It's a Big Sky' theory and leave obstacle clearance to chance. In my mind that is clearly 'accepting unnecessary risk' and contrary to the CRM model.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.