Narrative:

Inbound to sjc, instructed by ATC to maintain at or above 2000' to (name of hotel). Pilot descended to and maintained 2200' to hotel. Controller's voice was female. Heard second aircraft (small aircraft Y) reply to tower, 'roger, #2 following the... (Us). 'We were descending and approaching the white tanks when I (passenger) spotted small aircraft Y passing overhead approximately 50' above. Tower was silent as aircraft converged, although mode C is required in the arsa. Pilot veered slightly to the left while requesting a left 360 degree turn from controller. Reply was, 'negative, continue approach, enter downwind for 30R,' or words to that effect. Small aircraft Y, now ahead, continued to overfly the tower and field, disappearing out of sight. Conclusion: controller incompetent, nearly killed 5 people! What good is mode C requirement if not used? Corrective actions: replace this controller before she causes a fatal collision in the TA. Note: controller never once asked small aircraft Y pilot if he had traffic ahead in sight. The controller was negligent in not verifying that pilot #2 saw aircraft #1, and the controller was negligent in not observing from the radar display that the aircraft were converging both vertical and horizontal. The purpose of having a controller is to provide sep in the air traffic area; this one is not able to perform that function.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA HAS CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER SMA WHILE OPERATING IN AN ARSA.

Narrative: INBND TO SJC, INSTRUCTED BY ATC TO MAINTAIN AT OR ABOVE 2000' TO (NAME OF HOTEL). PLT DSNDED TO AND MAINTAINED 2200' TO HOTEL. CTLR'S VOICE WAS FEMALE. HEARD SECOND ACFT (SMA Y) REPLY TO TWR, 'ROGER, #2 FOLLOWING THE... (US). 'WE WERE DSNDING AND APCHING THE WHITE TANKS WHEN I (PAX) SPOTTED SMA Y PASSING OVERHEAD APPROX 50' ABOVE. TWR WAS SILENT AS ACFT CONVERGED, ALTHOUGH MODE C IS REQUIRED IN THE ARSA. PLT VEERED SLIGHTLY TO THE LEFT WHILE REQUESTING A LEFT 360 DEG TURN FROM CTLR. REPLY WAS, 'NEGATIVE, CONTINUE APCH, ENTER DOWNWIND FOR 30R,' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. SMA Y, NOW AHEAD, CONTINUED TO OVERFLY THE TWR AND FIELD, DISAPPEARING OUT OF SIGHT. CONCLUSION: CTLR INCOMPETENT, NEARLY KILLED 5 PEOPLE! WHAT GOOD IS MODE C REQUIREMENT IF NOT USED? CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: REPLACE THIS CTLR BEFORE SHE CAUSES A FATAL COLLISION IN THE TA. NOTE: CTLR NEVER ONCE ASKED SMA Y PLT IF HE HAD TFC AHEAD IN SIGHT. THE CTLR WAS NEGLIGENT IN NOT VERIFYING THAT PLT #2 SAW ACFT #1, AND THE CTLR WAS NEGLIGENT IN NOT OBSERVING FROM THE RADAR DISPLAY THAT THE ACFT WERE CONVERGING BOTH VERT AND HORIZ. THE PURPOSE OF HAVING A CTLR IS TO PROVIDE SEP IN THE ATA; THIS ONE IS NOT ABLE TO PERFORM THAT FUNCTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.