Narrative:

On extended downwind turn to final at 3000 ft to 2500 ft MSL; the stick shaker was actuated while slowing to 170 KIAS without flaps extended. ATC had asked for an airspeed increase of 10 knots from 200 to 210 KIAS while on downwind at 3000 ft MSL. At 10 to 15 miles on downwind ATC asked if we could identify another aircraft turning to final and the airfield. I responded (pm) with a response of 'we would have to get lower due to a cloud bank we are getting ready to enter'. After this comment; ATC asked us to descend to 2500 ft MSL; slow to 170 KIAS; and turn a base/continuous turn to intercept a visual final to runway 24 at bdl. Our autothrottle had been MEL'd earlier in the day for being inoperative. The PF reduced power to begin the descent and slow and used 20 to 30 aob (angle of bank). I believe the throttles remained back towards idle as the PF began leveling at 2500 ft MSL. I noticed the stick shaker and speed tape at approximately 175-170 KIAS during the leveling turn and immediately added flaps 5 and informed the PF of what was occurring. The PF added power to correct the trend and the event lasted no more than 3 seconds.I was assuming the PF intended to add flaps and start configuring upon rolling out on final and I failed to properly monitor the fact the power was not being added as we were rolling out on final; and I was looking out the window to identify the traffic and airfield in front of us. I did not expect to ever have any approach to stall issues at 170 KIAS and a clean configuration. I should have questioned the PF in regards to intent to configure upon being given the 210 to 170 KIAS airspeed request from ATC as we were simultaneously given a turn from downwind to final and a descent. Reviewing approach to stall numbers at different configurations and aobs should be reviewed during the review of numbers for landing. That is standard practice for other airframes. Being extra vigilant on throttle settings when the autothrottle is inoperative is a must as well. The incident was handled expeditiously and without any further issues.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported receiving a stick shaker during approach while slowing to 170 knots with autothrottles MEL'ed and the flaps up at 2500 feet.

Narrative: On extended downwind turn to final at 3000 ft to 2500 ft MSL; the stick shaker was actuated while slowing to 170 KIAS without flaps extended. ATC had asked for an airspeed increase of 10 knots from 200 to 210 KIAS while on downwind at 3000 ft MSL. At 10 to 15 miles on downwind ATC asked if we could identify another aircraft turning to final and the airfield. I responded (PM) with a response of 'we would have to get lower due to a cloud bank we are getting ready to enter'. After this comment; ATC asked us to descend to 2500 ft MSL; slow to 170 KIAS; and turn a base/continuous turn to intercept a visual final to runway 24 at BDL. Our autothrottle had been MEL'd earlier in the day for being INOP. The PF reduced power to begin the descent and slow and used 20 to 30 AOB (Angle of Bank). I believe the throttles remained back towards idle as the PF began leveling at 2500 ft MSL. I noticed the stick shaker and speed tape at approximately 175-170 KIAS during the leveling turn and immediately added flaps 5 and informed the PF of what was occurring. The PF added power to correct the trend and the event lasted no more than 3 seconds.I was assuming the PF intended to add flaps and start configuring upon rolling out on final and I failed to properly monitor the fact the power was not being added as we were rolling out on final; and I was looking out the window to identify the traffic and airfield in front of us. I did not expect to ever have any approach to stall issues at 170 KIAS and a clean configuration. I should have questioned the PF in regards to intent to configure upon being given the 210 to 170 KIAS airspeed request from ATC as we were simultaneously given a turn from downwind to final and a descent. Reviewing approach to stall numbers at different configurations and AOBs should be reviewed during the review of numbers for landing. That is standard practice for other airframes. Being extra vigilant on throttle settings when the autothrottle is INOP is a must as well. The incident was handled expeditiously and without any further issues.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.