Narrative:

During approach into iah; thunderstorms and heavy rain were in the vicinity of the airport during the approach phase. I was acting as pilot flying and had briefed the approach while making considerations for the weather. [The] captain and I discussed and reviewed the windshear escape profile in the event that a windshear event occurred because we had noted preceding aircraft making reports of gusty winds. During the approach heavy rain was encountered. The approach lights remained in sight until approximately minimums (200 AGL) at which time several things occurred simultaneously: ATC reported a windshear alert; minimums were reached; and the visibility was reduced to near zero and visual contact was lost with the runway. At that time I announced go around and hit toga while [the] captain simultaneously announced the same and also advanced the thrust. During this time neither of us was certain which runway had been announced as a windshear alert; as there was very little time to decipher and react. My perception of the event was that the thrust was advanced to max; due to the autopilot and autothrottles disconnecting in accordance to system logic. As I was pilot flying; I continued to hand fly the aircraft and began making call outs to configure the aircraft. No windshear indication was given by the aircraft's systems but the report from ATC had warranted immediate action for the go around causing a slight delay in my response to reconfigure the aircraft. During this time [the] captain responded to my calls while handling ATC and attempting to interpret the radar for an appropriate go around heading. This was a very high workload time and I overshot my assigned go around altitude by 200 ft. I noted the deviation and returned to the assigned altitude of 3000 ft and called for re-engagement of the auto pilot. We completed our checklists and came around for a second successful approach. I had not perceived that the throttles could have gone to max until the next day; having spoken to another pilot about the event who encouraged me to submit an as soon as possible report.my perception was that the captain advanced the thrust in response to ATC's windshear alert despite receiving no indication from the aircraft's systems. A go around was warranted regardless because at minimums the visibility was reduced to zero by the rain and I had initiated a callout that I was going around. The biggest issue that I have was the captain's control inputs without calling for control of the airplane while I was pilot flying. The advancement of the thrust either went to max or a thrust lever angle disagreement occurred due to two pilots simultaneously attempting to fly the go around. The disconnection of the autopilot and auto throttles lead to initial disorientation on my part while performing my pilot flying duties during a critical phase of flight. While I understand that the situation was extremely complex with multiple simultaneous inputs; the captain could have called for the airplane which would have caused less confusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 First Officer reported overshooting charted altitude during a go-around from a low visibility approach.

Narrative: During approach into IAH; thunderstorms and heavy rain were in the vicinity of the airport during the approach phase. I was acting as pilot flying and had briefed the approach while making considerations for the weather. [The] Captain and I discussed and reviewed the windshear escape profile in the event that a windshear event occurred because we had noted preceding aircraft making reports of gusty winds. During the approach heavy rain was encountered. The approach lights remained in sight until approximately minimums (200 AGL) at which time several things occurred simultaneously: ATC reported a windshear alert; minimums were reached; and the visibility was reduced to near zero and visual contact was lost with the runway. At that time I announced Go Around and hit TOGA while [the] Captain simultaneously announced the same and also advanced the thrust. During this time neither of us was certain which runway had been announced as a windshear alert; as there was very little time to decipher and react. My perception of the event was that the thrust was advanced to max; due to the autopilot and autothrottles disconnecting in accordance to system logic. As I was pilot flying; I continued to hand fly the aircraft and began making call outs to configure the aircraft. No windshear indication was given by the aircraft's systems but the report from ATC had warranted immediate action for the go around causing a slight delay in my response to reconfigure the aircraft. During this time [the] Captain responded to my calls while handling ATC and attempting to interpret the radar for an appropriate go around heading. This was a very high workload time and I overshot my assigned go around altitude by 200 ft. I noted the deviation and returned to the assigned altitude of 3000 ft and called for re-engagement of the auto pilot. We completed our checklists and came around for a second successful approach. I had not perceived that the throttles could have gone to max until the next day; having spoken to another pilot about the event who encouraged me to submit an ASAP report.My perception was that the Captain advanced the thrust in response to ATC's windshear alert despite receiving no indication from the aircraft's systems. A go around was warranted regardless because at minimums the visibility was reduced to zero by the rain and I had initiated a callout that I was going around. The biggest issue that I have was the Captain's control inputs without calling for control of the airplane while I was pilot flying. The advancement of the thrust either went to max or a thrust lever angle disagreement occurred due to two pilots simultaneously attempting to fly the go around. The disconnection of the autopilot and auto throttles lead to initial disorientation on my part while performing my pilot flying duties during a critical phase of flight. While I understand that the situation was extremely complex with multiple simultaneous inputs; the Captain could have called for the airplane which would have caused less confusion.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.