Narrative:

We were descending on VFR on top from 12500 MSL. Center had advised us of IFR traffic at 9000 MSL, 1 O'clock, southbound. The traffic was an small transport jet with approach lights on. I spotted the aircraft and advised ATC as such. My first officer was of south american background having trouble understanding english. The first officer was constantly missing radio calls and having difficulty in understanding the instrument approach we were about to do. We were to the point the first officer was a distraction rather than help. I was keeping an eye on the small transport and estimated it would pass off well to our rear. The first officer failed to call the back course localizer alive and was calling out wrong MDA numbers. While shepherding the first officer along and glancing at his HSI for course interception, I had lost sight of the small transport Y flight path. Looking up I realized the small transport was closing much too close. I leveled off at about 9200' AGL and started a slight left turn. The small transport spotted us and started a left turn. The first officer looked up and gave a cry. The small transport asked about the traffic passing overhead. I apologized to the small transport. This incident was my error because I allowed cockpit distrs to let us get too close to the traffic. In the future I will start a new first officer earlier in the descent checklist and approach review, stay on a hard IFR clearance (no on top) and try to maintain continuous outside contact.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC AT NIGHT. ACFT X ON VFR ON TOP DESCENT AND ACFT Y OPPOSITE DIRECTION IFR.

Narrative: WE WERE DESCENDING ON VFR ON TOP FROM 12500 MSL. CENTER HAD ADVISED US OF IFR TFC AT 9000 MSL, 1 O'CLOCK, SBND. THE TFC WAS AN SMT JET WITH APCH LIGHTS ON. I SPOTTED THE ACFT AND ADVISED ATC AS SUCH. MY F/O WAS OF SOUTH AMERICAN BACKGROUND HAVING TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING ENGLISH. THE F/O WAS CONSTANTLY MISSING RADIO CALLS AND HAVING DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE INSTRUMENT APCH WE WERE ABOUT TO DO. WE WERE TO THE POINT THE F/O WAS A DISTR RATHER THAN HELP. I WAS KEEPING AN EYE ON THE SMT AND ESTIMATED IT WOULD PASS OFF WELL TO OUR REAR. THE F/O FAILED TO CALL THE BC LOC ALIVE AND WAS CALLING OUT WRONG MDA NUMBERS. WHILE SHEPHERDING THE F/O ALONG AND GLANCING AT HIS HSI FOR COURSE INTERCEPTION, I HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE SMT Y FLT PATH. LOOKING UP I REALIZED THE SMT WAS CLOSING MUCH TOO CLOSE. I LEVELED OFF AT ABOUT 9200' AGL AND STARTED A SLIGHT LEFT TURN. THE SMT SPOTTED US AND STARTED A LEFT TURN. THE F/O LOOKED UP AND GAVE A CRY. THE SMT ASKED ABOUT THE TFC PASSING OVERHEAD. I APOLOGIZED TO THE SMT. THIS INCIDENT WAS MY ERROR BECAUSE I ALLOWED COCKPIT DISTRS TO LET US GET TOO CLOSE TO THE TFC. IN THE FUTURE I WILL START A NEW F/O EARLIER IN THE DSCNT CHECKLIST AND APCH REVIEW, STAY ON A HARD IFR CLRNC (NO ON TOP) AND TRY TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS OUTSIDE CONTACT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.