Narrative:

This was only the second time I have flown into dca as a captain and the second time I have flown the river visual to 19. Since I had a fairly new first officer; I decided I would be pilot flying for this leg. During cruise flight we briefed the frdmm arrival and the river visual 19 and highlighted all the important information. This flight was delayed due to a ground stop to dca. There was a line of weather between [departure airport] and dca and it was affecting the east coast. After about an hour on the ground; we were on our way to dca.after bucko washington center gave us a 'descend via' clearance. Between honnr and pldge; we requested deviations for weather. We were deviating right for weather direct pldge when able. As we were about to descend through FL250; washington center asked if we were direct pldge yet and we responded no. Center amended our altitude and said maintain FL250. I turned off the autopilot and leveled the aircraft at FL250. Soon he gave us FL220 and turned direct to pldge; but center still wanted us meet the restriction at pldge between 17;000 and 15;000. We told center we will unable to do that now because of the change in altitude assignment. Center was not happy. We would have had to descend at 5;000 FPM to comply with that restriction. I told center we could give him 3;000 FPM. Center then said to descend and maintain 14;000. Washington center transferred us to potomac approach who gave us descend via clearance again and stated we would be okay if we were high on the next few fixes. We didn't have any issue meeting the rest of the restrictions on the arrival.somewhere along the way we either had a controller change or a frequency for approach change because the controller's voice was different. We began getting vectored for the river approach and lower altitudes; but the controllers had not slowed us down. Approach turned us in early and cleared us for the river visual 19 and began slowing us. So I began to hand fly the aircraft to slow and get configured. The controller gave us 170 knots and then shortly 150 knots. I decided to use the flight spoilers to help slow down and was focused on flying down the middle of the river to avoid the P56A and B restricted areas; maintaining a proper descent to the runway and maintaining proper airspeed. I was so focused on those things that after we were fully configured for landing and on glide path; I forget to stow the flight spoilers. My first officer did not notice they were still out. The aircraft flight spoiler warning sounded and I immediately stowed the flight spoilers.I felt like I was having to work harder than I thought I should on the approach; but was so focused on the glide path and restricted areas; I had not noticed that I was adding more power than usual because I was hand flying; watching my glide path and vertical path; not my power setting. When we were lined up on final for the runway; I was on glide path; and airspeed and continued to landing. On landing the thrust reversers did not deploy. After discussing that with first officer; I was told I didn't call for the landing check. I don't remember if I did or didn't; but I do remember that landing check was not run. Our landing data received didn't require thrust reversers; but I know normal procedures require the use of them. Since the thrust reversers were not used the brakes did warm a little more than usual to 7 and 8; but cooled down to normal limits before we departed.the threats were many and I thought we discussed them in cruise. We talked about the frdmm arrival and all the altitude and speed restrictions; the river visual 19 and its associated threats and that this airport was new to both of us. We discussed the weather in route. Washington center stopped our descent causing us to be high on the arrival which caused us to have to work harder to get back on the arrival. I should have asked for slower from potomac approach earlier to be configured so not to have to use the flight spoilers to slow down. Having the flight spoilers out that low was an error and undesired aircraft state. Forgetting to call for and/or run the landing check could have had much worst consequences if we had not been fully configured or if the runway data required thrust reversers.I will take more time to brief the arrivals and especially the river visual 19 or other approaches similar to that with more clarity and what is expected from both of us if we stray from procedures. I would also challenge my first officers to be more assertive when it comes to checklists; especially if I am pilot flying and forget to call for a checklist. I believe the first officers should at least ask if I would like a checklist ran rather than not do it. I would also brief things like if I leave the flight spoilers out and my hand is not on the handle; ask if I am still using the flight spoilers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported some deviations from SOP on the River Visual 19 arrival to DCA.

Narrative: This was only the second time I have flown into DCA as a Captain and the second time I have flown the River Visual to 19. Since I had a fairly new First Officer; I decided I would be pilot flying for this leg. During cruise flight we briefed the FRDMM Arrival and the River Visual 19 and highlighted all the important information. This flight was delayed due to a ground stop to DCA. There was a line of weather between [departure airport] and DCA and it was affecting the East Coast. After about an hour on the ground; we were on our way to DCA.After BUCKO Washington Center gave us a 'descend via' clearance. Between HONNR and PLDGE; we requested deviations for weather. We were deviating right for weather direct PLDGE when able. As we were about to descend through FL250; Washington Center asked if we were direct PLDGE yet and we responded no. Center amended our altitude and said maintain FL250. I turned off the autopilot and leveled the aircraft at FL250. Soon he gave us FL220 and turned direct to PLDGE; but Center still wanted us meet the restriction at PLDGE between 17;000 and 15;000. We told Center we will unable to do that now because of the change in altitude assignment. Center was not happy. We would have had to descend at 5;000 FPM to comply with that restriction. I told Center we could give him 3;000 FPM. Center then said to descend and maintain 14;000. Washington Center transferred us to Potomac Approach who gave us descend via clearance again and stated we would be okay if we were high on the next few fixes. We didn't have any issue meeting the rest of the restrictions on the arrival.Somewhere along the way we either had a controller change or a frequency for approach change because the controller's voice was different. We began getting vectored for the River Approach and lower altitudes; but the controllers had not slowed us down. Approach turned us in early and cleared us for the River Visual 19 and began slowing us. So I began to hand fly the aircraft to slow and get configured. The controller gave us 170 knots and then shortly 150 knots. I decided to use the flight spoilers to help slow down and was focused on flying down the middle of the river to avoid the P56A and B restricted areas; maintaining a proper descent to the runway and maintaining proper airspeed. I was so focused on those things that after we were fully configured for landing and on glide path; I forget to stow the flight spoilers. My First Officer did not notice they were still out. The aircraft flight spoiler warning sounded and I immediately stowed the flight spoilers.I felt like I was having to work harder than I thought I should on the approach; but was so focused on the glide path and restricted areas; I had not noticed that I was adding more power than usual because I was hand flying; watching my glide path and vertical path; not my power setting. When we were lined up on final for the runway; I was on glide path; and airspeed and continued to landing. On landing the thrust reversers did not deploy. After discussing that with First Officer; I was told I didn't call for the landing check. I don't remember if I did or didn't; but I do remember that landing check was not run. Our landing data received didn't require thrust reversers; but I know normal procedures require the use of them. Since the thrust reversers were not used the brakes did warm a little more than usual to 7 and 8; but cooled down to normal limits before we departed.The threats were many and I thought we discussed them in cruise. We talked about the FRDMM Arrival and all the altitude and speed restrictions; the River Visual 19 and its associated threats and that this airport was new to both of us. We discussed the weather in route. Washington Center stopped our descent causing us to be high on the arrival which caused us to have to work harder to get back on the arrival. I should have asked for slower from Potomac approach earlier to be configured so not to have to use the flight spoilers to slow down. Having the flight spoilers out that low was an error and undesired aircraft state. Forgetting to call for and/or run the landing check could have had much worst consequences if we had not been fully configured or if the runway data required thrust reversers.I will take more time to brief the arrivals and especially the River Visual 19 or other approaches similar to that with more clarity and what is expected from both of us if we stray from procedures. I would also challenge my First Officers to be more assertive when it comes to checklists; especially if I am pilot flying and forget to call for a checklist. I believe the First officers should at least ask if I would like a checklist ran rather than not do it. I would also brief things like if I leave the flight spoilers out and my hand is not on the handle; ask if I am still using the flight spoilers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.