Narrative:

The aircraft that we were to take had the right cursor on MEL. I had flown this aircraft a few days earlier and had maintenance repair the cursor issue prior to my acceptance. Maintenance initially said that they didn't have a replacement part; nor was there a replacement aircraft. I told them that I'd refuse the aircraft because; even though it was MEL'd; I felt that its inoperative status put undue workload on the crew if events should require emergency action. We have not specifically trained to fly in such situations. The cursor operates the electronic checklists and other related communication functions. It's MEL status took away a redundancy safety barrier. It limited use of cockpit resource management and placed the crew in a non-normal situation ever under a normal flight conditions. I felt that under non-normal; or emergency flight situations that this could lead to crew confusion and place the crew into the red safety matrix. The cursor was replaced by maintenance and it operated normally. Several days later I was assigned the same aircraft. It still had the cursor MEL'd. The cursor failed again within just a few flights. This time I felt that there was another underlying maintenance issue causing this failure. I refused the aircraft. We were given another aircraft and flew several hours late with no issues. The next day I met with the inbound crew. They informed me that on their aircraft; the aircraft that I was assigned to fly out that night; that the left cursor was under MEL. I had flown this aircraft several days earlier and it had the left cursor MEL'd as too sensitive but still functioned. Now the cursor was completely inoperative. I called and asked to discuss this situation with my chief pilot. This aircraft had been MEL'd for several days and no maintenance trouble shooting to fix this issue had been done. They kept throwing this issue on the backs of the line pilots. I was not keen to be placed into this situation again and again. My chief pilot called and I began to explain my concerns with the situation that they put me in. He totally ignored these and informed me that other line pilots had accepted the aircraft with the MEL'd item. I stood by my convictions and told [the] captain that I was outside the green on the safety matrix with this ongoing issue. I felt intimidated and out of the loop with regards to how this would develop. I didn't get much rest and I occasionally checked my schedule to see what; if anything; they had in line for me.... No changes. The crew arrived at the airplane and the agent told me that it was full. The flight attendant had a 5 month old baby that he had to get home to see. I felt huge pressure. My chief pilot had placed me in this situation with no support; only threats and intimidation. I spoke at length to the maintenance personnel. They shared my concerns that there were additional issues effecting the cursor. They had trouble shot the issue and found that the aims computer channel had failed and took out the elms computer and the L-1 door lock; which by the way as inoperative on the other aircraft; and the left cursor. They had noticed maintenance to this problem earlier and maintenance choose to ignore their advise and continue to operate this aircraft on the MEL rather than fix it. Maintenance kept focusing on the cursor itself. I then spoke in depth with my crew and caved to the pressure from my chief pilot to fly this aircraft. I signed fit for duty even though I was fit to be tied. Knowing that the cursor was not the faulting issue gave me some relief. I gambled that we'd have no enroute issues -- we didn't. Even under normal flight conditions operating this aircraft at times was confusing. I feel ashamed that I allowed the management of this major airline to intimidate a fairly senior captain and to use pilot pushing tactics of my supervisor. I feel that this justified his tactics to be used on other line pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 Captain reported company pressure to accept an aircraft with repetitive cursor functionality issues.

Narrative: The aircraft that we were to take had the right cursor on MEL. I had flown this aircraft a few days earlier and had maintenance repair the cursor issue prior to my acceptance. Maintenance initially said that they didn't have a replacement part; nor was there a replacement aircraft. I told them that I'd refuse the aircraft because; even though it was MEL'd; I felt that its inoperative status put undue workload on the crew if events should require emergency action. We have not specifically trained to fly in such situations. The cursor operates the electronic checklists and other related communication functions. It's MEL status took away a redundancy safety barrier. It limited use of cockpit resource management and placed the crew in a non-normal situation ever under a normal flight conditions. I felt that under non-normal; or emergency flight situations that this could lead to crew confusion and place the crew into the red safety matrix. The cursor was replaced by maintenance and it operated normally. Several days later I was assigned the same aircraft. It still had the cursor MEL'd. The cursor failed again within just a few flights. This time I felt that there was another underlying maintenance issue causing this failure. I refused the aircraft. We were given another aircraft and flew several hours late with no issues. The next day I met with the inbound crew. They informed me that on their aircraft; the aircraft that I was assigned to fly out that night; that the left cursor was under MEL. I had flown this aircraft several days earlier and it had the left cursor MEL'd as too sensitive but still functioned. Now the cursor was completely inoperative. I called and asked to discuss this situation with my chief pilot. This aircraft had been MEL'd for several days and no maintenance trouble shooting to fix this issue had been done. They kept throwing this issue on the backs of the line pilots. I was not keen to be placed into this situation again and again. My chief pilot called and I began to explain my concerns with the situation that they put me in. He totally ignored these and informed me that other line pilots had accepted the aircraft with the MEL'd item. I stood by my convictions and told [the] captain that I was outside the green on the safety matrix with this ongoing issue. I felt intimidated and out of the loop with regards to how this would develop. I didn't get much rest and I occasionally checked my schedule to see what; if anything; they had in line for me.... no changes. The crew arrived at the airplane and the agent told me that it was full. The Flight Attendant had a 5 month old baby that he had to get home to see. I felt huge pressure. My chief pilot had placed me in this situation with no support; only threats and intimidation. I spoke at length to the maintenance personnel. They shared my concerns that there were additional issues effecting the cursor. They had trouble shot the issue and found that the AIMS computer channel had failed and took out the ELMS computer and the L-1 door lock; which by the way as inoperative on the other aircraft; and the left cursor. They had noticed maintenance to this problem earlier and maintenance choose to ignore their advise and continue to operate this aircraft on the MEL rather than fix it. Maintenance kept focusing on the cursor itself. I then spoke in depth with my crew and caved to the pressure from my chief pilot to fly this aircraft. I signed fit for duty even though I was fit to be tied. Knowing that the cursor was not the faulting issue gave me some relief. I gambled that we'd have no enroute issues -- we didn't. Even under normal flight conditions operating this aircraft at times was confusing. I feel ashamed that I allowed the management of this major airline to intimidate a fairly senior captain and to use pilot pushing tactics of my supervisor. I feel that this justified his tactics to be used on other line pilots.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.