Narrative:

My most recent 7 day tour completed with 82 hrs and 20 min of duty. We began day 5 having completed 59 hr 12 min of duty; and finished day 6 with 72 hr 47 min of duty. At the end of day six we were assigned a passenger trip. Thunderstorms were omnipresent. After multiple ATC delays; holds and reroutes; we landed at approximately 12.5 hrs of duty for the day and 71 hrs of duty for the week; at dusk; flying an IFR approach into an uncontrolled airport in a mountainous region navigating around thunderstorms to a short runway. With 12 years here; I can count on one hand; with fingers to spare; how many times I've flown into [this airport]. Scheduling then assigned a 10 hr rest for 2 more flights and an airline home on day 7. At this point we were clearly fatigued; and made the necessary call at the end of day 6. Why was a 10 hr turn and multiple legs even an option for scheduling after we've put in 72 hrs of duty in 6 days? It seems risk mitigation and responsibility falls entirely on the crew. In nine out of my previous twelve 7-day non-training trips; cumulative duty time exceeded 60 hours of duty on the sixth day of my 7 day trip; often early on day 6. This would not have been legal in the airline world; and it seems the 60 hrs in 7 days duty limit is even more prudent in the fractional world. The number of schedule changes crews receive continues to be significant. During my most current trip; I had 69 different schedules in 7 days. One of which was an as soon as possible trip for a passenger whose child had a severe nut allergy requiring all nut products removed from the aircraft and the aircraft to be professionally cleaned. Guess who caught that one? Yep; the crew.how is it that an airline; under part 121 and subsequently 117; is limited to only 60hrs of duty in a 168 hr period (7 days)? The airlines autopilot fly one radar-vectored ILS to another on routes they know to destinations they know. With that familiarity (and safety factor) they are limited to 60 hrs of duty. Meanwhile [company]; is operating all over the world to all kinds of airports; many new to the crews on a regular basis; and with almost no duty limit. That duty limit is only bound by the judgment of the crew in the moment. Considering studies have shown that the effects of fatigue are comparable to impairment due to alcohol; the crew 'in the moment' does not seem to be the best source for that judgment call. Furthermore the retort; and excuse of 'you can always fatigue' has long since overstayed its welcome. This is a systemic problem and rational solutions exist. Furthermore; [company] has touted it's 'fatigue mitigation program' for years; yet my fatigue call was number 39;XXX; almost 40;000 fatigue calls and there is still no proactive solution.when reviewing far part 117; as compared to our scheduling practices; I am concerned especially concerning the scope and breadth of this operation. The FAA needs to implement the 60 hr duty limit to part 135 and part 91 with all due urgency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain of a fractional operation commented on fatigue issues with scheduling flight crews in 135 and 91 operations.

Narrative: My most recent 7 day tour completed with 82 hrs and 20 min of duty. We began day 5 having completed 59 hr 12 min of duty; and finished day 6 with 72 hr 47 min of duty. At the end of day six we were assigned a passenger trip. Thunderstorms were omnipresent. After multiple ATC delays; holds and reroutes; we landed at approximately 12.5 hrs of duty for the day and 71 hrs of duty for the week; at dusk; flying an IFR approach into an uncontrolled airport in a mountainous region navigating around thunderstorms to a short runway. With 12 years here; I can count on one hand; with fingers to spare; how many times I've flown into [this airport]. Scheduling then assigned a 10 hr rest for 2 more flights and an airline home on day 7. At this point we were CLEARLY fatigued; and made the necessary call at the end of day 6. Why was a 10 hr turn and multiple legs even an option for scheduling after we've put in 72 hrs of duty in 6 days? It seems risk mitigation and responsibility falls entirely on the crew. In nine out of my previous twelve 7-day non-training trips; cumulative duty time exceeded 60 hours of duty on the sixth day of my 7 day trip; often early on day 6. This would not have been legal in the airline world; and it seems the 60 hrs in 7 days duty limit is even more prudent in the fractional world. The number of schedule changes crews receive continues to be significant. During my most current trip; I had 69 different schedules in 7 days. One of which was an ASAP trip for a passenger whose child had a severe nut allergy requiring all nut products removed from the aircraft and the aircraft to be professionally cleaned. Guess who caught that one? Yep; the crew.How is it that an airline; under part 121 and subsequently 117; is limited to only 60hrs of duty in a 168 hr period (7 days)? The airlines autopilot fly one radar-vectored ILS to another on routes they know to destinations they know. With that familiarity (and safety factor) they are limited to 60 hrs of duty. Meanwhile [Company]; is operating all over the world to all kinds of airports; many new to the crews on a regular basis; and with almost no duty limit. That duty limit is only bound by the judgment of the crew in the moment. Considering studies have shown that the effects of fatigue are comparable to impairment due to alcohol; the crew 'in the moment' does not seem to be the best source for that judgment call. Furthermore the retort; and excuse of 'you can always fatigue' has long since overstayed its welcome. This is a systemic problem and rational solutions exist. Furthermore; [Company] has touted it's 'Fatigue mitigation program' for years; yet my fatigue call was number 39;XXX; almost 40;000 fatigue calls and there is still no proactive solution.When reviewing FAR part 117; as compared to our scheduling practices; I am concerned especially concerning the scope and breadth of this operation. The FAA needs to implement the 60 hr duty limit to part 135 and part 91 with all due urgency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.